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THE THINGS WHICH ARE SEEN

A REVALUATION OF THE VISUAL ARTS

BY

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TO MY

FATHER

AND

MOTHER.

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INTRODUCTION.

This book does not partake of the character of an historical or academic treatise. It does not contain a long array of names of which not one man in a hundred has ever heard. In fact, it is not addressed to learned people in particular, but can readily be apprehended by everybody. There are no obscurities of language, no paradoxes and no flights of fancy in these pages; for, on account of the magnitude of the subject chosen, it was thought fitting to adopt a manner which is simple and grave.

The title was found by a strange chance. For a long time I had searched in vain for some concise heading which would include the whole scope and substance of the book. At last, what seemed the ideal phrase came to me unexpectedly in the form of a biblical quotation that a preacher, to whom I was listening one day, had introduced into his sermon. Ever and again he took occasion to tell the audience that it was a cardinal error to attach much importance to "the things which are seen." There are intangible spiritual things, he hinted, of more value than these and, in fact,

having very little connection with them. The material world appeared to him not to be the expression of the spiritual, but something almost antagonistic to it, a gaudy show and an illusion by which we must on no account be deceived. Was there not in his philosophy any room for art? That was the question which presented itself to me. Obviously, his disrespect for "the things which are seen" was not due to a blindness to form in general. His sermon bore traces of careful arrangement, while his language was based upon the language of the Old and New Testaments and reflected the splendid literary colour, the strength and severity of his model. He showed himself to be a master of that chaste and vigorous biblical English which fortunately has not yet been cheapened by too frequent use. No one, therefore, could say his mind was unsensitive or lacking in distinction, and when he blamed his hearers for their devotion to external things, his reproof could not be lightly ignored as if it had been uttered by a person incapable of valuing beauty of any kind; for he understood the beauty of the spoken word. That he included the visual arts, however, in his condemnation there was no room for doubt, as he was at special pains to affirm that even the most competent critics of a building or a picture resembled the proverbial rich man in that they had a very poor title indeed to enter the kingdom of heaven.

"The Things which are Seen" are sometimes held to be of low repute, because all the appurtenances of wealth and bodily comfort are placed in that category, and too much love of

wealth and bodily comfort is hurtful to the soul. But this was not the only reason why the preacher was so angry with those who set great store by outward semblances. The extreme frivolity of most of what is commonly designated as art, its pretentiousness, its limited scope, its narrow personal character and its total lack of any proper social function must be considered partly responsible for his attitude. Although he did not mention these blemishes individually, perhaps through not having fully analysed the cause of his repugnance, it is probable, nevertheless, that he was instinctively aware of them, and was moved thereby to Puritan disdain. But in spite of the fact that I am able to feel some sympathy with the preacher's views I have made bold to adopt as my title the phrase "The Things which are Seen," which in my eyes is not a term of opprobrium but, rather, a comprehensive description of what I regard with reverence and deem to be of the highest import. It may be suggested that I am laying myself open to the charge of worldliness, as if I took no cognizance of anything which cannot be sized up by a measuring-rod. I would say in answer to such an accusation that matter is not merely matter but is sometimes reflective of spirit, and there is a certain kind of material change which is the one and only token of spiritual change.

The nature of the spirituality inherent in "The Things which are Seen," its different degrees, and the means by which it can find expression will be discussed in the following pages. The subject is a wide one and a comprehensive treatment of

it is plainly impossible. Much will have been achieved if it has been invested with a few firm outlines.

The material world is not uniformly imbued with spirit. In parts of it, and such parts are, in extent, an almost infinitesimal fraction of the whole, obvious gradations of vitality are manifested; but the residue has the appearance of being quite dead. The highest stage of life known to us is the human, and of all physical forms the human is the most spiritual. If the human race were destroyed, the superior spirituality of which it is the incarnation would altogether cease to be; the universe would then have suffered an irreparable injury, for it would be like a creature suddenly deprived of one of its chief organs of sense.

"The Things which are Seen" may be grouped in three main classes, of which the first two comprise animate and inanimate nature. The former is especially precious and delicate; each separate unit of it is doubly blessed in that it has the gift of life and the gift of mortality: the latter is of coarser grain, tougher and more durable because the conditions of its existence are less complex. The third class is distinct from these two, but yet shares the characteristics of both. There is a method by which the inanimate, or, rather, a certain portion of it, can be made to display a kinship with the animate. It is silent and immobile, it does not eat nor drink nor propagate its kind, but still it is to some extent organic. In this case dead substance has been given form, a living agency has set its stamp upon

it, and it has become a work of art. Thus, spirit is not confined to the members of the animal and vegetable kingdoms; it also exists, though in a lesser degree, in everything which evinces the qualities of design.

The purpose of art is to enable spirit to declare itself in terms of matter, and the task of the artist does not consist merely in the creation of objects such as pictures, vases, tapestries, furniture, buildings or even whole cities; he should primarily devote his energies to the development and perfection of the human type, for this physical form of man is immeasurably more significant than the noblest achievement in architecture or painting or in any of the crafts. Man, in so far as he is an artist, cultivates his person, he imposes a special character upon his environment, but he does not attempt the impossible. For instance, he does not try to any great extent to direct the fortunes of creatures of a lower order than himself. Floriculture is an activity which deserves to be called æsthetic, as is also the breeding of horses, cows, dogs, cats, mice or chickens if some peculiar beauty of species be aimed at; for the most part, however, the artist must leave animals and plants to take care of themselves, and except where he uses them for decorative purposes, as in a house, park or garden, must be content to admire them in their native wildness.

This is the difference between natural science and art; both concern themselves with the material world, but while the one seeks only to understand " The Things which are Seen " the

other would control and modify them. Yet, not all such control and modification belong to the province of art; some changes are productive of ugliness and confusion, being the work of men who are energetic and industrious, indeed, but unacquainted with any proper standard of values. It is obvious, too, that mechanical inventions, powerful instruments of civilisation though these may become when regarded in their right perspective, do not of themselves conduce to a beautiful or dignified manner of existence. Some people, who, on looking out upon the world, find much there that they dislike, contend that too great a preoccupation with external things is the real source of mischief and that the only remedy is to take refuge in the inner life, in spiritual contemplation. But this is a counsel of cowardice and, moreover, it indicates a shallowness of mind. They know nothing of the spirit who despise " The Things which are Seen," for it is through the medium of " The Things which are Seen " that the spirit makes its most emphatic declaration. A thought is only half a thought if it does not end in a deed, and every deed results in a modification of the objective world. Nature herself testifies that an increase of mind or of sensitiveness in the member of a species is accompanied by profound and subtle changes in its form, which is vested with a new refinement.

What particular metamorphosis, then, of Man and his surroundings could be counted the true symbol of his spiritual growth? No answer to such an inquiry is possible until the æsthetic ideal is plainly defined. This ideal has never met with

much favour, for it is commonly supposed to conflict in some mysterious way with the moral ideal. Many people suppose that if they make virtue the end of their endeavours they will incidentally obtain everything else which is of genuine value.

Unfortunately the promise here implied is not always fulfilled; the "good" people, on whom so many gifts are showered, sometimes lack the gift of elegance and leave a trail of ugliness behind them. But when the artists cry "Seek beauty, and you will find virtue by the way" their opponents are not convinced. That is not surprising, for in this contest the artists have placed themselves under a double disadvantage; not only have they generally failed to acknowledge such truths as may underlie the good man's moral code (narrow though this may be), but they have never thought it necessary to formulate a rival system of their own, an intelligible æsthetic code. In fact, the good man is accustomed to win an easy victory; for while he may know little about beauty he himself is fully persuaded, and succeeds in persuading others, that he knows a great deal about virtue. He preaches morality and triumphs because he has clear opinions concerning it. The artists preach beauty, and with the same breath exclaim "What is beauty?" They vouchsafe no clue to the riddle, and the public fails to applaud; then they revile the public for its obtuseness! Yet the æsthetic ideal includes the moral as the greater includes the less, and it goes ill with every community which holds it in slight esteem. Obviously, however, people cannot become

enthusiastic about something which is utterly vague, and before one can hope that the quest for beauty may become general several changes must take place both in the common attitude towards art and in the conception of art itself. An attempt will be made in this book to indicate clearly what these necessary changes are.

In the first place it is desirable to arrange the arts in the order of their social importance. Unless this task be accomplished, the artist, devoid of any true sense of perspective, is in danger of incurring the contempt of his neighbours. Most of them will regard him as somewhat of a nonentity absorbed in an occupation which he imagines to be of much greater moment than it is; and even if they praise him there will be a note of patronage in their praise. Moreover the welfare and progress of the arts themselves are dependent upon the recognition of the comparative rank of each. Secondly, in art the form must be distinguished from the subject as it is in language. The latter could never have reached its present stage of development if the study of grammar had been confounded with that of literature. Grammar deals with verbal inflexions and with syntax, whereas in reading literature whether of fact or fiction one's thoughts are concentrated upon the meaning of the sentences rather than upon the machinery by which they are built up. Without grammar there can be no literature, but a grammarian is not always a man of letters. People often contend that as form and subject are indissolubly linked together it is useless to try to part them. Yet if one is to have

any knowledge of art such an act of dissection must be attempted, and it will be found by no means impossible, for the same objects can have many aspects each of which is capable of being apprehended separately.

According to one school of thought art is nothing but beautiful form. This is as much as to say that good literature is only a series of euphonious phrases which call up beautiful images and that the sense does not matter! But it is not enough that what is written should be written in a pleasant style; one must inquire whether it was worth committing to paper at all. Another school of thought, perhaps in a spirit of reaction from the former, professes to find the ideal of beauty unsatisfying and maintains that even ugliness is acceptable provided that it have significance and power. The presence of these qualities, however, is always dependent upon some formal relation. An orator may have a message of vast and terrible import, and he may succeed in delivering it, although lacking in what are usually called the graces of speech; but he is obliged to concern himself, just a little, with the proper arrangement of his theme and he must also show a slight acquaintance with grammar; otherwise he would be talking mere gibberish, and gibberish can never be sublime. Art, too, has a grammar, and the artist, no matter what lofty thoughts he may wish to convey, is quite inarticulate unless he is willing to study its precepts.

Besides these two changes in the ordinary attitude towards the visual arts—the changes which are implied in the acknowledgment of their

various degrees of social value and in their resolution into form and content—yet a third may be suggested. The æsthetic ideal will never find universal favour, nor will it deserve to do so, if art is supposed to be nothing but the mirror of the artist's peculiar temperament. The thing created must transcend its creator. For it will be found that the grammar of design is a fixed ordinance, as perfect and inevitable as are the living principles which control the shape of animals and plants; while the selection of a subject, so far from being the result of caprice, must to some extent be determined by the needs of society. When this fact is generally recognised a more cordial relation may be established between the artist and his neighbours. If he has an intelligible method he is not likely to incur the reputation of being a charlatan, a reputation which clings, not unjustly perhaps, to all who have not; and the more clearly he can explain that he is not aiming at the indulgence of an idiosyncracy but doing his utmost to perform a necessary social function the more probable is it that he will become a power in the state. The worship of self-expression, so flattering to the vanity of the artist, is really destructive of his influence.

The popular concept of art might with advantage undergo one other modification, but this is not exactly an addition to the first three for it is inherent in them all. It has reference to a habit common to many people who are held to speak with authority upon the present topic, the habit of sneering at the intellect. The contention that the creative faculty is made up of

imagination, feeling and taste and has little to do with brains, will not bear the test of criticism. The opposite of intellect is not taste but the lack of intellect—that is, stupidity; and a picture which shows no evidence of intellect must be condemned as a stupid picture, whatever emotional qualities its author may claim for himself.

The origin of this fashion can be easily traced. Everybody hates being scrutinised too closely, for it is not agreeable to have one's faults pointed out, especially in public. Hence a theory of æsthetics which effectively does away with all standards of judgment is certain to have plenty of advocates. How convenient it is for an architect, for instance, to be able to dispose of his detractors by saying that he himself has taste and that those who are inappreciative of his work have none! Then if they refuse to be silenced by this remark and proceed to specify a particular blemish in his building he can inform them that it is sacrilege to seek to analyse a work of art, for art is an affair not of intellect but of taste. Unfortunately, the matter cannot be allowed to rest there, because among those who describe themselves as artists there are innumerable impostors, and imposture can never be exposed except by means of reason. But it is not only the deceivers and mountebanks who speak slightingly of logic. Some quiet honest folk are of opinion that reason is harsh and cold and quite unfitted to cope with really vital problems. These emotionalist philosophers, who, by the way, are nearly always middle-aged, think that in exalting

instinct at the expense of intellect they are acquiring a certain skittishness, a spontaneity of expression such as belongs to childhood, apparently oblivious of the fact that the normal child, before his innate curiosity has been checked by the constant snubs of his elders who are generally too lazy to give proper answers to his questions, is above all else intensely logical, and clamours to be told the reasons for everything.

It is true that the intellect of man does not take within its vision the whole of life, but at least it embraces the whole range of philosophy, including the philosophy of art, if such there be. Whether I am able to show in the following pages that the nature of beauty is not utterly obscure and unfathomable but is one of the subjects which can be illumined by the processes of argument it will be for the reader to judge.

In the first part of this treatise the visual arts have been composed into a social hierarchy so that their human significance might be made manifest; the second part deals with the distinction between form and content, while the third is devoted to a consideration of the personality and status of the artist himself.

PART ONE.

THE HIERARCHY OF THE ARTS.

CHAPTER I.

The Order of Precedence.

The first of the visual arts is the art of the cultivation of human beauty, the second is the art of manners, the third is the art of dress, and the fourth is architecture; and then there are the minor arts of painting and sculpture.

If anyone be inclined to quarrel with the order given here, if he complain that it is wrong to place dress before architecture and that only a philistine would call painting and sculpture minor arts, he can easily be corrected; for this order of precedence, although it may give offence to many of those who are accustomed to arrogate to themselves the title of artists, can be shown to be in complete accord with the judgment of mankind, with that mature judgment which best finds its reflection in the opinions of *the average man*. But the reader, before assenting to any statement about the average man may rightly demand to have some more precise knowledge of him. What are the merits of this commonplace person that his alleged views or prejudices should be treated with so much respect, and—a more pertinent question still—when has he ever expressed himself, or, if incapable of self-expression, when has he ever

given authority to a particular individual to speak in his name? These two points must be considered separately. With reference to the first, suffice it for the present to say that we are compelled to defer to the average man because he is the upholder of society, and because the institutions of society have been created to supply his wants: but the second inquiry is not so easily answered. The being whom we are discussing, the human unit who embodies within himself the elementary virtues, who is distinguished by the sanity of thought and of conduct without which no community could exist, has not expounded his philosophy of life for our edification and he is without an official mouthpiece. In fact, he is inarticulate, just as society is inarticulate.

If society were self-explanatory there would be no need for sociologists and others to try to interpret it. Of course, there is such a thing as "public opinion," but this must on no account be confounded with the opinion of the average man. What at any special period is called public opinion is little more than the view of some dominant clique which has, for the nonce, succeeded in getting its phraseology adopted in common parlance; the peculiar phraseology, the catchwords accompanying the various "movements" which pass like ripples over the surface of society, are seldom used sincerely and with profound conviction. The vast majority of people, although they may profess allegiance to some popular ideal of the moment, go their own way undisturbedly, and their real preferences are shown, not by what they say or are taught to say

by their instructors, but by what they *do*. Hence it is by examining the deeds which men perform and the conventions which are in very truth established among them, that we can obtain an accurate idea both of society and of the average man.

This act of dispassionate observation is not easy unless, for the time at least, we dismiss from our minds all the political, æsthetic or religious doctrines that have hitherto been accepted, unless we put aside the burden of history with which educated people are so often weighed down, and concentrate upon the present with a direct and childlike vision. By this means alone it is possible to understand the things that are, and thus to gain the preliminary knowledge without which nobody is entitled to discuss the things that ought to be. Many who have sought to be reformers have adopted the attitude of a scold and have consequently failed to make any impression upon their neighbours. They did not recognise the wisdom underlying ordinary usages, and they condemned the conduct of others simply because it was at variance with some very doubtful maxims of their own. But when precept and practice disagree it is not always the practice which is at fault. Nothing is easier than to ridicule the habits of the average man, and to sneer at his grossness and lack of perception, but some of his views have their source in a tradition which is universal and permanent because founded upon reason. One may well hesitate, therefore, before venturing to question such valuations as have met with general acceptance.

Now, the word "artist" is commonly misused. As a rule when a man says he is going to be an artist it is immediately assumed that he intends to be a sculptor or a painter or a draughtsman of some kind. Painting and sculpture are called The Fine Arts, and the title suggests that they are held in great reverence. It is obvious, however, that most people devote very little thought to them. We are at liberty to suppose either that the average man is spiritually blind and altogether devoid of an artistic sense (and this is what a certain type of person is never tired of telling us), or else that he displays æsthetic faculties in his appreciation of other arts which he deems more important than painting or sculpture. The first alternative will be rejected by everyone who shrinks from trying to dispose of a highly complex matter in too summary a fashion; on the other hand the second may be recommended for our acceptance not only because it is in accord with the dictates of intellectual caution but because it opens up what may perhaps prove to be a fruitful field of inquiry.

Three distinct propositions will be maintained in the course of the following argument. In the first place it will be urged that the order in which the visual arts were disposed at the head of this chapter is their natural and proper order, the order of precedence that must scrupulously be observed by artists, if they are to have a regard for the highest welfare of society; secondly, evidence will be produced to show that this order reflects the scale of values which ordinary men and women, whatever they may be persuaded to *say*,

in point of fact really do uphold; thirdly, by an analysis of each of the arts in turn, I shall attempt to prove that success cannot be achieved in any single one of them unless the artist is willing to recognise this same order of precedence.

In estimating the social value of the arts it will be of advantage to make use of the very common logical method by which a part of something is deducted from the whole in order that its true relation to that whole may be made clear. After the act of abstraction the residue is examined and it is then realised to what extent the thing has been injured by the removal of one of its constituent elements. For instance, if I wished to find out the effect of yeast upon bread I should make two loaves, identical in every respect except that the first was leavened and the second not. Then by comparing them one with the other I might gain a certain amount of knowledge both about yeast and about bread. This method of abstraction cannot always be applied in the same rigid way as in the exact sciences, but even in dealing with human affairs it is frequently of great service.

Let us consider the art of the cultivation of human beauty, the art which has been designated here as "the first of the visual arts." It will help us to measure the scope and significance of this art if we try to conceive the state of things which would arise if its claims were ignored. Imagine a society composed of citizens who were one and all devoted to painting and sculpture, who had inherited fine cities in which to live, who were exquisitely dressed and whose personal habits were without a fault. If these same citizens,

however, owing to a culpable neglect of the means of physical development, were all extremely hideous, exhibiting every possible deformity of face and figure, would we not say that the best was lacking in such a community, that all its excellences could by no means atone for its one conspicuous defect? Contrast with this a society whose members cared little for elegance except the elegance of their own splendid selves, a society devoid of the secondary attributes of civilisation but still a pleasant place because it was the home of lovely children and superbly handsome men and women. It is obvious that the latter is not only the healthier of the two but also the more clear-sighted. For all other sorts of beauty are as dross in comparison with the beauty of the human body, and an abhorrence of ugliness in men and women is a surer sign of an artistic nature than is the ability to criticise a picture or a building.

Let us next refer to manners. The visual art of manners consists in a determination to avoid becoming an offence to others. Of course, if one is by birth misshapen one's very existence is an impropriety, but at least it is possible to abstain from aggravating this fault by a slovenly and indecent demeanour. The average man, whether he confesses it or not, attaches the highest importance to manners, and he shows this by his actions. If people eat in a disagreeable way, or distress their neighbours by other objectionable gaucheries, they are punished by being kept down in the social scale. It is idle for sentimental folk to rail at such a state of things, to call it caste prejudice and the like. We shall be judged

by these small matters until the end of time, for the instinct which leads us to appraise them so highly is planted deep in human nature. In whatever station a man may be placed, unless he belong to the very lowest rank of all, he will have acquaintances whose personal habits grate upon him to such an extent that he will have little to do with them. This attitude, so far from being reprehensible, is to be commended, as it is indicative of an æsthetic sensibility, which is not confined to a few favoured aristocrats but is present in various degrees throughout the whole of society. It is more necessary to maintain a high standard of manners than to attend to what is popularly known as "art." If men and women are themselves vulgar, the only message which they can cause to issue from stone or canvas will also be vulgar, and not only vulgar but *stupid*. It will be a *stupid* message because its authors will unconsciously have revealed the fact that they have never reflected upon the nature of the relationship subsisting between the arts, nor realised that if we fail to show a nicety of judgment in the way we deal with our own bodies, which are more completely under our control than anything else in the world, it is extremely unlikely that we can achieve a very fine result in those remoter fields of artistic activity where a thousand difficulties and obstructions prevent us from giving free expression to such talent as we may possess.

Yet personal beauty is far more important even than breeding, for it is a more solid possession. It would require a tremendous effort, a great social will steadfastly exercised for hundreds of years,

to make personal beauty a common thing; but a single generation of proper schooling would do much for the improvement of manners. To some sophisticated people a man who has breeding but no beauty appears preferable to one who has beauty but no breeding. This verdict might be justifiable if they confined their attention to individual cases, but it must not be allowed to translate itself into a general principle; as such it would be a false valuation which, if commonly accepted, would constitute a danger to society, for it might lead to a neglect of the physical basis upon which all human development must ultimately depend. The art of manners is an excellent thing, but when it usurps the first place in the hierarchy it becomes a burden and an offence.

Few people will be found to deny, however, that it has a legitimate priority over the art of dress. Most of us would rather be considered badly dressed than ill-bred, for the simple reason that dress is not in the same degree a part of ourselves as are our personal habits and our bodies. Besides, it does not require much effort to dress at least in a harmless conventional way. Another cause which will always contribute to prevent the art of dress from being esteemed as highly as the first two is that dress, unlike beauty and breeding, is to some extent a matter of money. It is unfortunately the case that elegant garments as a rule cost more than those which are badly made, so clothes are seldom a true reflection of the taste of the man or woman who wears them. But although it is possible to devote too much attention

to clothes, the art of dress is yet fraught with great significance; and just because its range is so strictly limited, it has the merit of being the best understood and by far the most mature of all the visual arts.

For every person who is capable of appreciating a building there are ten who take an interest in clothes and are qualified to judge accurately about them. This is only natural and proper, as architecture is further removed from us than is dress, and its existence is not so urgently necessary. The strength of our various desires is in some measure determined by the order in which they arose in the minds of our remote forefathers. Man delighted to decorate himself with beads long before he invented architecture. Dress is one of the elementary means of satisfying the artistic instinct, and the advance of civilisation has not deprived it of its place of honour. Even architects, who imagine that they are totally absorbed in their profession and who are accustomed to exalt its claims, would really far prefer to live in an ugly house than to go about with objectionable clothes; and they often show that, in spite of their devotion to architecture, they know less about it than they know about dress, for while their clothes are in the best of taste, the buildings for which they are responsible may be exceedingly vulgar. The reason of this is that vulgarity in a building is not so readily detected nor does it meet with such severe condemnation as vulgarity in dress. The raiment that we have on makes a more intimate appeal to us than any erection in stone or brick, for these

are hard, intractable materials which can only with the utmost difficulty be made reflective of human values.

But if we think more of dress than of architecture there can be little doubt that the place of our habitation, the character of the rooms we live in, the convenience and amenity of our native town or village concern us far more closely than do "The Fine Arts." Whilst few people have any opinions to offer about a drawing or a statue, everybody has a certain practical interest in houses and even in shops and public buildings. Architecture of some sort is a necessity for the health of the citizens and for their social life. In what sense, however, are painting and sculpture necessities? Could we not very well do without them altogether, and in the four major arts still find ample scope for the exercise of our gifts? Is not the reality of immeasurably greater worth than the reflection of reality, the beautiful person more significant than the beautiful portrait or bust, the fine city better than the fine sketch of a city? We all know what answer the average man would give to questions such as these. He is not likely to mistake the shadow for the substance.

It is a somewhat strange phenomenon, therefore, that painters and sculptors are allowed to make such extravagant claims for themselves, and to contend that if people turn away from them and their works then civilisation is imperilled. "The Fine Arts" are by no means the supreme symbol of culture, for there might easily be displayed a remarkably high standard of artistic attainment in a country where the perpetration of painting

and sculpture was absolutely forbidden. But although nobody would approve of such a harsh and unnecessary veto as that, there will be general agreement that since our bodies and our deportment are an integral part of ourselves whilst dress and architecture are at least indispensable accessories, it is advisable to make these our first consideration.

The fact is sometimes commented upon that the English people give but scanty support to "The Fine Arts," and it is inferred therefrom that the English are deficient in an æsthetic sense. This is a hasty and unwarrantable conclusion. It is true that on the occasion of the chief annual exhibition of pictures in London, the people who attend it act as if they were met for the sole purpose of taking part in an agreeable social function; they seem to regard the place as a fashionable resort and congregate there in order to admire each other rather than the pictures which are upon the walls. But there is no need to take it much to heart when critics scream with anguish on this account. While the vast majority of the exhibits have little bearing upon civilisation, being trivial in idea and mechanically executed, the spectators themselves are not unworthy of study; for there are many beautiful people in London. Thus the men and women whose behaviour at the gallery might seem to an uncritical observer to be inexcusably frivolous, are in reality displaying sound æsthetic judgment.

No disparagement of "The Fine Arts" is implied in the insistence upon these truths. It must be pointed out, however, that in an age of

printing and of photography some of the tasks which in former times were assigned to the painter have since been taken from him. Many famous pictures of the past but tell a story or point a moral and were made to perform these offices because of the rarity of books; and the majority of old portrait sketches are only valuable to us in so far as they are accurate representations of the subjects treated. But to those who practise "The Fine Arts" there is still left a legitimate social function, and the future prospects of painting and sculpture are discussed in a subsequent chapter. Sufficient has here been said to bring to a close the first stage of the argument in which I have asserted that the visual arts are arranged in a fixed hierarchy, and the existence of this natural sequence is both the cause and the justification of most of the æsthetic prejudices of the average man or woman.

Before proceeding to develop the present theme in greater detail, it is necessary to deal with an objection which will perhaps have already occurred to the reader. If people show by their conduct that, in spite of all the influences tending to upset their judgment, they do actually maintain the arts in their proper order of precedence, how is it they are so lacking in self-confidence that when they speak about "art" they seldom refer to the cultivation of human beauty and manners? In a previous paragraph I contended that in analysing the forces by which society is governed one must study particularly the things that people do without paying too much heed to what they say. But their words are also of some importance, and

if there is a discrepancy between men's professions and their real mode of life, this is a fact which, like other facts, requires an explanation. For everything which exists there is an adequate reason. I shall show presently that the first two of the major arts fail to receive verbal recognition because people are secretly *ashamed* of them. They are ashamed to proclaim that they value human beauty and manners so highly. This shame is due to a quite natural and excusable confusion of mind, and when this confusion is cleared up the hierarchy of the arts will be firmly established. The prestige both of dress and of architecture would be enhanced by such a change, but not unduly; for since our clothes and our buildings would be considered of less account than the healthiness and grace of our bodies, a devotion to the former could never be carried to the pitch at which it would become injurious to society; and as for painting and sculpture, it will not be difficult to prove that in a complete subservience to the other arts they will find their true mission.

CHAPTER II.

On the Cultivation of Human Beauty.

Everybody has a certain admiration for human beauty. It would be for the advantage of society, however, if people admired it even more than they do. Such a quickening of the artistic sense might lead to the abolition of the numerous social evils which have as their result the stunting and the mutilation of millions of human forms. How many people have had their frames warped by degrading kinds of employment, how many have never been permitted to reach their full strength because they have continually suffered from the pangs of hunger! All honour is due to the noble, public-spirited reformers, to the journalists, politicians and administrators who labour to remove these evils. Their efforts, however, can never be crowned with complete success until the artist comes to their assistance. By this I do not mean that our first task is to increase the number of picture galleries. That might be itself quite commendable, but it could not be more than a very slight palliative for the ills from which we suffer. The word "art" must be given a much wider

connotation than it generally has when used by the people who are accustomed to dilate upon "The Fine Arts." By saying that the artist must lend his help to these reformers I mean that he must so stimulate men's love of beauty that they will cease to tolerate ugliness, and especially preventible ugliness, in human beings. He will thus provide the social impulse, he will arouse a common desire for reform, for the lack of which statesmen are impotent. The truth is we do not love human beauty enough, we do not reverence it enough, and that is why we are not so deeply outraged as we ought to be at the sight of those who have been disfigured through the manner of life that has been imposed upon them in this industrial age; and as we are not offended by the unsightliness of the spectacle we are not concerned to stir ourselves to remove its causes.

At the end of the last chapter I said that the average man does not care to avow his admiration of human beauty because for various reasons he has become ashamed of it. There are two classes of people who tend to make him ashamed of his real feelings about this matter; in the first place there are the moralists who think that if we are only good it is not of very much moment whether we are beautiful or not, and secondly there are the silly sentimental folk who exist in such large numbers that they have almost succeeded in making the term beauty, that is, so far as its human signification is concerned, synonymous with the beauty of women; the former would question the necessity of beauty whilst the latter would restrict its content.

Let us first examine the position of the moralists and consider in what particular respect their influence is likely to be mischievous. The artist will seek to discover how, without denying their legitimate claims, it is possible to prevent their activity from extending beyond the field which is proper to it, and, so far from adopting a hostile and contemptuous attitude towards the moralists, he will earnestly desire to utilise such services as they may be able to render to the cause of art.

Now the artist is possessed of an æsthetic idea, a certain definite concept of society which it is his highest ambition to see realised. He says there must first be beauty of person, and then there must be beauty in the environment of the person. His spiritual home is in "The Things which are Seen," and the formulation of an idea can never satisfy him unless the mental effort is followed by a change which can be apprehended by the senses. The path of creation is a difficult one requiring from those who would tread therein the exercise of every faculty, but as soon as the artist ventures upon the first step of his admirable journey he is tripped up by the moralist, who upbraids him thus:—"How utterly superficial you are, you with your passion for a society of beautiful persons! Do you not know that character is immeasurably more significant than physical form? A man may be very ugly and yet possess the best of all gifts, namely, a nobility of soul." What is the artist to say in reply to such an antagonist? How can he establish the prestige of the visual arts, if the very chief of them is slighted in this way?

Before a rejoinder can be attempted, there must be a preliminary statement concerning the scope of this particular discussion upon morality. I may point out that I do not at the present stage intend to enter upon the general question of conduct, as that can more conveniently be dealt with in the third part of this volume, where the personality of the individual receives special consideration. I am now examining the function of the arts, and my immediate task is to refute the school of moralists who would discount the social value of the art of the cultivation of human beauty.

It may readily be admitted that if one has to choose between a good man and a very handsome one who happens to be an utter scamp, one would prefer as a companion the good man even if he suffers from some physical defect. Many people are led by this comparison to imagine that beauty must be contrasted with virtue and that it is impossible to extol the one without, in some subtle manner, depreciating the other. That the æsthetic ideal is still a subject of suspicion is shown by the existence of the popular proverb "Handsome is that handsome does." This proverb contains an element of truth, but it will be necessary to point out the profound and dangerous error to which its misinterpretation may give rise. The truth of the saying has already been touched upon. It consists in the acknowledgment of the fact that when one is considering individuals, good character is generally preferable to good looks. But this custom of weighing individual units against

each other is utterly unphilosophical. The consideration of exceptions teaches us nothing unless these exceptions are related to a rule. Instead of contrasting the beautiful person and the good one, we must contrast a *society* of beautiful people with a *society* of good people.

Let us compare, both in respect of desirability and in respect of virtue, the two societies in one of which there is a high standard of beauty and in the other an abundance of ugly people reputed to possess all the moral virtues in a high degree. In asking which is the more desirable society we appear to be prejudging the issue. The very question seems to imply a denial of the moral ideal. For to the moralist morality is the standard by which the worth both of individuals and of societies is appraised. To him there can be no doubt as to the answer. But the upholder of the æsthetic ideal says that the society of beautiful people is more desirable, and thereby shows that he has a criterion of value over and above what is generally understood to be the moral criterion. In so far as he is a moralist, morality is for him a means, and when the end is not forthcoming he denies that the proper means have been employed at all. He looks at the society of ugly people and condemns it not only as undesirable but as immoral. He states dogmatically that, no matter how smoothly the machinery of such a society may work, nor how kind, forbearing and unselfish, nor how honest and industrious its members may be, it is lacking in the highest morality. The artist says, not of the individual but of the race, that *Beauty is Nature's touchstone*

by which the attainment of virtue can be recognised.

Moralists are apt to depreciate personal beauty because they argue that a handsome man is born with the potentiality of being handsome and a good figure does not really stand to his credit, whereas in the acquirement of character there is a greater element of freedom and choice left to the individual. Such an attitude is somewhat ungracious. Those excellences which are, as it were, unsought should be especially blessed in our eyes, for they may be regarded as the gift of the gods. For although it is incumbent upon us to formulate canons of judgment by which the worth of men can be compared, it is pleasant occasionally to take a holiday from the censorious mood and to find delight in whatsoever good things fortune has vouchsafed to mankind.

In individual instances, it is true, a pretty face cannot be held to be the reward of meritorious conduct, but when one considers a whole people the case is different. A high general standard of beauty will not be achieved unless the social virtues are practised; and the attainment and maintenance of such a standard is indicative of a prodigious moral effort calling for more strength of resolution, more brains, more sensitiveness, more honesty and discipline than are needed for the acquisition of mere goodness, using this word in its conventional sense. Hence the devotees of human beauty cannot justly be accused of underrating the value of character.

The good man, however, unless he acknowledges the claims of art, fails ignominiously to enforce

his precepts. The moral idea, when unsupported by the æsthetic, is its own greatest enemy. The doctrine that conduct need not be directed to the beautification of physical form leads people to hold the human body too cheap. The moralist condemns the excessive use of alcohol because of its injurious effects upon character. But in inculcating a disrespect for the body he provides the very atmosphere in which excessive alcoholism can best flourish. For an abhorrence of the physical effect of too much alcohol would be a far greater deterrent than any objection to its moral effect. The physical effect is far the more obvious of the two and it appeals immediately to the senses. Again, the institution of the family is especially dear to the moralist, because it is one of the chief means whereby a stable social polity can be secured. When the bulk of the adult population is paired off in intimate partnerships of men and women, partnerships which have as their main object the rearing and the proper care of children, the conditions which are necessary for a high standard of behaviour in both old and young are in part attained. Yet no more deadly blow could be struck at the institution of the family than would certainly fall upon it if the average level of human beauty were lowered beyond a certain point. The greatest stimulus to marriage is the mutual attraction between the sexes, and this attraction ceases to be effective when men and women are ugly. I am not now speaking of those vicious unions which are determined by considerations of finance alone but of natural and desirable unions which are

undertaken by the free will of the people concerned.

Let us next consider in one group the numerous moral evils that are directly to be attributed to poverty. The artist would abolish poverty because it is productive of ugliness. But the moralist can never tackle the problem of poverty with success, for the moral impulse is divided against itself. Half the moralists deplore the existence of poverty because so many of its victims suffer a deterioration of character; but the other half are busily engaged in praising poverty and in condemning riches; they speak of the stern moral lessons, the discipline, the spirit of self-sacrifice which the struggle with poverty inculcates. It may be admitted that great wealth is often a bane to those who possess it. The artist, however, would abolish all the evils at one sweep, both the vulgarity of the rich and the poverty of the poor.

It has been shown that the proverb " Handsome is that handsome does " is misleading because it only deals with the exception and fails to take into account society as a whole. But in acknowledging that it is possible for a man of hideous countenance to be a more useful member of the state than a handsome one, is not the artist surrendering his ideal of a beautiful race? Is not society the sum of the individuals who compose it, and could it not be altogether made up of these ungainly paragons of virtue each of whom would be superior in worth to the handsome substitute that might be found for him? These are most pertinent questions, for the very basis of the artist's creed is endangered if he cannot prove

himself to be justified in denying the implication which is contained in them.

By way of answer it must first be asserted that we are not separate units completely divided off from one another; for a man's personality extends far beyond the bounds of his own physical being. A broken leg does not necessarily symbolise a disinclination to walk. A cripple may have the instinct of a dancer, and to gratify his taste he may encourage his friends to dance. Spiritually such a man is not a cripple, for although he cannot move gracefully himself, his personality finds expression in the graceful movement of others. But if he pours scorn upon the art of dancing and does not wish to see it practised, then he is a cripple indeed! Again, a man of uncouth form may by his labours vastly increase the sum of beauty in the world. In praising him, however, we are not praising or extenuating ugliness, but we are expressing our admiration of the beauty by which his ugliness is redeemed. On the other hand, a good-looking person may foster a tendency to racial decay, for he may be unworthy of his bodily heritage; he may be ruining his own beauty, or by his social activities creating conditions injurious to the beauty of others. And in condemning such a man, we ought not to disparage the beauty of which he himself is the accidental and unworthy possessor, but mourn rather on account of the *destruction of beauty* that his conduct entails. Thus if beauty on any occasion appears to be in disgrace, the reason is because it violates the law of its own being and is, in fact, associated with its opposite. And if ugliness

may ever be condoned, that is only in those instances where it is recognised to be an exception and where it repudiates itself. But ugliness which has been elevated to the rule, triumphant, unblushing, complacent ugliness is quite insufferable. Ugliness is always ignoble unless it walks in sack-cloth and ashes.

It has sometimes been suggested that morality was formulated by all the botched, the deformed members of society who, envious of those who had the good fortune to be better constituted than themselves, conspired to belittle the beauty they did not possess and to exalt the moral excellences which they imagined to be within their reach. But this opinion is unjust to the moralist, unjust and unkind. It is true that the ill-favoured occasionally experience a secret feeling of satisfaction when good-looking acquaintances come to grief, but such baseness of mind is a rarity. In an overwhelming majority of cases the men or women who have to endure the affliction of ugliness have no feeling of enmity against those who are or ought to be the decoration of their lives. For instinctively they recognise that the very existence of beautiful people is an honour to themselves, and are pleased and flattered by their company. And when the moralist repudiates the æsthetic ideal, this is the result of bad thinking rather than of bad motives.

The average man shows by his conduct that he is by no means distrustful of beauty. In this as in all other essential matters he exhibits sanity of judgment. But although the particular class of moralists whose prejudices it has been found

necessary to combat in the foregoing pages are not fully representative of moralists in general, and are, in fact, sectarians, the average man has been sufficiently confused by them to be somewhat ashamed of affirming his natural reverence for good looks. He is afraid that he might be accused of supposing that a handsome man was necessarily of greater social worth than a virtuous one, and he would never maintain such a foolish proposition as that. When it has been once made clear to him, however, that the æsthetic ideal is not antagonistic to the moral, it is likely that he will feel more inclined boldly to give expression to his true sentiments.

But, as was hinted at the beginning of this chapter, there is another reason why the artist has hitherto been unable to claim the average man as a convert and ally. There is a fashion peculiar to certain vulgar and objectionable people of referring to feminine beauty only, when they speak of beauty. Evidence of this offensive attitude is to be found in the common use of that odious expression "the fair sex." He who employs this phrase accredits women with beauty for no other reason than that they are of the opposite gender to himself. Such a love of beauty is devoid of an intellectual basis, for it is merely emotional; in fact, it does not deserve to be described as a love of beauty, as it indicates a corruption and a narrowing down of the æsthetic sense. Unless men glorify male beauty also they cannot be said to have any real appreciation of the human form. The idea that beauty was a gift peculiar to women was quite unknown in antiquity or in those periods

of history which have been especially distinguished for artistic attainment.

The average man is well aware that the most boorish and brutalised persons, in fact the very lowest types of hooligan, are capable of admiring feminine beauty, so naturally he has no reason to be proud of his own taste in that respect. But, although he himself is able to recognise good looks in whichever sex they may be present, it would be impossible for him to proclaim any great enthusiasm for personal beauty without the risk of being misinterpreted, because, owing to the prevalence of the phraseology that has just been criticised, the term has acquired a restricted meaning, and a devotion to such beauty is no longer associated, as it was among the ancient Greeks, with an exalted philosophy of life.

The prestige of the first of the visual arts will never be restored until the proposition is established that there is no such thing as a "Fair Sex," but that both men and women have their characteristic beauty of form. Some people scoff at the notion that men should be beautiful. In their opinion this would indicate nothing but effeminacy. They seem to think that man should be a gaunt, rugged creature with prominent bones and sinews. Woman, on the other hand, according to this conception, should conform to a standard of prettiness which is partly expressed in curls, a pink and white complexion, and in the inordinately small hands and feet such as still disfigure many popular representations of the feminine form; while it is not considered necessary or even desirable that her face should be expressive

of strength of character. The corruption of the ideal of feminine beauty has resulted in a revulsion against masculine beauty also, for this kind of prettiness which is supposed to be becoming to women would rightly be condemned as quite ridiculous if affected by the male fop. The Greeks, however, achieved something different. The youths who were most admired by them had not only very great strength, a splendidly developed physique, but beauty and grace as well; while their model types of women were handsome rather than pretty.

It is only by first apprehending masculine beauty that men can learn to pay the respect which is due to the beauty which is feminine; and that the Greeks, in their adoration of the male form, did not neglect its necessary complement is proved by the fact that if in sculptural representations we wish to show special honour to femininity, we are not permitted in imagination to stray very far from Woman as the Greeks conceived her.

In commending the example of the Greeks I do not suggest that there is only one pattern of bodily excellence, or that the world ought to be inhabited by individuals who are cast in a uniform mould. The popular conception of the physiognomy of the Greeks is an erroneous one, for an examination of the relics of classical antiquity reveals a surprising variety in the Hellenic type. The peculiar virtue of this people, and the one I wish to insist upon here, is that in their appreciation of the human species they struck a just balance between its two main

divisions. Such a balance cannot be attained unless men place a certain conscious emphasis upon the need for the cultivation of the beauty of their own sex, for it is this, rather than the beauty of women, which is likely to be ignored by them.

Europe still sits at the feet of Greece, yet it is not generally understood precisely in what respect the civilisation of the Greeks was superior to our own. Its superiority was expressed by this very devotion to the ideal of male beauty. The sentiment of which I am speaking was one of the chief resultants of a well-considered, a mature and an eminently sane philosophy, and it is difficult to exaggerate its importance, for it showed that the æsthetic impulse, or that essential part of it which is identified with a love of human beauty, was directed not only to personal but to social ends. It was a sign that *race-culture* was in progress of acquirement. But if in any country one attends a picture gallery ostensibly devoted to "Studies of the Nude," and finds nothing but rows of feminine figures, one may be certain that such artistic skill as is exhibited there is of no significance whatsoever for civilisation, except in so far as it provides evidence of racial debility. No robustness of character, no true creative talent is displayed by people who imagine they are celebrating human beauty when they take such a limited view of its range. Wherever the naked male figure, developed to its highest degree of excellence, is for men the supreme æsthetic symbol, the arts are certain to flourish; for there the appreciation of beauty has transcended

the primitive stage and has become delicate, fastidious and critical. The æsthetic impulse will not be weakened through the adoption of such a standard of value. On the contrary, while growing in complexity, it will grow in strength as well, and it will be more fruitful of lasting result because more conscious of its purpose.

Enough has here been said in defence of the first of the visual arts. It has perhaps been made clear in these pages that the love of human beauty is not associated with any sentiment of hostility to the just claims of the moralist, nor is it to be confounded with mere voluptuousness.

If we acknowledge this to be a great and noble art, it is incumbent upon us to inquire what steps we ought to take in order to practise it. When people have the will to practise it they will not be slow to find the means, and there is no need to discourse at great length upon the nature of the social revolution which would take place if, in very truth, men were determined to remove those causes which obviously contribute to the uglification of their species. The abolition of poverty, as we now know it, healthy conditions of housing and employment, the spread of the opportunities for athleticism, a wonderful development of the dance both for men and women—all these things would follow if only people could be induced to value the human body at its proper worth.

A new tradition, a new attitude of mind, a new conscience are desirable rather than an elaboration of administrative machinery. The

impulse must come from the public and not from any small clique of experts seeking to arrange for us the place of our habitation, our general mode of life, and even our marriages. It is especially necessary to resist the presumption of those who would breed men as if they were cattle. When once the fair fame of the first of the visual arts has been restored by the removal of the misconceptions which have brought it into disrepute, then the race will progress naturally and spontaneously, without the assistance of scientific busy-bodies who take it upon themselves to improve human beings although ignorant of humanity.

I have referred incidentally to the subject of health. Everybody, of course, recognises the desirability of acquiring habits of proper living. It must be remarked, however, that the apostles of hygiene are often so deficient in taste that they fail to win any large measure of sympathy or active support. Those who think such a great deal about health may fail to achieve it because they have a too limited conception of the virtues which appertain to the human form. For instance, as weakness is associated with disease, some people are tempted to strengthen themselves in abnormal ways; but it turns out that their excessive muscular development, which the artist would immediately condemn as ugly, is injurious to their physical constitution, for it causes a straining of the heart. It would be tedious to enumerate all the absurdities advocated by the little fanatical sects that worship at the shrine of health. If we were to act upon the advice of one

type of reformer we should abstain from all concentrated food such as meat and devour nothing but vast quantities of vegetable products. It is the first few generations who would suffer the most discomfort through such a course. In time our descendants, if they continued the regime, would adapt themselves to the nature of their diet, and having developed a triple digestive apparatus, would chew the cud like cows. The adherents of another school of thought have such a horror of the indulgence in indiscriminate feasting that they would strictly forbid us to eat more than a single meal a day. And there are even sterner disciplinarians who contend that to be really hale and hearty a man must rise from every repast with a sense of unsatisfied hunger.

Yet even if the suggested dietary or routine be perfectly sensible it can never be elevated to an article of religion unless it be related to an æsthetic ideal. In addition to health men must have beauty, but they would become gross and ugly if in their search for health they descended to the mentality of animals. Exercise, a variety of food and an abundance of sleep are prime needs of the body, but for complete physical well-being constant occupation of the mind is also essential.

This spiritual factor is ultimately the determining influence in the creation both of health and of beauty. When one exalts the claims of the body, it does not mean that one favours the establishment of a society of brawny but brainless individuals, wholly engaged in slaking such appetites as they have in common with the beasts of the field. A true devotion to the body is a far

subtler sentiment than that, for to those who can read its message the body is the expression of the soul. The significance of the human form will become more apparent when, in the next chapter, we consider the visual art of manners.

CHAPTER III.

ON MANNERS.

When a people despises the first of the visual arts there result a defective industrial and social organisation and the prevalence of personal vices of all kinds; when it despises the second we have mutual ill-will between the various sections of society, and a universal vulgarity which not only finds its expression in the demeanour of men and women but is most certainly reflected in the arts of dress, architecture, painting and sculpture.

As this second art is often misunderstood, and reviled and neglected on that account, it is desirable to take some pains to investigate its character. The theme is so vast that it is obviously impossible to describe it comprehensively, but nevertheless an attempt will be made to get a general idea of its content.

The average man is somewhat shy of acknowledging his profound regard for manners because he feels that it is ungracious consciously to separate people into degrees of breeding. There seems to be something particularly churlish in declining to have much to do with persons of perhaps admirable moral character simply because

they cannot be trusted to comport themselves properly in good society. In such an instance a man condemns his neighbours on æsthetic and not on moral grounds, but if the æsthetic ideal has not in his mind been reconciled with the moral, he dare not confess to his natural prejudice. There are other reasons, however, why many people are ashamed of this separatist feeling of class. In the first place, they cannot help recognising that a great deal of vulgarity, false pride and vindictiveness is often associated with it. Secondly, they so strongly resent the inequalities of wealth by which the division of men into social classes is accentuated that they are apt to confuse the various kinds of inequality. They know quite well that the rich man is not by virtue of his riches any better than the poor one, and, rather than be accused of supporting degrees of caste founded upon degrees of wealth alone, they deny the existence of caste altogether and maintain that there is the same spiritual equality between the ill-bred and the well-bred as there often is between the poor and the rich. But this is an untenable position. It would be found that if income were equalised to-morrow society would still be broken up into cliques, and there might be circles from which the most objectionable types of men and women would be rigorously excluded.

The institution of class would not have successfully withstood the very violent assaults to which from time immemorial it has been exposed had it owed its existence entirely to the baser instincts of mankind. In fact we are here in the presence of a phenomenon caused by the

operation of an æsthetic impulse which, so far from being on the decline, is destined to grow yet more powerful in the future. Must, then, a system of acute class division be continued indefinitely? The answer is that it will last until such time as the rudiments of good breeding are so clearly understood that they can be made the subject of logical disquisition and thus become communicable from one person to another. By such means alone will it be possible eventually to eliminate those offensive characters who, through want of proper notions of behaviour, are the chief instigators of social discord.

It is sometimes contended that because the virtue of which we are speaking may be described as the expression of temperament or taste it cannot therefore be analysed. But as the art of manners must be reflected in all the subordinate arts if these are to be free from the reproach of vulgarity, such an act of analysis is absolutely necessary. How often does it occur that a man who, as far as his own person is concerned, is a model of decorum yet produces buildings or pictures which are devoid of all refinement? The reason is that, having never intellectualised his own good manners, he is not able to transfer the essence of them to the objects which he has created.

There are very agreeable folk who hold that the really well-bred rigidly abstain from talking about manners. That may be an excellent practice, and it is certainly far preferable to the habit of for ever criticising with an air of superiority the conduct of others. A reluctance to discourse upon questions of breeding is for most people a sign of

grace. But a philosopher is in an exceptional position, and in him a complete silence concerning the present topic might be construed as mental laziness. Besides, if a subject is brought into the domain of reason it becomes completely impersonal and loses the objectionable odour which it may have had when surrounded by an atmosphere of prejudice. I shall try to discuss this matter in a quite impersonal spirit, just as if I were developing a series of propositions in algebra or geometry.

It may help us to interpret the rules of this art if we consider a few specific instances of their breach and observance. The illustration which I am about to take may appear at first sight to be exceedingly trivial, but we shall find that it exemplifies a principle which is of universal application. Let me discuss the subject of eating. Many people say that the style of eating is a matter of fashion, because what is permissible in one country is taboo in another. It is true that some of the customs connected with the ceremonial of eating are variable. The difference between the use of chopsticks and a knife and fork is not important, nor is the shape of the table-napkin a matter of great concern. But we must concentrate our attention upon the manner of using the implement rather than upon the implement itself. Now, there is one condition of proper eating which should be preserved by everyone who wishes to retain the dignity of a human being. The eater must always make it plain that he regards the process of feeding himself as a thing which does not completely absorb his attention; he must

not seem to be giving his soul to the occupation as if in spirit he resembled a dog lapping up gravy from a plate, with its tail wagging and its whole being trembling with an ecstasy of excitement. There are thousands of men and women who devour their food in a most indecent way, and all little children are apt to do so unless they are corrected. What is the root of the error which has been committed here? Obviously, we are not discussing a question which has anything to do with race or climate or national habit. Whether a man lives in China or in America or in Timbuctoo he must not offend in this respect. The fault, and it is a grave fault, is a spiritual one. It lies in a certain lack of a sense of proportion, in an inability to recognise that one of the differences between men and animals is that for the former, as they have infinitely more varied interests and are for that reason more spiritual, the act of eating, necessary though this may be, does not loom so largely in the mental outlook as it does with animals, and if we are by our demeanour to show our superiority to the lower members of creation we must be careful not to make too much ado about such a simple act.

Besides the placing of correct emphasis upon the functions of the body, the emphasis expressive of human dignity, there is a second matter to be considered, namely, the impression which one's comportment is likely to make upon others. A man who eats with his jaws wide open, smacking his lips and exposing the contents of his mouth to all and sundry is not to be commended. He who behaves thus may seek to justify himself by

asserting that the labour of chewing his food is necessary for his health and that he has no reason to be ashamed of it. But we have a right to answer that even if this labour be of great interest to him it is not of the slightest interest to us. When a man practises the visual art of manners he not only conserves his own good appearance, but he displays a delicate regard for the æsthetic sensibility of his neighbours.

It is a common view that the principles which govern polite convention, and especially those which have to do with table manners, are of minor importance and provide no true test of character. There is a certain type of democrat who thinks he can spurn the niceties of social behaviour and still remain a man. It must be pointed out, however, that he is only half a man if he eats like a dog.

A particular virtue of good breeding is that it reduces every physical operation to its proper status. It is a lamentable fact that industrial labour does much to make impossible the practice of this virtue. For this reason the apostle of manners is one of the most enthusiastic allies of those who are seeking to obtain better conditions of employment for manual labourers. A man who throughout his whole life has been used to grinding toil is bereft of that spiritual substratum in his character, that subtle feeling of intellectual stability, which enables those who are more fortunately placed to avoid being wholly dominated by their immediate tasks and to express by their demeanour, even when engaged in some necessary act of drudgery, that they have not been

reduced to the level of machines. They are no friends of humanity who talk too much of the dignity of labour. A routine of monotonous labour is often ignoble, and it is our duty to invent appliances which will enable us to dispense with it wherever possible.

Some of the victims of the industrial system, to those who have eyes to see, present a sorry spectacle. Whatever they do, whether they walk down the street, light a pipe, or lift up a mug to their lips, they reveal the narrowness of their outlook. These actions are performed with a quaint deliberation as if each of them required a great mental effort. When imitated on the music-hall stage this has its funny side, but in real life it is a tragedy. Quite different are the bearing and the gestures of a man who has the grace of movement born of an harmonious development of body and soul. When the intellectual interests have been stimulated the smaller actions are performed with ease and nonchalance. Of course, it is possible to exaggerate the ease and the nonchalance, and then one has the music-hall dandy whose supercilious air expresses the fact that he has no regard for anything or anybody. Both these attitudes are indicative of a vacant mind. It is the nature of humanity that it transcends the small things, but then it does not undervalue them.

Greek sculpture is of supreme worth because it possesses in a higher degree than any other the attribute of manners; yet it is sometimes condemned for its very virtues by critics who

have no appreciation either of beauty or of breeding. For instance, it has been alleged that the famous statue of the Discobolus is lacking in animation. Here a man is portrayed throwing a quoit. The exertion is violent, yet he does not seem to suffer from any obvious strain, and his features are in repose. Such critics, were they commissioned to give their own interpretation of the theme, would ruffle up the athlete's brow, distort his face and make every sinew and vein stand out as if his whole being were intent upon the deed; they would imagine that by emphasising the man's effort they could render the statue more powerful and expressive of a greater depth of thought. But by such a course not only would they be proving themselves to be devoid of insight, but the model, too, would cease to represent a cultured human type and would appear to share the stupidity of its authors. The elegance of this Greek statue is largely due to the mental attitude which enabled the Discobolus to envisage his task in its true perspective.

I have discussed briefly the art of manners in its personal relation, that is, so far as it has to do with individuals considered separately. The second sort of manners is apparent in the mutual deference which is shown in salutations, the surrendering of seats on appropriate occasions and in countless other ways. In the practice of these articles of good breeding it is possible to exaggerate as well as improperly to minimise the attention which is due to others. A perfunctory nod will sometimes be interpreted as a slight, but too effusive a greeting may embarrass its recipient.

One must adopt the happy mean between cringing and rudeness, and, in one's anxiety to show respect for friends and acquaintances, one must not omit to bear in mind the respect which is due to one's self. The practice of the art of manners does not interfere with the frank expression of cordiality, but it could never lead to self-abasement.

It is perhaps desirable at this point to remind the reader that I am not now speaking of politeness of speech, for that is too large a subject to treat of in this volume. I am here confining myself to the province of the visual arts, and I am dealing with concepts which are articulated by means of visible changes. Of course, the two kinds of breeding have a connection with one another, for otherwise the same name could not be applied to both, but the nature of the good manners shown in verbal intercourse is a far more controversial topic than is the visual art.

The latter, as we have seen, is governed by rules capable of definition, and nobody who understands these rules will overlook their breach, but few will be found to agree concerning the amount of license and candour which ought to be permitted in conversation. True courtesy is sometimes held to mean the avoidance of saying unpleasant things. Unfortunately, however, there are many occasions when the unpleasant word must be uttered if the spirit of criticism is to be kept alive. Not much value need be attached to the civility which consists in never telling home truths, for this is merely the bulwark which vanity has raised for its own protection. It were better if we

could dispense altogether with this species of politeness and become as little children who do not scruple to correct each other freely.

What is in common between the visual art of manners and politeness in conversation is that each is ultimately based upon a regard for others. Yet in one respect they are not alike, for the expression of the first is always pleasing, while the second may sometimes take upon itself a reformatory character which may occasion annoyance to the subject of it. But this feeling of annoyance should be of short duration, and does not rankle in the minds of those who have the wit to recognise the essential difference between pride and conceit.

It remains now to indicate how good breeding can be reflected in dress, architecture, painting and sculpture. This aspect of the matter will be discussed at greater length in the chapters where these arts are given a detailed consideration. In the present passing reference to them I may mention that in the art of dress, manners of both the personal and the social kind are evident. The former kind of manners is shown in the designing of dresses which give to the various parts of the body an emphasis which best accords with a worthy conception of humanity : everybody knows that the human figure can be very easily vulgarised and degraded by inappropriate dress. The latter is manifested in the elaborate ritual of those conventions which decree the wearing of special garments on special occasions. It is thus obvious how mistaken are the superior people who affect to despise the art of dress and to think it

insignificant. Dress derives its importance in men's eyes not because it administers to human vanity, but because it is one of the chief means by which the realm of manners is broadened and consolidated.

In architecture, too, there must be a similar reflection of the second of the visual arts. The personal kind of manners is exhibited when the features of which a building is made up are distinguished by the degree of accentuation that befits them. An example of improper accentuation, of architectural vulgarity, in fact, occurs when in private houses the sanitary appliances are allowed to assert themselves unduly, when irregular little windows belonging to the minor rooms not only destroy the cohesion of the façade but flaunt in the public eye things in which the public cannot possibly be interested. Ill-breeding of the social kind may be found in the presumption of individual buildings that often seem to be imbued with a spirit of self-advertisement. Perhaps in some quiet residential square having pale grey stucco frontages, the owner of one of the mansions is pleased to remodel that part of the composition of which he has control, and covers the exterior of his abode with bright red brickwork. It is, as it were, an act of rudeness to its neighbours for the house to puff itself up in that fashion; and the flagrant violation of the tone of the whole architectural group not only shows ill-breeding on the part of the man who authorised it but also bears witness to the low standard of culture attained by the community which permits such extravagances.

It is obvious, of course, how vulgarity in a subject is immediately reflected in the representation of that subject. In painting and sculpture it will be found that manners are displayed both in the choice of the theme and in the technique itself.

If the subordinate arts fail utterly when they do not defer to the art of manners, this itself owes fealty to the art of the cultivation of human beauty. Let me give some instances where manners are deprived of their virtue by usurping the place of the first of the visual arts. A double deterioration may here set in. Manners then degenerate either into excessive formality or else into prudery. Manners assume the guise of excessive formality as soon as they become a burden, as soon as the social ceremonial grows so elaborate that it hinders the free physical development of those who practise it. Prudery also implies a refusal to recognise the legitimate claims of the body, but in this case it is the personal kind of manners which has been distorted into a caricature. It is the exact opposite of that form of vulgarity which leads to an exaltation of the bodily functions we share with the animals. On the whole, it is better for the race to lack refinement than to be prudish, for prudery is invariably a sign of a greatly impaired vitality. But the artist joins issue with both parties to the dispute. He quarrels with those moralists who, generally not acknowledging the first of the visual arts, have no standard by which they can regulate the demands of the second; on the other hand he condemns the licence of those who in their

repudiation of the false claims of a morality which is devoid of an æsthetic basis are so carried away by a desire to revolt that they offend not only against morality but against manners as well. Manners are a powerful ally of morality, so morality itself suffers if they are brought into disrepute through being allowed to lapse into prudery.

Good breeding forms a necessary supplement to what is commonly understood to be physical beauty. It is, as it were, an extension of the beautiful. These first two of the visual arts are so intimately connected with one another that the canons of judgment which govern the criticism of deportment can be utilised in an analysis of human beauty itself. For in the parts of the body there is a formal relationship expressive of a definite scale of functional values, and the phenomenon which we designate as ugliness is nothing more than a repudiation of this scale. If we hold to the conception of humanity which is the outcome of centuries of civilisation, we cannot commend forms of physique which run counter to that conception. Many people seem to be of opinion that human beauty is without a definite standard, and that in time we could get used to any aberration from the normal type and call that beautiful.

Let us consider some of these possible aberrations. Suppose, for instance, that a man had a very large protruding jaw. The vision which is conjured up is not a pleasant one. Yet there are innumerable animals that have such a characteristic and they are held to be beautiful.

Quadrupeds, birds and fishes have their mouths placed in a position of great prominence. But here we have a true expression of their spiritual natures, for their minds are occupied nearly all day long in the search for food. In a man, however, a feature which suggests that he thinks of little else but eating is sure to seem offensive. The person with a huge jaw might pass very well in a company of gorillas and might even be awarded the palm for beauty in such an assembly, but if he is to continue a member of human society he must be condemned as ugly.

Again, if someone has a very long nose, he reminds us of a fox. Now, a fox is an exquisitely graceful creature, but his aggressive snout symbolises that very narrow form of specialisation which is identified with an abnormal development of the sense of smell. It is proper that the shape of the fox should suggest such a facility, for this animal gets its living by means of it, but in men the balance of interest is differently disposed, and we cannot, without sacrificing our idea of humanity, admit into the category of the beautiful anybody who has a nose which exceeds a certain limited dimension.

Let us next imagine a group of men and women who suddenly took into their heads to walk on all fours. The members of the sect might address us in the following terms:—"We are pioneers and are inaugurating another era in the progress of society. We are tired of the monotony of human type, and we seek to introduce modifications, for all life advances through modification. Our attitudes may at first appear to be inelegant, but

as soon as you have got accustomed to them you will acknowledge their superior beauty. The ugly, you must remember, is only what is strange and abnormal." The people who decline to admit the existence of an æsthetic standard would not be able to refute the new apostles. But whoever believes in the power of reason to apprehend the nature of beauty can expose the fallacy, for he must necessarily be aware of the simple truth that the upright attitude is the expression of the intellectuality of man. By no other arrangement of members is it possible to give such formal emphasis to the headpiece of the body, the centre where the understanding finds its place of habitation. Unless, therefore, we wish to deny our own souls we are not at liberty completely to abandon the perpendicularity of posture which is native to us. This does not mean we ought not to sit down or rest at ease; even when reclining we do not lose our essential characteristic, for it remains obvious that the mould of our bodies has been determined by the practice of standing up straight. A person may grovel on the ground and pretend to be a horse in order to amuse a baby, but if, without humorous intent, he were to walk on all fours he would be displaying very bad manners, in fact the ultimate degree of bad manners to which it is possible to attain, since in no way could he more emphatically repudiate the spiritual nature of man.

Have we, then, come to the end of racial development? Can we imagine no changes in the human body, changes, for instance, which might indicate a still further advance in intellectuality?

It has been suggested that in the future our heads may grow larger and our bodies small and puny. Now, formal emphasis is dependent, to a certain extent, upon the size of any particular part, but the intellect is an all-embracing element, and it is not expressed by a curtailment of the powers of the body. The brain is a complicated organ which must be provided with sustenance, and a very vigorous body is required for its proper support. But putting aside the physical necessities and concentrating our attention upon the pattern of the human frame, we shall find it of advantage to remember that the idea of domination presupposes something which is dominated. A king may be master of his realm, but if his realm be very much reduced the prestige of the monarch will suffer, in spite of the fact that relatively he appears greater in comparison with his subjects. If the body became a mere appendage to the head, the latter would look ridiculous, and the whole figure would be suggestive of impotence. Continue the process still further, and men and women would be quiescent and rotund and for ever doomed to emulate the reflective inactivity of oysters. It is of small avail to possess the faculty of thought unless we have limbs and can walk, run and dance, and unless we can manufacture innumerable objects for our use and pleasure. So the gradual elimination or weakening of the body is no part of man's intellectual growth. The people who foresee a race of larger-headed creatures have but dreamed a very ugly dream.

The more one studies the human body the more

convinced one must become of its inevitability and its finality. There is no need to try to create some new and strange species. What is wrong with the race is not the imperfection of its type, but its neglect to preserve the beauty which is quite natural to it. The immediate task is to secure that we should all be properly fed and be given an opportunity spontaneously to develop the limbs we already possess; and with the care of the body there must be fostered the intellectual balance which will save us from vulgarity of mien.

Within the limits, however, of the physical pattern which the idea of humanity engenders, there is room for variation. For instance, eyes can be brown, grey or blue, and still retain the characteristics of the human eye. Hair can be dark or light without forfeiting its natural quality. Noses straight, aquiline or retroussé may so harmoniously be set upon the face that they are neither insignificant nor yet obtrusive. There is a peculiar kind of elegance to which only slender people can attain, but the stout and sturdy, if well-proportioned and capable of graceful movement, may be very beautiful too. Of course, a person can be stout and yet ugly, or slender and yet ugly, but this is because he has the wrong kind of stoutness or the wrong kind of slenderness. One man may have rather thin legs and another man rather thick legs, and both may be possessed of a good figure. But bow legs are an abomination. The reason is that, being arranged in two equal and opposite curves enclosing a space, they create, at about the level of the knees where the space is widest, a marked focal centre to which

the eye cannot help being directed. He whose frame has been distorted in this fashion, although perhaps most anxious not to give offence to others, is compelled by circumstance to be guilty of a species of ill-breeding; for he goes about continually attracting unnecessary attention to his legs, which, instead of being exquisitely moulded features in due subordination to a perfect artistic whole, are a rebellion and a discord. This is one of the occasions where state intervention is fully justified. As the deformity in question is preventable, since in the majority of cases it is due to the improper nurture of infants, the parents responsible ought to be visited with a severe penalty.

I may now state briefly the relation between human beauty and manners. Since the form of human beauty is dependent upon the maintenance of the same scale of spiritual values which must be recognised in deportment, it is ugly to be ill-mannered. But we have seen that manners have a social aspect and must find expression in benevolence. As the sight of physical imperfection gives much pain to sensitive minds, it is therefore ill-mannered to be uglier than one can help.

CHAPTER IV.

On Dress.

The more intimately an art concerns us, the less are we inclined to talk about it. People display a certain uneasiness when physiognomy or demeanour are mentioned and often misinterpret even the most casual reference to such matters as an indirect criticism of themselves. The reason of this is that human beauty and manners are not usually dealt with in an impersonal way, they are not related to philosophic principles, and in most books upon the subject of æsthetics they have no place at all. And when we remember the various confusions of mind to which the consideration of these topics gives rise, it is not surprising that a measure of reticence is observed concerning them. But having established the good repute of the first two of the visual arts, we shall find that the task of dealing with the others will be immensely simplified.

Dress, as a theme for conversation, shares the unpopularity of human beauty and manners, for although not an integral part of ourselves as are our bodies, it is yet sufficiently close to us to be a

highly personal matter. If, in company, a man hold forth upon the principles of dress, people immediately think of what they themselves have on, and his tongue is tied as he is afraid his remarks might be construed as a reflection upon the good taste of his neighbours. Thus it comes about that a philosopher is encouraged to discourse upon architecture, painting and sculpture, for these are associated with the term "art" and are highly respectable subjects, but society has decreed that dress, if touched upon at all, must be treated quite superficially. Of course, when women are collected together, they may have occasion to exchange views about the qualities of materials, the competence or incompetence of a particular dressmaker and so on, but, recognising that these things have to do with practical details rather than with principles and are not of universal interest, they seldom obtrude them in a general conversation in which both sexes are taking part. But although they do not talk about it men and women think a great deal about the philosophy of dress, which subject, indeed, occupies far more of their attention than do architecture, painting and sculpture. It is significant that, while all kinds of freakishness are permitted and even condoned in these latter arts, in the art of dress deviations from convention are of a limited character. Because for so long it has been essential to the very structure of social life, dress has reached a highly advanced stage of development. The æsthetic crudities which so often mar the design of houses or of pictures would not for one moment be tolerated in an art governed

by forms and usages which are the product of a recognised necessity. I shall now try to investigate the nature of the convention which claims such strict obedience. If the following argument is to be of any value, it must be distinguished by the same frankness which marked the discussion upon human beauty and manners.

I must, at the outset, remove a misconception which may possibly exist in the mind of the reader. When somebody is reputed to entertain opinions upon dress people often jump to the conclusion that he desires to impose one particular kind of costume upon everyone. "What, in your view, is the correct dress?" such people ask, and then with an air of amusement they resign themselves to hear of some new fad, some caprice of the costumier. I have no such correct dress to offer. In fact it is an error to suppose that there is any single type of correct dress. On the contrary, there is a multiplicity of types differing widely from each other, but having this in common that they conform to certain fixed principles.

Now, what are the main canons of propriety which must regulate the art of dress? The answer is that dress must serve the art of the cultivation of human beauty and it must serve the art of manners. Almost every fault in dress arises from the neglect of one or other of these rules. When dress offends against the first of the visual arts it becomes uncomfortable and injurious to health; when it offends against the second it becomes vulgar.

Let us take the first of these canons. It is clear that, so far from determining one fixed pattern, it

necessitates the design of separate patterns suitable for separate occasions. The possession of a principle is not, as some people suppose, a hindrance to the development of imagination, but is a stimulus to the creative faculty. The variations we are now discussing are due to differences of function and differences of climate. The former are expressed in the distinctive costumes which the many kinds of athleticism impose on those who take part in them. Few garbs are more becoming than are the short knickers, the jersey, the stockings and brown leather boots which footballers affect. When attired thus, one cannot help feeling impelled to the strenuous exercise of the limbs. It may be noted what a degree of license the observance of the principle permits even within the limits of a single subordinate type. The colour and texture of the knickers, jersey and stockings can all be modified in countless ways without offending against the first of the visual arts. It is needless to enumerate the forms of clothing adopted for riding, walking, swimming and dancing. The reader will doubtless, at the mere mention of these employments, call to mind the sorts of apparel which are most appropriate for them.

A word may here be interposed concerning the skirt which social convention ordains that women should wear. A great deal of nonsense is occasionally talked about this matter. It is said, for instance, that the skirt is an emblem of slavery and that women will never attain their true status until they wear trousers or knickerbockers or some other bifurcated nether garment. The theorists

who hold this view appear to have completely forgotten that in the only countries where woman is clothed in such a fashion she lives in a harem; and they have never properly considered the effect which their proposals would have, if carried out, nor do they realise that the institution of the skirt, so far from being the means of servitude, is a symbol of social equality. The main fact of the situation is that nature has given to men the more imposing exterior, for they are, on the average, taller, stronger, more vigorous, and more capable of swift movement than are women. If women dressed in trousers or knickerbockers, they would appear as just minor editions of men. But the long skirt has the effect of considerably increasing their apparent height, and also, by establishing a distinct difference of type between the costumes worn by the two sexes, it prevents any direct comparison between them. This is to the advantage of women, for their beauty is of a different character from that of men, and we cannot obtain a just appreciation of it unless we judge it by other standards than those we apply to men. That the ancient Greeks understood this well is attested by the supremely elegant draperies with which they adorned the female figure. In their sculpture, and in the pictures decorating their vases, one generally finds that the men are naked whilst the women are robed.

Yet women must be free to attain to a condition of perfect physical development. Crinolines, tight waists, or heels so high that they make it impossible for women to walk gracefully, are, of course, most objectionable. The skirt, however,

need not be a hindrance to athleticism. It is quite easy to take long walks, to ride a horse, to play golf, tennis, Badminton, and many other out-door games in a skirt. Certainly, a long dress might prevent women from taking part in a race on foot; but then women are not designed for swiftness of locomotion and they do themselves an injustice in attempting to run very fast. Women are subjectively strong but not objectively; when the exercise takes the form of a dance, they may, without any undue strain, give an exhibition of marvellous agility, and the agility, if brought into separate relation with the rhythm and melody of a piece of music, may constitute an æsthetic phenomenon of a high order; but they are ill-advised when they try to become rough, to push other people hither and thither and to fling themselves with great violence about a football or hockey field. Even for ballet dancing, which is the most strenuous of all feminine activities, a pair of trousers is not in the least necessary, as a short skirt satisfies the practical conditions just as well. I am here speaking of forms of dress which are intended for serious criticism. As a joke, a women may wear almost anything whether on the stage or at a fancy-dress ball.

The influence of climate upon dress is patent, and for reasons of health people may be obliged to eschew many kinds of raiment which are in themselves very graceful, such as Classic dress, for instance, which is hardly suitable for northern latitudes. But the Greek and Roman tunics, beautiful though these may be, are by no means the only becoming garments. Men's dress fit for the

coldest temperature can be elegantly designed, and it is needless to point out the variety of exquisite fur cloaks, seal-skin jackets and other winter costumes for women.

The art of dress serves the art of the cultivation of human beauty by clothing the body warmly and comfortably. But besides ministering to the physical wants it has an influence for good in that it often enhances such beauty as a person may possess. Here we enter ground which, in a sense, is transitional between that occupied by the first two of the visual arts. A great regard for clothes is sometimes held to be a sign of vanity, but it is possible to contend that as great if not greater conceit is shown by the people who wilfully neglect the art of dress, for these latter seem to imagine that their moral virtues are of such a high order that they can afford to dispense with manners. They do not realise how much pleasure others derive from the sight of the human form becomingly apparelled. Those who are anxious to avoid giving offence may find a great relief in dress, by means of which certain optical illusions are made possible, illusions that disguise physical defects. It is our duty to our neighbours not to draw attention to our worst points. Excessive stoutness and excessive leanness and other abnormalities of figure can be made less obtrusive by various sartorial devices. This is not to advocate a deceit as a substitute for elegant form. The true remedy for ugliness is slow and consists in the gradual elimination of the ill-favoured types, but the course proposed is at least a palliative the adoption of which would

show that both beauty and manners were receiving the regard which is their proper due.

It will be remembered that the visual art of manners is of two kinds, the personal and the social. It is unnecessary to describe at great length the blemishes of dress which would be counted an offence against the former kind of manners. This species of vulgarity consists in an exaggeration of one aspect of the human figure, which is not the most important; we find, perhaps, the best evidence of this in the offensive caricatures which disfigure the worst sort of illustrated comic newspaper.

The method whereby deference is shown to the second kind of manners requires a more lengthy analysis, for it cannot be understood unless we study the character of the highly complicated *ritual* of dress. I refer not only to the distinctive raiments worn by the king on his throne, the judge, the mayor, the soldier, and the priest, and to the hundred other uniforms and liveries, but also to the costumes which ordinary civilians wear on special occasions. A complex civilisation is supported by this ritual. When the king is being crowned, will somebody assume a counterfeit of royal robes? Who but the barristers and those officially entitled will attire themselves with wig and gown when entering a law-court? When a wedding is about to take place, will anyone except the appointed bride venture to appear in a long white veil spreading to the feet? The conventions of dress rest upon such a secure foundation that, for the most part, they are undisputed. Even to put the questions I have just asked seems

unnecessary and foolish, a ruthless tearing up of a field which has been smoothly tilled.

How impatient people would become if an offender wanted to argue the matter and to give reasons for his transgression! Suppose, for instance, that a self-opinionated man who came to a tennis party in evening dress were to say to his hostess: "I am very sorry, but I could not find my flannels, so I put on the only other thin suit I possessed. I have often danced all night in these clothes and they are perfectly well adapted for violent exercise. But, really, why should I bother so much about these niceties of toilet? A man's character is the thing that matters and his clothes are merely superficial. To a less enlightened person than yourself I might have felt constrained to apologise in more abject terms, but I will not insult you by supposing that you ascribe much importance to such a trifle as convention in dress." Nobody would deign to bandy words with such a simpleton as that. In spite of his plausible reasonings he would be considered absolutely insane. In fact, his case would be specified as an example of the pitiable manner in which reason leads people astray. But this would be untrue, for it was not his reason which led him astray but his inability to reason. Although society would not take the trouble to investigate his error and explain it to him, the error may briefly be stated here, because the exposure of it will throw some light upon this subject of dress.

In the first place, by defying convention the man was making himself unduly conspicuous; and

whereas in reality he was just a player among players, his garb would seem to indicate that he had some special relation to the rest of the company. In isolating himself from them in that way he was guilty of a breach of manners. Secondly, he had not thought of the real reasons for the choice of flannels and of black cloth for the occasions in question. As tennis is played generally in the summer, it is desirable to wear a light-coloured material, because it reflects the heat best. Flannel is chosen because it can be easily washed and can with comfort be worn next to the skin. Why do men wear white flannels, it may be asked, and not any of the pale pinks, blues or yellows such as are often chosen for the summer costumes of women? The answer here is analogous to the argument concerning the skirt. There must be a differentiation between the sexes, and that is why at many kinds of social functions women wear coloured clothes whilst men have to confine themselves either to white or to black.

As the art of dress grows in maturity the special tones are reserved for somewhat special occasions. Thus it has gradually come about that black is of all others the festive tone. It is the *smartest* shade of dress which anyone can wear. The manual labourer who puts on a black coat on Sunday realises immediately that he is performing an act of ceremony; for there are thousands of greys, blues, and browns but only one black. Hence we find that black is used by men not only for funerals, in which case it is associated with mourning, but at dances, weddings, special calls and at church services. This is not a passing

phase, for in the present advanced state of society the convention has come to stay. Black, by virtue of its uniqueness, must be reserved for unique occasions—that is if dress is to be a true reflection of manners.

It is noteworthy that men, in their determination of fashions, although they have given to the other sex by far the greater variety and flashiness of attire, have reserved the most pronounced kind of formality, the wearing of black, almost entirely for themselves. It would be highly undesirable that this custom should be extended to women. The darkness of the men's clothing forms an agreeable foil for the variegated tints of the feminine garments, which in their turn enhances the blackness of the black. If, as in certain periods of history, this convention concerning colour be reversed, that is the mark of an ill-regulated or of a somewhat primitive society. It is true that peacocks are more gorgeous than their mates, but men must follow a different standard. If, in addition to the natural distinction which they enjoy through a superiority in height, men claimed for their persons the artificial emphasis which is derived from gaudiness of apparel, and if it were furthermore decreed that women should, in a spirit of self-sacrifice, be content with dull and drab habiliment, then the two sexes would not be united in any genial relation, and the social balance would be grievously upset. On the other hand, were it to come about that women surpassed men in strength and stature, it would be obviously unfair for them to retain their present privileges

in the matter of dress. In such altered circumstances it would be proper that the husband should be decked in silks and satins and all manner of bright and lovely raiment, while the wife, scorning such adventitious aids to beauty, should clothe herself in stiff materials of sombre hue; and if woman denied this favour to her diminutive consort, it would be clear that her domination was not tempered by an honourable clemency and she would stand revealed as a tyrant.

At present, however, it is incumbent upon men not to attire themselves too resplendently. But this is not to say that they should be forbidden to wear colours at all. Except at certain kinds of social functions their dress ought to have colour, though a subdued colour. Bright ties, bright hat-ribbons and little bright stripes on their shirts are quite permissible, but if any man venture to don a suit which is a vivid green, or a very rich purple, or a brown that borders on crimson he will soon be informed that he is becoming effeminate. The soldier's dress uniform is a different matter, because it is not intended that any individual should be exalted by it. The soldier is gorgeously clad in order that the national army may receive its proper meed of respect.

Dress must take into account not only sex but age, and here the question of colour again arises. It is becoming that children should be very gaily dressed, because they constitute, as it were, a republic by themselves, and the conventions of adult society ought not to rest too heavily upon them. There is not the slightest reason why a little boy of six should not run about in scarlet.

But besides colour there is form, and it is important that every succeeding stage of youth should be marked by its appropriate cut of costume. Any attempt to introduce uniformity here would be a sign that the art of dress was being controlled by people devoid of imagination. The periods of adolescence are sometimes held to be merely transitional, but each of them has the character not only of a transition but of a separate and perfect state which is well worthy of artistic celebration. A child is not a little man or a little woman, but something differing in kind from either. The clothes of a boy of ten ought not to be a small replica of those of a boy of fifteen, and the latter ought not to dress like a young man of twenty. The need for this differentiation is often recognised. For instance, even in those schools where it is ordained that all the pupils shall wear long trousers, we find that the younger have very short jackets and wide collars, those of medium age have jackets of medium length, while the prefects have coats with tails. Of course, each school will create for itself its own peculiar sartorial convention. The point is that these distinctions are natural to boyhood and prevail in all schools which possess, as every school should do, a substantial measure of self-government. The clothing of the legs provides another opportunity for a symbolic series, ascending from the little socks and bare legs to the stockings and shorts, and thence to knickerbockers of the ordinary kind. Unfortunately, owing to a certain universal laziness, the small changes in boys' dress tends to become obliterated. It is so much

easier to put a boy in a man's suit than to study the type of costume which best befits him.

In the case of girls the problem is just as complex, and just as urgently demands a satisfactory solution. Here, in the method of disposing the hair, there is an additional *motif* to play upon, and the average mother is quick to seize advantage of this. She finds pleasure in making her daughter display various kinds of pig-tail and other formal and informal arrangements of long tresses, which help to emphasise the several stages of girlhood. The character of the dress and the extent of its embellishment must also be considered. It seems to be commonly agreed that the frock, starting at a point above the knees, should with the advance of years undergo a progressive elongation until it finally reaches the ankles. This fulfils the requirements admirably and provides an easy method of making sure that the fact of youth receives adequate recognition. When attending to the question of ornament it is well to bear in mind the inviolable æsthetic rule that great multiplicity of detail must have a fairly large background before it can give pleasure to the eye. Nothing looks worse than the figure of a child overburdened with elaborate lace and other fripperies.

For adults the passing of years need not entail a very conspicuous change of costume, but it is desirable that certain habits of dress should be regarded as the exclusive privilege of old age.

We have seen that dress serves the art of the cultivation of human beauty and it also serves the

art of manners. There may be occasions, however, when the two kinds of service appear to conflict. It is then always preferable to make the art of manners the first consideration, for the degree of self-sacrifice demanded is only temporary. On a very hot day in August one is doing no good to one's health by putting on a frock-coat and silk hat on the occasion of a funeral, but one is strong enough to endure a slight discomfort out of respect to a friend and for the maintenance of an honourable social convention. Yet to wear a frock-coat every day throughout the summer in the City of London, when engaged on one's ordinary business, is highly absurd; this would be an instance of that excessive formality which was condemned in the last chapter. On the other hand the people who think it a virtue to be sandalled and to go about bereft of hat and collar are equally lacking in mental balance. What is generally called ' rational ' dress is the very negation of reason. The advocates of this sort of rationality have concentrated their attention upon a single aspect of dress and have ignored all the others. As their love of health is accompanied by a disregard for manners they are incompetent to institute reforms in the art of dress, for this latter has naturally two functions and cannot be permitted to neglect either.

It would be untrue to say, however, that the forms and practices belonging to the third of the visual arts are entirely determined by its subordination to the first and the second. If that were so, dress would have reached its final stage and there would have developed a set of

conventions, highly elaborate, indeed, and expressive of nearly every relation of human life, but yet constant. But this art has so many potentialities, it is so subtle and profound that the task of serving the cause of human beauty and of manners does not absorb quite the whole of its energy; it can do both of these things and still have freedom to display a group of changes differing in character from those which have just been discussed. I refer to the existence of fashion. It is not enough that there should be variations in dress corresponding with variations in its function. There are innumerable styles of overcoat which fulfil the practical and social objects of an overcoat equally well, and if such an article of clothing is to be allowed to realise its true nature, all these styles must have their turn. Of course, it would be possible for them to appear simultaneously, but that would result in confusion. One of the advantages of fashion is that while permitting variety it secures a certain measure of order. Yet there is no danger of the discipline becoming oppressive, because the maintenance of a single style does not necessitate an unpleasant degree of uniformity. In a given year a particular cut of jacket may prevail, but in the choice of the hue and texture of the material considerable freedom may be left to the individual. Again, there is the very wide skirt and there is the narrow skirt, and each has its peculiar merit. But no skirt can be very wide and also narrow at the same time; there is no archetype that has all the beauties for which a skirt can be distinguished. Hence, periodically, the shape of the skirt must

be altered, for otherwise the complete character and range of this garment will not find expression. Nevertheless, the purveyor of fashion is not at liberty to introduce any new type which happens to take his fancy. Certain limits are clearly defined and cannot with propriety be overstepped. If the skirt is so narrow that its wearer can hardly walk, or so voluminous as to be burdensome, it is physically injurious and offends against the first of the visual arts. If it becomes very short there is an encroachment upon the privileges of childhood; if a cleavage be surreptitiously introduced so that the skirt ventures to partake of the nature of a pair of trousers there is then an encroachment upon the privileges of masculinity. Society cannot prosper unless the mutual relationship of man, woman and child is emphasised in dress. Tailors, in their desire for novelty, may sometimes transgress the prevailing code of manners, but generally they abstain from the worst extravagances because they know that a critical public is watching them. Fashion is created by a public demand and is not imposed by a self-interested clique. It has been said that its purpose is merely to please the wealthy classes who always wish to be ahead of the others and object to having their modes copied. But this theory is based upon too low an estimate of human nature, and does not take into account the other factors which are themselves sufficient cause for the prevalence of fashion.

The nature of fashion is apt to be misunderstood because the term is loosely used. Fashion is the superficial change in costume, which has for its

object the attainment of variety. It does not in any way affect the permanent laws of dress, for those owe their origin to a social necessity of a much more urgent kind. Many people, when the subject of dress is mentioned, think only of fashion, because fashion, through being constantly altered, acquires an artificial prominence; but as they know that the fleeting changes have no very profound meaning, they conclude that there is no serious philosophy of dress. It is just as if they imagined that the constitution of the sea was completely manifested in the dancing of its waves. And as criticism of dress so often resolves itself into gossip about its least essential element, it is not surprising that the third of the visual arts does not usually receive the honour to which it is entitled.

A great deal more might be remarked concerning dress, but to enlarge upon this topic any further would be to lengthen unduly a particular part of my argument. Enough has perhaps been said to indicate what an important thing dress is, and how intimately it is related to the arts which are superior to it.

CHAPTER V.

On Architecture.

Architecture takes within its scope things both large and small. It includes landscape design, the planning of cities, towns and villages, the proper arrangement of roads, bridges and other engineering features. On the other hand, besides the individual building it comprises all its appurtenances such as furniture, and also such painting and sculpture as may be formally related to it and necessary to its complete design; but this latter will receive only a passing reference here, for it can more conveniently be discussed in the the next chapter.

How does architecture serve the art of the cultivation of human beauty, how does it serve the art of manners? These are the questions which must now be asked and, if possible, intelligently answered. As in the case of dress, as soon as we recognise the hierarchy of the arts we are provided with a criterion of judgment. If architecture offends against the first of the arts it becomes injurious to health; if it offends against the second it becomes vulgar. It would be incorrect to say that it directly serves the art of dress, but we shall find presently that the architect, when he begins

to study his subject in its social aspect, has a great deal to learn from the third of the visual arts, which is in a far more advanced state of development than the one he himself practises. Dress is prior both historically and in point of general interest, and architecture stands to gain everything by being related to such a highly popular art. In fact, they have done an ill service to architecture who have exalted its claims too much, for it seems greater in content, subtler and more attractive if it is known to be akin to other æsthetic activities, especially if these latter, being very near to our persons, are instinct with the very spirit of humanity.

The interest which most people have in architecture is a practical one, that is, they are concerned with buildings in so far as they minister to their comfort and convenience. From the point of view of the philosophy of æsthetics which is here being expounded this attitude is entirely commendable. The main object of architecture is to satisfy the elementary needs of men and women; if a building be not roomy, well ventilated and properly fitted with sanitary appliances, it fails in its first purpose, which is to further the development of the human species. It is true that a building may show a disregard of these utilitarian necessities, and yet have a very agreeable form. In such an instance it has a certain beauty, but its subject is wrong. The error is not confined to subject, however, for it extends to form, namely, to the form of the men and women whose beauty is impaired by the unhealthy conditions. And human bodies are

immeasurably more important than the forms of architecture, however splendid. To think otherwise is to make an idol of architecture, to make it a Moloch to which human beings are sacrificed. Thus, to neglect the utilitarian aspect of architecture is not merely a lack of practicalness for which an artist may be excused, but an æsthetic offence of the first magnitude, not so much against architecture as against the art of the cultivation of human beauty, which it is the business of architecture to serve.

The æsthetic ideal includes the utilitarian, but the practical person is not entitled to consider himself a complete artist. In the chapter dealing with the grammar of design it will be shown that every object, besides fulfilling its appropriate function, must satisfy certain laws of composition. But without anticipating the second part of this volume, it may be remarked that the man who thinks of nothing but utility is not only ignorant of form, but he has an imperfect conception of the subject of art, for he overlooks some of its most important social elements.

Such a lack of understanding is occasionally shown by those who make a point of praising the country at the expense of the town. In expressing their fondness of the animal vigour which may be acquired in the country they fail to do justice to the town, which from time immemorial has been the chief centre of civilisation. These theorists imagine that the country is the origin of all manliness and virtue, while the town is symbolic of vice and decadence, that the country is natural, while the town is artificial and therefore a needless

luxury. They claim to be the champions of simplicity and health, and consider themselves wiser, more moral and more practical than the benighted urban population. Now, it is clear that if this attitude of mind were a correct one, the fourth of the visual arts would be of very small account indeed. The architect is thus in the unfortunate position of a man who, before attempting to explain his craft, must justify its existence. As his chief interest lies in the cities, which, of course, represent by far the greater part of the architectural achievement of the race, he must defend them against their detractors, and his best way of doing this is to prove that these large aggregations of buildings are indispensable to human welfare and need not in the least be destructive of that animal vigour which is so justly admired.

The city is apt to have innumerable faults, but nobody has yet proved that these are inseparable from it. The two chief faults of the ordinary city are noise and congestion. The incessant racket and bustle have a most injurious effect upon its inhabitants, and even if they get used to such an infliction their senses are sure to become blunted by it in time. We must therefore aim at the attainment of quietude by the better regulation of traffic and by the planning of residential areas where people can sleep or meditate without being disturbed. As for the overcrowding, this too is an avoidable evil, and its remedy lies in the provision of additional housing accommodation. If the towns are too small for the people who wish to live in them, that does not furnish an argument

against towns. Some reformers seem to think that although men are willing to endure great discomfort in order to have the privilege of satisfying their gregarious instincts, they ought to be torn from the environment they have chosen and planted out like vegetables upon the country side. But instead of repudiating the idea of the town, it is obviously our duty to retain the town, while making it so commodious that all who choose can dwell there in conditions of health and comfort. If the medical authorities produced evidence to show that every terrace, every continuous street, every city built up close is necessarily a hot-bed of disease, then we should have to submit to living in horribly monotonous tracts of country dotted with little cottages carefully isolated from each other, just as if the whole world were a fever hospital. It has not yet been demonstrated, however, that a compliance with the dictates of hygiene entails such a sacrifice of the most splendid achievements in the art of building. By continuous architecture the dignity of communal existence finds expression. The architect will not willingly surrender his right to design in the grand manner, nor is society likely to be gratified at the prospect of going back to dwelling-places which, in their configuration, would appear to be a revival of the primitive hut. Most people, instead of abandoning the city, would prefer to believe that by the improvement of its architecture and by the addition of adequate recreation grounds, parks and other amenities, it could be made a pleasant place to live in.

Although the city is the true home of man it

must not be his prison, and it is desirable that he should be able to refresh his spirit by communion with nature. It is to those whose minds have been developed through contact with the polite assemblage of men that Nature makes its most intimate appeal. The illiterate rural labourer is blind not only to the charms of art but to the charms of Nature as well. Moreover, by congregating large societies within limited areas, we make sure that the beauties of natural scenery will be preserved. If the population were thinly spread over the widest possible territories, nearly every landscape would be broken up and nobody would be able to enjoy the full advantage either of company or of solitude. This latter system of estate development would not find favour even among those who are employed upon farms. Agricultural pursuits must be accompanied by the delights of city life, or else, as the general standard of culture advances, it will become ever more and more difficult to persuade people to take part in them. Eventually it will be necessary to work the fields from the towns, and an increase in the facilities for quick travel will make this possible. There is no need to anticipate that the physique of the human race would be impaired by such a mode of life. The spacious architecture of the city can be just as healthy as the most picturesque of thatched cottages.

Architecture, besides serving the first of the visual arts by protecting man from the heat, the cold, the rain, and from all manner of diseases, has another relation to the human body in that it aids its proper display. It is a background

against which figures are set. Buildings must be made to take account of the scale of the human figure, and they must not be ridiculously small nor yet monstrously large. If dwellings are diminished in size beyond a certain point, the people who live in them do not appear to be magnified by contrast. As the dwellings look like dolls' houses which have just been taken out of a toy-box, the inmates also seem to be imbued with some of the triviality which appertains to dolls. All tiny detached cottages are apt to have the offensive quality of belittling their occupants, so it is advisable, when dealing with very small habitations, to group them into larger wholes.

On the other hand, the unit of design should not be extended indefinitely. Many a stately fabric reflects glory upon its creator, but when the wild ambition of artists leads them to erect structures so colossal that men and women look like insects beside them, the main purpose of art will not be fulfilled. For the purpose of art is to endow matter with mind, and this cannot be accomplished if mind is brought into disrepute as is certainly the case when human beings, the highest embodiment of mind, are themselves humiliated before huge creations in stone. This is an insult, not to any individual, but to the humanity which is common to us all. It is natural, of course, that the individual should be conscious of his own subordinate position when in the presence of some vast assemblage of public buildings that expresses the majesty of the state to which he belongs; in this instance, however, a sense of his own comparative unimportance is accompanied by one

of exaltation in that he is a member of a great society. The magnificence of the whole sheds lustre upon the parts. But our spirits are not elevated when architectural fabrics are allowed to attain such dimensions that our bodily forms are made to appear mean, petty, infinitesimal. It is necessary for our welfare that we should retain a pride in our own type and species.

Some people hold that even St. Peter's Cathedral is too big and has not so much dignity as St. Paul's of London, which is far smaller. The grandeur of the Pyramids may doubtless be cited, but the Pyramids have all the simplicity of mountains. They are the decoration of a desert. A solitary monument may be as gigantic as we please, but when a dwelling-place is unduly inflated, when a façade is increased either in height or breadth to such an extent that the windows, the visible symbols of the human use to which the building has been devoted, lose their identity as windows and become insignificant factors in an immense pattern, then architecture overreaches itself and sublimity suddenly degenerates into dulness. The noblest works of architecture never detract from the dignity of the human body, but on the contrary they enhance it.

Let us now consider another element of the fourth of the visual arts, the element which expresses its relation to the demeanour of our persons. A building can signify many things: it may be an example of the proper performance of a utilitarian function, it may indicate strength and stability, and it may have other virtues, but it will never be of the first rank unless it also possess

the gracious attribute of manners. Sometimes houses ignore their neighbours, or else parts of them ignore other parts in a way that is suggestive of nothing but ill-breeding. Unfortunately the error is not an affair of practice alone, but has its roots in theory. There are two æsthetic doctrines widely held that in a certain measure militate against the possibility of good manners: we are told that a building ought at all costs fully to reveal its purpose, and also that its construction must be prominently displayed. These precepts are closely allied to one another and originate in a desire to attain what is called "truthfulness" in art. Nobody can deny that these are plausible precepts, but they are nevertheless responsible for much that is ugly and extremely vulgar in architecture.

Buildings which show a total disregard of their environment are most obnoxious. The gravity of their offence will be recognised when we consider how vast is the number of views both in our towns and in their immediate vicinity that are completely spoilt because dominated by hideous backs of terraces and separate dwellings with their fussy little protrusions and outhouses in which some degree of dignity and order might have been attained if only a little extra care had been devoted to their planning. If the "truthful" architect be told that the kitchen offices he has designed are an appalling eyesore, he will reply that they indicate their purpose and that one can desire nothing more than this, for expression is the highest form of artistic achievement. With a note of triumph in his

voice he will ask us to look at Nature, and to admit that all animals and plants express their purpose and it is this that gives them beauty. Yet it is possible to answer this theorist. Everybody is aware that animals and plants have a perfect beauty of their own, but they are inferior to human beings in that they have no manners. A visit to the Zoological Gardens is a lesson in impropriety. We see a concourse of beasts that have little in common except a complete lack of self-control; and the untempered discord of monkeys and parrots gives but a faint idea of the anarchy that prevailed in the primeval jungle. Things are little better in the plant world; among trees, shrubs and creepers the habit of mutual disregard is firmly established. Art cannot follow the model of these lower organisms, for art is a human product, and our buildings must not only subserve our uses but acknowledge our social standards.

A dog expresses his whole personality, he is absolutely naive and frank, he is ashamed of nothing; but it is the peculiarity of human beings that for every little they reveal there is much they conceal. This reticence is necessary for intercourse, and without it there can be no comity either among people or among things. Architecture will be of a low order unless individual buildings cease to assert themselves unduly, and show a restraint symbolic of the recognition that they are but parts of a larger whole. Thus full expression should never be the aim of the designer, but only expression, subject to certain very rigid limitations. A house may

venture to assume such beauty as is consistent with the beauty of the city to which it belongs.

Bad manners can also be shown in the very structure of the building itself. In this instance the breach of good taste is euphemistically called "truthfulness in construction." The appeal to nature is even less happy in this instance than in the former. The bones of our body are not exposed to view, and the crude outlines of our sinews are modified by a covering of flesh; in the case of trees the bark covers the trunk. An ungainly arrangement of girders may have a certain dignity if it support a viaduct of gigantic span; but to lay bare an ordinary steel truss to our gaze, a framework which has no other merit except its mechanical stability, which has neither the beauty derived from the organic inter-relation of its parts nor the interest attaching to a notable feat of engineering skill—this is an affront for which there can be no excuse except that afforded by the sternest necessities of economy. It is often seemly that the construction of things should be concealed. In the case of a piano, for instance, the harp which everybody knows exists inside is hidden by a rectangular case which does deference to the other articles of furniture in the room. The best gramophone, and the one that expresses the most aristocratic temper, is enclosed in a simple and well designed box which accords far better with its surroundings than does a vast horn that continually attracts to itself an attention of which it is not worthy.

Let us consider at greater length the architectural reflection of manners, the manners

that consist in the maintenance of correct social values. The chief distinction to be observed is that between buildings in isolation and buildings in congregation. When by himself in the country a man can shout and kick up his heels and do pretty well what he pleases, but in the town he must conform to civilised usages. Yet how many frisky countrified villas do we not see waving their arms about, as it were, and dancing a jig in our modern towns! If a detached house is in a natural setting in the country, and is the chief object of interest as one approaches it, great individuality of form is quite permissible; and this also applies to any number of houses each in its own grounds and at such distances apart that they do not conflict with one another. But when such houses are so arranged that they can be seen simultaneously, the effect is one of restlessness, and in these circumstances they must be modified and brought into mutual relationship. The architect of a town house cannot with propriety introduce a multiplicity of gables and little dormers, nor allow the top windows to take no cognisance whatsoever of the lower ones, as if his æsthetic canons were derived from too literal an interpretation of the text "Let not thy left hand know what thy right hand doeth."

It is in the city that the problem of architectural character arises, for such character is little more than a species of deportment, a stationary, silent ritual. Buildings must be in proximity to each other before it is necessary to ask whether their proper social rank has been expressed. In the midst of a spacious park there may be a chateau

having turrets with high steeples at its corners, but place it in the town in such a position that the very church spires are set at nought and the building immediately becomes a vulgar intruder.

A city must be given an intelligible pattern, and as the pattern has for its subject-matter the habitation of a human society, it follows that if there is to be any correspondence between the subject and the form, the points of emphasis, the pivots of the pattern must be those buildings which have a peculiar social importance and are points of emphasis and pivots of the social structure of the community. There are various methods of accentuation. The majority of the buildings can be kept low while just a few towers, domes and spires are conspicuous; here the formality resembles that which is shown when the priest is raised above his congregation. Another device is to arrange a group of tall structures in an orderly manner around some large, low, massive building, which thus appears most dignified and important: it is as if the retainers stand up whilst majesty is seated.

Besides the big architectural shapes which can be seen from afar, certain decorative attributes can be made to support the scheme of values. For instance, colossal classic orders could be preserved for buildings of great social consequence; and a similar restriction might be imposed upon the use of very rich cornices and many other kinds of sculptural embellishment. There is a tendency to endow structures with architectural grandeur for no other reason than that their owners have more money than they know

what to do with. Of course, it may easily be that fabrics erected for utilitarian purposes may occupy even more ground than a university or a cathedral, but that does not entitle them to domineer over the whole town. A shop with a big dome is rather like a private citizen who chooses to don the mayoral robe and chain simply because he could afford to buy them and thought they were becoming to him. That the former anomaly should be so common whilst the latter is quite unheard of shows that people do not consider their architecture to be of such serious import to them as is their dress.

Different types of building have not all got the same right to be prominent, and if we could achieve a nice adjustment of their rival claims a beneficial change would come over the appearance of our cities. This result will be brought about when it is realised that architecture, so far from being a difficult and recondite art about which none but the learned are entitled to express an opinion, is really subservient to the art of manners, a thing which concerns everybody most closely. The advantage of making this clear will be patent at once. If an architect's work is criticised on purely technical grounds, he will often be quite indifferent, and reply that architecture is a matter of individual taste. As soon as it is suggested to him, however, that he has been guilty of a breach of manners, he will be inclined to listen; for, whereas many people are quite pleased at being notorious for their eccentric views about art, everybody hates being accused of bad breeding. Of course, a great deal of inferior

architecture exhibits vulgarity because it is conceived by vulgarians who eat and do everything else in a vulgar way, but some of it is in a different class. Some of it has this blemish because the polite and agreeable people who are responsible for it have been taught by their academic masters that architecture has no other virtue except that derived from good construction, or the right use of materials, or its power to express the personality of the designer. But good manners can never be an independent creation, because they consist in an act of deference to society; and architecture, in its developed civic form, must express the spirit of society.

As the time may seldom recur when the patronage of princes or rich men will enable architects to execute their projects without being obliged to appeal to popular taste, they will not be able to achieve anything great unless the whole commonalty is imbued with a love of architecture. By this I do not mean a predilection for ivy-covered ruins, or the passion of antiquaries and Romanticists who have such skill in determining the dates of Gothic churches, or who revel in the historical associations that palaces and castles call to mind. There is an abundance of this sort of sentiment, and the people who indulge in it often flatter themselves that they are connoisseurs of architecture. But in order that they should have a real claim to such a title, it is not enough that they should admire these ancient things. They must also have both the will and the competence to adopt a critical attitude towards every modern structure, towards the block of

offices, the shop, the station, the factory, the bridge and the very pavement upon which they tread.

Nearly everything we revere in the architecture of the past has been the work of the few, but henceforth the power to command great things will rest with the many. A noble street that is created at the bidding of a democracy is of profounder significance than a whole city laid out by a tyrant, for the former indicates the attainment of a high level of general culture. It is by the average man that a civilisation must be judged. This last statement is not a denial of the ultimate responsibility of great individuals. When one condemns a people one condemns its prophets too; for either they were only learned and had no knowledge of the things that really matter, or else, possessing such knowledge, they were incapable of communicating it to others.

But the relation between the teacher and the taught sometimes appears to be reversed, and it is so in the case of architecture. The art of dress is many centuries in advance of architecture. This is because the average man has been compelled to practise it himself, and because dress being something pliable can easily be made reflective of social values. Architects have much to learn, therefore, from the art of dress, and if they wish their own art to share the esteem of the latter they must explain to the average man that they are not engaged in an attempt to convert him to some new philosophy of their own, but are only suggesting that he should apply to architecture the same canons of propriety which he himself

makes use of in his criticism of dress. The correspondence between the third and the fourth of the visual arts will seem still more obvious when in the second part of this volume it is made clear by the help of diagrams that clothes and buildings exemplify the identical grammar of design. A knowledge of the principles of dress would help the architect to expose a certain fallacy by which popular criticism of his art is apt to be vitiated, the fallacy that artistic merit is derived from some virtue in the act of craftsmanship. Nobody would say of a gown decked with elaborate embroidery that it was worthy of especial praise simply because the embroiderer had taken delight in her toil. It would be recognised immediately that the gown must be judged by quite other standards. People would ask whether or not it was too ornate for the occasion on which it was used, and whether its design gave the correct emphasis to the various parts of the human body.

In architecture so many practical and constructional questions supervene that the distinctively æsthetic and human attributes are often neglected. Of course, if an architect, in spite of all the obstacles which are placed in his way, succeeds in endowing his buildings with these qualities, there stands to his credit an achievement which is far higher than that of a man who helps to formulate, or who apprehends and practises, conventions in dress. Perhaps in securing the adoption of his design for a street he may have to influence public opinion, to cajole shopkeepers, and to contend successfully with a town council. It is not enough for the architect

to have a clear vision of the purpose of his art; he is obliged to have social qualities of a high order. Moreover, he must be able to cope with the difficulties involved in the convenient arrangement of buildings and their serviceable construction, the supervision of materials and contracts, and, lastly, he must have a technical skill in draughtsmanship, which cannot be acquired without years of training.

But although architecture demands a more formidable effort on the part of the man who practises it than does the art of dress, it does not follow that the latter is not prior in rank. One gets an erroneous impression by comparing a big building with a costume. The costume is small and easily made, while the building may be a towering structure which took five hundred labourers a year to erect. One must compare dress as a whole with architecture as a whole, and it will then become obvious that the former occupies a larger place in the thoughts of men and women and fulfils a more elementary need than does architecture. Nevertheless, a great architect is one of the chief personages of his age, for he is regarded as a chosen interpreter of the human spirit. But however skilled in the art of dress a man might become, he could never occupy a very prominent position, because the responsibility for the welfare of this art is fairly evenly divided among all the members of society.

The elaborate nature of the technique of architecture has been the cause of much mental confusion. There seems to have been created a duality of interest—the building itself and the

company of men who are entrusted with the mechanical task of its erection. Some theorists, when judging a building, concentrate their minds upon the condition of the labourer, and contend that if the labourer is a slave no good architecture can result. The other view, as generally propounded, is that the design has nothing to do with the craftsman, as the virtue of a building is dependent upon its form and its social utility. This view is correct so far as it goes, but it does not represent the whole truth, for its exponents lay themselves open to the charge of overrating the virtues peculiar to a building and of underrating the value of human life. If the men who raised an Egyptian temple were slave-driven and transformed into machines, if they were broken and bowed down under the lash, this would show that the total act of building was inartistic, because even if the temple was a superb monument, in the process of its construction much human beauty was destroyed, and human beauty is of greater worth than such beauty as can appertain to a fabric of stone. And it must be admitted that if a Gothic church is the result of the leisurely exercise of the craftsman's creative faculty, if in the course of its construction the craftsman grew in health and strength and happiness, then, no matter in what respect the design of this particular church may be inferior to that of the Egyptian temple, the total act of its building did less to hinder the fulfilment of the æsthetic ideal than did the total act of building the temple.

As a matter of fact, the assumption in each

case is historically incorrect. There is no evidence that the Egyptian, although a slave, was incapable of taking delight in his work; in the ancient world some of the greatest artists were slaves. On the other hand, without in the least degree disparaging the natural gifts of the mediæval craftsman, one may point out that in recruiting labour for the building of Gothic cathedrals the methods of the press-gang were not unknown.

This question of the place of the craftsman in architecture is completely resolved as soon as the order of precedence of the visual arts is borne in mind. A regard for the first of these arts would lead to the framing of regulations which would safeguard the welfare of manual labourers in every conceivable trade. But it only creates misunderstanding if a direct attention to the person of the craftsman be considered the essential part of the practice of architecture itself. A building exists to satisfy the needs of those who inhabit it rather than of the masons and carpenters employed upon its construction.

Some people hold that if only the architect were abolished and a general body of free craftsmen appointed in his place, then great architecture would result, popular, democratic architecture, in fact. But if in addition to serving the first of the visual arts architecture does not also serve the second, it suffers from the fault of vulgarity, and there is no guarantee that such a body would have any apprehension of this fact. The choice of the subject and form of a building can only be determined by philosophical considerations.

It is undesirable, of course, that labourers should work at tasks which they do not understand. The remedy, however, is not to make the craftsman independent and to induce him to suppose that this independence will in itself lead to the production of good work, but for the architect to supply to the men engaged upon a building a brief account of the æsthetic scheme. By such means the workman will know that he is not a blind tool, but has been taken into the confidence of his chief. And if the ideas of the latter are in accordance with reason and lucidly expressed they will inevitably meet with the approval of the labourer, who will make these ideas his own and work with a good will for their fulfilment. Nor would any architect of merit refuse to perform this act of grace if once he were assured that it would be appreciated. He would know that a failure to comply with a request for enlightenment on the part of the workmen would be injurious to his reputation; for most people would certainly suspect, and with good cause, that if a man is not prepared to justify the main points of his design, that design has not had expended upon it the amount of thought and care to which it is entitled.

When the organic unity of the scheme has been explained the labourer will know what he is doing, and such knowledge will probably give him pleasure in his employment; but it is dangerous to reverse the proposition and to say that a man's work is to be commended simply because the performance of it brings him happiness. Some of the worst writers, musicians and painters take

a wonderful pleasure in their work. But what gives joy to them gives pain to others.

It would be unprofitable to pursue the present topic much further at this stage, because we have not yet taken proper account of the formal element in architecture. We have so far confined ourselves almost entirely to its subject. As there are many aspects of this art which cannot be studied with advantage until the grammar of design has been investigated, I shall postpone their consideration to the third part of this volume.

But there is one more point which may be touched upon here. Much has been written about the historical significance of architecture; that is not surprising, for the buildings of the past constitute an important historical record. It must not be forgotten, however, that the chief purpose of architecture is to serve the senior arts. Unless the historian bears this in mind he is unable even to read the record which he values so highly. But if he find out how far the architecture of a particular period conduced to the cultivation of human beauty and manners he can judge of the degree of development attained by the society which brought it into being. By recognising the hierarchy of the arts we become possessed of an instrument both of creation and of criticism.

CHAPTER VI.

On Painting and Sculpture.

The prime distinction between the major and the minor arts is that the former are expressed in terms of reality whilst the latter are only reflections of that reality. However much the painter may conventionalise a theme, however skilfully he may manipulate the elements of his picture in order to create a pattern, his work must always have an imitative character. "The Fine Arts" need not be realistically representative, but representative of something or other they must be, if their products are not to degenerate into geometrical diagrams or else mere scribbles.

It may be well here to indicate briefly the nature of the difficulties with which we shall have to contend in the analysis of this subject. The difficulties are not of the same kind as those which have been encountered in the discussion of the other arts. Before it was possible to gain a knowledge of the first two of the visual arts many personal questions had to be considered, because these arts are so intimately related to the person that unless the claims of some of the rival elements in human nature had been reconciled, the good repute of the æsthetic ideal could not have been

established. Architecture, being further removed from us, could be discussed without this kind of embarrassment. In the case of a building, however, the agent and the object are separate, and this very separation was the cause of fresh misunderstanding, for the failure to recognise the dual character of the creative act resulted in the fallacies concerning craftsmanship and construction. Fortunately, in dealing with painting and sculpture, it is not necessary to trouble about the problem of mechanical construction, but the technique of these arts is more complex than that of architecture because the intricacies of representation itself are innumerable. In fact, the questions which concern the proper treatment of colour, shadows and perspective absorb so much of the attention of painters that it is a marvel if they do not forget the real purpose of the art which they are practising. Painting to them is an obscure subject which only an expert is competent to discuss. For the most part they are engaged in finding answers to the conundrum "How is it possible to paint?" without having first asked themselves "What ought to be painted?" and the still more elementary question "Why paint at all?"

I shall be adopting an obvious course of procedure if in the following inquiry I first treat of the function of painting and sculpture, and afterwards attempt to examine their technique.

The function of the minor arts is to serve the major arts, and no great success can be achieved in the former if the latter do not receive the

attention they deserve. What is it that painting and sculpture really mean to us? Is it not their chief attraction in our eyes that they illustrate the charm and interest of human beings? Deduct from painting and sculpture their content of human beauty, and how lamentably the poorer they become! The noble statues of the Greeks could never have been created if the models, the exquisite figures portrayed, had not existed in real life. And it is just because the Greeks took such pains to practise the first of the visual arts, that they excelled in sculpture. It is a significant fact that among the Greeks the craftsmen and sculptors had no great social standing, because the art of reproducing beauty in stone was held to be quite subsidiary to that of the cultivation of the beauty which was alive. The cult of ugliness, however much it may appeal to cliques and coteries, is not pleasing to the average man, who always likes to look upon something that is comely. In this particular respect public sentiment is in complete accord with the profound conviction of classical antiquity. The pictures which are most admired, even the historical and religious ones, owe their popularity very largely to the fact that a well-favoured breed of men and women is represented therein. It is occasionally contended that beauty is something limited, and that artists must stray from its boundaries in search of new subjective material. Of course, if beauty is identified with a certain uninteresting type of feminine prettiness, it is not surprising that artists revolt from it and try to find refuge in the bizarre. The love of what is hideous and

grotesque, however, will never lead to a rejuvenation of painting and sculpture. If, at any time, these arts appear to be in an ailing condition, that is probably because they are trying to go ahead independently of the major ones. First let there be a revival in the art of the cultivation of human beauty, then painting and sculpture will revive as well in order to celebrate the additional beauty which has been achieved.

It is needless to point out that the authors of both pictures and statues can help to further the art of manners by a strict avoidance of vulgarity of theme. No example of figure drawing can be of the highest quality if it is the work of a person whose idea of the human form is derived from the study of men and women having neither good physique nor distinction of bearing. The artist's model must be chosen from a very wide field. In every class of society ideal models are to be found, and it should be the business of the artist to induce such people, irrespective of their status and employment, to help to provide the subject matter of art.

Again, the success of painting and sculpture is in a certain degree dependent upon the progress of the art of dress. There are many artists who look down upon the occupation of the costumier, because they think it frivolous. Yet, if we examine the sculpture and vase decoration of the Greeks, it becomes obvious that these forms of art owe much of their merit to the elegance of the classic dress. Good taste was undoubtedly shown in the way in which the drapery was modelled, but the fact cannot be obscured that the shapely

form of the Grecian garment itself was the creation not of the sculptor but of the costumier, and no amount of technical skill on the part of the former could have elevated the representation of ugly and vulgar clothes to the rank of great art. In more recent times numerous portrait painters have taken infinite delight in the careful delineation of elaborate lace, of velvet, silk and satin, and have prided themselves upon their ability to imitate the texture of these materials. In future this kind of copying had better be done by means of colour photography; but the sketches which faithfully depict the costumes of past ages are precious in our eyes not on account of their technical skill, for this is often somewhat mechanical, but because they are records of dress, which could not have been preserved to us by any other means.

There are four distinct ways in which the minor arts can show their subordination to architecture. In the first place it may be pointed out that much of the excellence of painting is derived from such architecture as may comprise part of its theme. The dignity of classical landscape is enhanced by beautiful temples and colonnades which are inserted at special points in the scenery. Nature itself is made to look more lovely when set against such a magnificent foil. Substitute for these temples a row of jerry-built villas, and both man and nature seem to be degraded. Groups of figures in great paintings whether of the East or of the West generally have some sort of an architectural background. If these figures were put in association with trivial

and slovenly houses, a discord would be established, and the scenes would be deprived of half their virtue. And there is no need to insist that the very fine sketches which illustrate cities, individual buildings and interiors owe their existence to the successful cultivation of the fourth of the visual arts.

Secondly, certain kinds of painting and sculpture are dependent upon architecture inasmuch as it is only by the help of architecture that they can be placed in their appropriate setting. Such painting and sculpture is in the strictest sense decorative, and although in its subject it may show deference to the other arts as well, by its general disposition it becomes a subordinate entity in an architectural design. Whether the work be a fresco or a panel in relief, its size and position, its general massing, and the type of conventionalisation employed must be determined by the architect, and the success of the whole is largely a measure of his ability to realise the formal necessities of the case.

Thirdly, the art of painting can have a still more direct relation to architecture. For architects are not always content to inspire the painter, or even to provide him with a grand setting for his work, but they may demand the services of painting for the prosecution of their own art. One can always photograph, it may be urged, what already exists. But one cannot photograph what has its being only in the mind of the designer, so it is necessary to make perspectives and coloured sketches of architectural schemes. For this object, and for this alone, is the copying

of existing views justified. By such copying the architect gradually acquires the skill which will enable him to elucidate his own projects. But these imaginative drawings must be realistic in their technique, for their originality lies entirely in their subject; they would fail in their purpose if they did not give an accurate idea of the proposed building or group of buildings.

Lastly, there is one other kind of picture which is subject to architectural considerations, although in saying this I am perhaps going counter to received opinion. I refer to what is popularly known as landscape painting. In my definition of architecture it will be remembered that I included under the term not only small accessories such as furniture and knicknacks of various sorts, but also the planning of cities and the arrangement of parks and landscapes. Every landscape painting which has merit either records some beauty which exists as it were by chance, or else, and this is more often the case, it is the result of conscious selection and adaptation by the painter himself, who thus performs an act of constructive criticism. He does not tell us what the landscape really was, but what he thought it ought to be. And when in time the whole country is mapped out, either to be preserved in its natural state or to be subject to some kind of modification, people will be guided by the painter in their treatment of the various areas. But he will have authority only in so far as his efforts are creative, in so far as he is able to prove that he has a distinct vision of the pictorial excellences which scenery natural or formal is capable of possessing.

The landscape sketches that are of most value are those from which the landscape architect has most to learn.

We have seen how, in their subject, painting and sculpture can show deference to the major arts. It will presently be found that they also serve them in various ways by means of their technique.

Let us consider the mechanical act of drawing, painting and sculpturing. This act cannot be held to be in itself elegant or conducive to physical development. It seems to be a stupid and ungainly performance to crouch over a table, tee-square in hand, or to sit still in a restrained attitude wielding a paint-brush. Few youths possessed of both animal vigour and distinction of mind could possibly enjoy the act of drawing for its own sake any more than they could enjoy the act of calligraphy. Numerous works of painting and sculpture are produced by men who have chosen to practise these arts not because they have any social function to perform but because they derive infantile pleasure from the mechanical manipulation of their fingers. But if the artist finds the labour of craftsmanship irksome, he will invent numerous subtleties of technique which have as their object the elimination of such labour.

One important result of such an attitude is that it leads to the acquisition of a sense of values. One does not carefully transcribe everything with the same degree of elaboration as does a man who revels in draughtsmanship for its own sake. The great Japanese masters have a scale of pictorial conventions. In their colour-prints one generally

finds that the faces are drawn most realistically, while the dress, though exquisitely rendered, is stiffened out a little, for it is less important than the human features. Architecture is simplified even more than the dress. In the portrayal of foliage the essential characteristics of vegetable form are duly recorded, but by the rapid method of their delineation the fact is emphasised that plant life is of a lower order than the human. In the case of water and clouds a still greater degree of simplification is attained. The authors of these prints were economical of labour yet prodigal of intellect, and they created a type of art which is something clean and bold and at the same time wonderfully dainty. And by their system of technique they not only express their acknowledgment of the worth of human beauty, but they display a superiority of manners which is most notable. They were natural aristocrats, poor and of humble station perhaps, but yet possessed of a dignity which places them on a far higher plane than many of the rich and popular painters of a later day. They recognised that there is no need to try to depict every leaf and every ripple as it is in reality, for most people are familiar with the aspects of nature and do not want to be told what they already know. In their desire to avoid emphasising what could not possibly be of interest to the beholder they showed the same kind of good breeding as is manifested in deportment.

One can judge of the artistic talents of those who practise drawing by watching their very postures. People who cannot estimate the value

of a sketch without screwing up one eye or cocking their heads on one side are immediately convicted of a lack of taste, and no great work of art can be expected from them. If they have so little regard for the body as quite needlessly to make themselves look ridiculous when at their work, it is very improbable that they could be capable of a true appreciation of the human form. And one nearly always finds that a glance at the draughtsmanship of such persons confirms one's first impressions. One finds that in what they call their "studies from the nude" they exaggerate all the delicate curves of the human figures, magnifying every muscle and sinew. That is what they describe as giving "character" and "strength" to a drawing. But instead of interpreting physical beauty and possibly exalting it by their interpretation, they are merely boasting of their knowledge of anatomy.

It was stated in a previous paragraph that the chief cause of the omission to consider the social function of painting and sculpture was an undue absorption in questions of craftsmanship. It may be well here briefly to discuss the influence of photography upon these arts. Although the coming of photography has in certain ways thrown light upon their nature, it has also been responsible for certain confusions of mind which have led to all kinds of eccentric developments. Some people, on realising that it was no longer the business of painting to copy things exactly, have rushed to the opposite extreme, and have denied that it has any imitative character at all.

In estimating the effect of mechanical means of

representation, it is necessary to anticipate a little and to assume that these mechanical means have been brought to a point of perfection. Let us imagine that photography could render with verisimilitude even the finest glint of light and colour, and that, by some method of machinery, human figures could be exactly copied in stone. The mechanical reproductions would be devoid of all merit in their technique, but it does not follow that they ought to be excluded from the category of art. It is not generally recognised that while any clever draughtsman can draw a model, it takes an artist to choose one and subtly to arrange it in characteristic attitudes. A human pose may itself constitute a theme of such high merit that the image of it is worth preserving for ever for the delight and edification of mankind. In such an instance the representation whether sculptural or pictorial may be an exact copy of the original.

The popular infatuation for photographs of pleasant subjects is not at all to be condemned, nor need we take seriously the sneers of those painters who say that photography is not an art. It is often very much nearer art than are many of their own works, which are but slavish imitations of nature or else fanciful treatment of subjects which are unworthy of being dealt with at all. The advent of the camera ought not to lead us to despise realistic art in general, but only such useless examples of it as those laboriously executed portrait and landscape sketches which compete with the photograph in its own field. To a sensitive person such pictures can only cause annoyance, for they make him think of the waste

of valuable hours which might have been spent on some more useful employment. Of course, realistic pictures painted before the age of photography are justified in so far as they are records of the progress of the major arts in those periods.

The province of the painter, besides being limited by the advance of photography, has also been further curtailed by the extraordinary growth in the number of books and other printed publications. But just as some painters seem to be unaware of the existence of photography there are others who fail to appreciate the fact that many of the functions they wish to perform have now been shown to belong to literature.

Let us consider the various types of picture which encroach upon the proper domain of language. In the first place there are the didactic types such as the ' Passion ' pictures which are to be found in many Italian churches. These had an educative value, and were used to instruct illiterate people in the essentials of their religion. Such frescoes were performing a necessary office at the time, and they still appeal to us not only because they mark an epoch in human history but because they possess great merit as decorations. But as soon as we set out to convey moral lessons by means of pictures, as in a series showing the downfall of the wicked, it becomes obvious that we are addressing an audience of the mentally undeveloped. If a teacher says that if people eat an inordinate amount and take no exercise they will get too fat, the sentence itself immediately calls up to the mind a vision of obesity. A person

possessing in some slight degree the faculty of imagination can realise the effects of proper and improper living without being presented with two careful drawings, one of them showing a normal figure and the other an offensively corpulent one. Nice draughtsmanship and colouring, good composition and the element of humour may impart an interest even to didactic and satirical pictures, but it would be a good rule if all those who seek to employ the graphic arts for the instruction or castigation of their neighbours were first to ask themselves whether they could not express their message just as well or better by means of language.

Akin to the didactic picture there is the symbolic. Of the two the latter generally shows the greater failure to appreciate the place of painting in the modern world. Here an attempt is made to attach a pictorial symbol to certain abstract thoughts. Maternity, Love, Revenge, Sorrow, Hope, Care, Labour and other conceptions are illustrated by means of figures which are supposed to express them. For instance Care might be symbolised by a man with a ruffled forehead, and Labour by a slave bent down under a burden. It is extremely doubtful whether these pictures, however skilfully executed they might be, could teach us anything new either about Care or about Labour.

It may be objected that much of the best decorative sculpture is symbolic—that is, it consists of figures which are known to represent certain ideas such as Justice, Time, the Sea, and so on. In these cases the subjects are made

recognisable by labels, descriptive appendages such as a pair of scales, a scythe, or a trident; the distinguishing features are well known, being merely illustrations of a mythology with which we are familiar. But the symbolism which is not to be tolerated is original symbolism, for this is only calligraphy in the wrong place. Nine-tenths of the newer art which is in revolt against realism is characterised by this kind of symbolism, which necessarily fails in its purpose, because the signs employed, never having been the subject of universal agreement, are not capable of signifying anything definite. It is true that the titles of the works tell us something about the mentality of their authors, but the works themselves are not expressive of any particular conception, for the men who created them have not aimed at expression by form alone, but have attempted the task, seemingly easier though in reality far more difficult, of exciting within the mind of the spectator an arbitrary association of ideas. If one sees a statue of an exceedingly self-conscious woman, entitled "The Spirit of Eternity," it is immediately obvious that the symbol is worthless, because there has been no agreement concerning it. Were one to succeed in entering into conversation with the author of the statue, one would probably find that he knew no more about "The Spirit of Eternity" than anybody else knows—which is very little indeed!

A symbol is quite different from a convention. Anyone can design hundreds of conventionalised flowers, and the most ignorant person would recognise them. But a symbolic flower may

represent something different from itself, a recollection, a quality, or a country. An individual may make a convention, but it takes a group of people or even a nation to make a symbol. Language and writing are the best examples of this. Every word and every letter has a signification that is not natural to it but has been imposed from without. A symbol only becomes a vehicle of thought when it represents the same thing to everybody. But many painters and sculptors invent symbols on their own responsibility and then they are very angry because we cannot interpret them. Yet even if we could agree upon their symbols and they became current coin in the world of art, the introduction of symbolism at all would not be a sign of advance but of retrogression. The inevitable tendency of the arts is towards the differentiation of their functions. Now, Language has given undivided energies to the expression of ideas by means of symbols. Anything that any other art can do in this respect is of the most infantile crudity. It should be an essential part of the training of those who wish to practise the minor arts that they should first undergo a severe discipline in the use of their native tongue. They would not then be so inclined by means of their works to give clumsy expression to ideas which with a little literary skill could be conveyed with clarity and ease.

Painting and sculpture reach their highest degree of development when they become decorative. Language can call up innumerable visions of beauty and it can fulfil most of the

critical and interpretative duties which these arts are made to perform, but it cannot decorate a wall surface or any object of use.

It is perhaps necessary here to combat a certain error which is prevalent. Many people hold that the subject matter of a painting is of little importance and that the manner of vision is everything. They have such a horror of the old type of realistic picture that they imagine the presence of a recognisable subject to be a blemish. But an insistence upon the decorative nature of painting need not imply a repudiation of subject. Granted that a decorative picture must differ from one which is merely didactic, descriptive or anecdotal, its subject must still be a recognisable one and it must have dignity and simplicity. A picture which is like a puzzle may possess mysterious virtues peculiar to itself, but it certainly cannot have any decorative quality. Of course, if it is only a geometrical pattern, it may have such merits as may belong to a pattern, but it must be pointed out that a geometrical pattern is not a picture. Yet in all decoration, whether pictorial or otherwise, there is a formal element, and its nature will be discussed in the chapter dealing with "The Grammar of Design." To contend, however, that this formal element is the sole desideratum in a picture would be as absurd as to say that poetry consists in nothing but versification, whereas there are some subjects which neither rhyme nor metre could ever elevate to the rank of poetry. The view that a painter can make a great decoration out of whatever theme he pleases is preposterous.

As in poetry, the first virtue to be insisted upon is universality of subject. That part of the life of men which is common to all times and races is eminently fitted to be the subject of a decoration. It is the function of the decorative artist to reveal to us humanity free from accidentals. The scenes must in all cases explain themselves and they must be endowed with a certain repose which will bring them into relation with the immobility of the object they adorn. An element of permanence must here manifest itself. But it is not necessary that all the figures should be at rest. That would be too narrow an interpretation of the term "repose." Actions may be displayed, but the only actions which are really suitable for pictorial treatment are continuous and of a reasonably homogeneous character for a period at least as long as the time that the ordinary spectator is likely to study the picture. Even violent action which conforms to this rule is quite tolerable. For instance a dancer or a runner may be shown, because even though his position changes one is at liberty to assume that he will go on dancing or running for several minutes at least. In decorative art it is desirable to emphasise the permanent aspects of men and things. For this reason shadows ought not to be made to appear very conspicuous. The shape and degree of density of shadows constantly change, so it is an error of the first magnitude to give them a pictorial value equal to that of the objects by which they are cast. A picture fails in its decorative purpose if its chief lines, its backbone as it were, be not indicative of material forms.

Another element of particularity which should be introduced only with great caution is perspective. What makes pronounced perspective unsuitable for frescoes is the fact that every view in which it occurs has but a single point of sight. But a decoration is generally intended to be viewed from several points, and for this reason in Japanese paintings the perspective is orthogonal, that is, the lines do not converge but are parallel. This special point of sight is eliminated, and consequently the scenes, without losing their variety of plane, are to a certain extent flattened out and made to cohere with the wall surface. A mural painting ought not to be like a window through which one looks down a street. The deliberate rejection of both perspective and shadows on the part of the Japanese was the result not of an inability to represent them but of a knowledge of the requirements of decorative art.

In the case of sculpture the problem is very much simpler, because the subject is confined almost entirely to human figures. But the clothing of the figure presents a difficulty. Sometimes sculptors, in their desire to express the spirit of their age, venture to give an interpretation of modern dress in stone. The modes of modern dress, however, succeed each other so rapidly that this type of apparel does not possess to a sufficient degree the attribute of universality; and for that reason it is not suitable for a decoration. Fashion, as we have seen, is an indispensable element in modern dress. If we are to give to dress a truly pictorial quality

we must eliminate this element as far as possible and thus arrive at a species of attire which is not characteristic of any particular period but is so comfortable, simple and dignified that it never could become out of date and, in fact, may be said to belong to all ages of human history.

A word may here be said concerning stage scenery. Theatrical scenery comprises a certain number of real objects, such as tables, chairs or crockery, and often representations of real objects, such as houses, trees, fields, clouds, and so on. These latter need not be of photographic accuracy, but serve their purpose if they are sufficiently descriptive to create illusion. Of course, in amateur play-acting a forest may be suggested by a pot of ferns, but this is only suitable for comedy: when we are witnessing tragedy there are occasions when our dominant feeling is one of awe, and we forget the conceit of imagination that such scenery demands of us. The fern would assert itself to be only a fern, and a false note of humour would be introduced. Thus Shakespeare tried to give his plays an elaborate setting and made use of all the stage devices which were known in his time, for he did not wish the attention of his audience to dwell upon the trappings of a play, as it would certainly do if they were deficient or incongruous, but upon the language and conduct of the characters represented.

In summarising the argument of this chapter, one might say that painting and sculpture have a prospect of unlimited advance upon several distinct paths. But these arts cannot flourish

unless there has been a careful analysis of their function. This necessary task is not likely to be performed, however, if we give heed to that numerous and loquacious body of philosophasters who continually preach the doctrine that art does not make its appeal to intellect, but to instinct, feeling and emotion. These theorists inflict a double injury upon painting and sculpture, for not only do they prevent us from arriving at a clear conception of the purpose of these arts, but they lower the prestige of those who are engaged in practising them. For when there is a consensus of opinion that art and logic are incompatible terms, nearly all the cleverest boys are discouraged from entering the field of art at all; and when they see that painters and sculptors are largely recruited from the ranks of draughtsmen well known to them as schoolfellows who have failed to distinguish themselves in intellectual studies, then their indifference to " The Fine Arts " is still further increased. To them the drawing class appears to be an immense joke, an agreeable interlude during which everybody is fully entitled to give his brains a rest. But art must be approached from the point of view of design and not from that of draughtsmanship, and design itself must become an academic subject dominated by rules which are capable of rational exposition, before we can expect the brighter spirits of our schools to be interested in it. For while a vapid emotionalism leaves them cold, the glitter of intellect would attract them immediately.

The worst blemishes in any work of art can always be shown to be due to a false valuation, to

a disregard of some demonstrable truth. Many people fail in painting and sculpture, not because they have insufficient reverence for them but because they appraise them too highly, they idolise them. Nearly everything that is noble in painting and sculpture is but the reflection of the dignity of greater arts than these.

CHAPTER VII.

General Review.

After a perusal of the preceding chapters, the first criticism which will occur to the reader will probably concern the omission of music and literature from this account of the hierarchy of the arts. I might excuse myself by saying that I set out to discourse upon "The Things which are Seen," which comprise a sufficiently large subject without the addition of the things which are heard and the things which are written. Nevertheless, as music and literature cannot be ignored in any work that purposes to deal with the philosophy of æsthetics, it is incumbent upon me to try to show how they are related to the arts we have just been considering.

Now, music and literature make an immediate appeal to the mind and are not expressed directly in terms of what is corporate and tangible. The visual arts differ from these in that their products are material; hence, it was not an illogical procedure to treat them as if they constituted a self-contained group. But although the two classes seem to be separate it is possible to establish a connecting link between them.

It may be remembered that in the introduction to this volume it was stated that the purpose of art is to enable spirit to declare itself in terms of matter. Such a definition might appear to leave

music and literature out of account, but it is really applicable to all the arts. For music and literature are only justified in so far as they increase the sum of the spirituality which is enshrined in " The Things which are Seen." If they are allowed to proceed without reference to any objective standard, any definite formal concept of the human race and its environment, they often tend to have a dangerous and weakening effect. On the one hand we may have an abnormal development of instrumental music, with the result that it is considered praiseworthy and a sign of true devotion to the ideals of culture if a crowd of people assembles in a hall in order to witness some young girl obviously overstraining her physique in the attempt to render dull but appallingly complicated music upon a violin. On the other hand, one has a vision of thousands of men and women who, although utterly devoid of a creative purpose in life, yet imagine that they serve the cause of civilisation if only they continue to ply their pens. But the wisdom of books is of little worth if it cannot be built up into body and substance, and while it is true that the performances of the concert-room may stimulate our musical intelligence, rhythm and melody can never give complete satisfaction to the average man unless they are brought into direct relation with human life by being associated with a song or dance, a theatrical or operatic display, or some form of ceremonial. And that this latter type of music can be great as well as popular there is no room for doubt. It is not too much to demand of music that it shall enrich the life which is common

to us all. If the labourer never sings at his work nor the mother to her babe, the learning of the concert-room will not adequately compensate us. The influence of good melody should ultimately be shown in the demeanour of our persons. Vulgarity in a tune may often be the occasion of vulgarity in a dance or gesture. The spectacle of human life needs music for its accompaniment, but music itself does not fulfil its whole purpose if its spirit be not imbued with the visual arts. The best music is that which helps to develop not only the graces of the mind but the graces of the body also.

Of course, literature is a supremely great art in that its subject is conterminous with that of thought itself. It is compelled to deal, however, with the fair outward semblance of the world, and it cannot exist without constant reference to the qualities of the things, whether animate or inanimate, which have a corporate being. The best test one can apply to literature is to ask how far it helps to increase the beauty and the significance of its own subject, which is the visible universe of Man. A discussion of the various methods by which literature, through biography, history and social science, through poetry and drama and through prose fiction, can serve this end would lie outside the scope of the present volume.

Animal and vegetable species of infinite variety and loveliness have sprung up without the aid of music or literature, yet every living thing has found it necessary to keep a tight grip on the material world. In maintaining the distinction between the primary and the secondary no

injustice is done to the latter. Because music, literature, painting and sculpture are late growths and because primitive men could possibly do without them, it does not follow that they are not necessities of an advanced civilisation. But while acknowledging the worth of these later cultural developments, it must be insisted that our more elementary needs ought first to be satisfied.

For that reason it was with serious intent that I described painting and sculpture as "The Minor Arts." This expression may serve to remind us of the existence of those major arts which must on all occasions be given prior consideration. If the realities of life are not recognised in the terminology of speech they are apt to be disregarded. It is impossible to exaggerate the evil which is caused by the association of the term "art" with painting and sculpture alone. One result is that the artist is not encouraged to perform the services that society has a right to demand from him and of which it stands in such very urgent need. There is not a little child walking about the streets hungry and clothed with rags, there is not a man or woman eking out a miserable existence in a mean congested dwelling whose sufferings are not in some measure due to the habit of construing the term "art" in this narrow sense.

"Bring art to the people!" That is a phrase one sometimes hears. It is generally interpreted as a demand for an effort to give additional facilities for the teaching of draughtsmanship in elementary schools or to persuade the poor to visit

museums and galleries in their spare time. But let the people be encouraged and given the opportunity to cultivate personal beauty themselves, let them have proper food and exercise and be exempt as far as possible from injurious kinds of labour so that their bodies may attain to the degree of comeliness which is native to them, create for men and women the conditions of life which will enable them all to acquire the mental perspective which results in manners, make it possible for them to be suitably and gracefully clad, and provide them with dwelling-places which, without being ornate or luxurious, are at least healthy, dignified and well-composed; then, even if their devotion to the pictorial arts was expressed in no other way than in the acquisition of a few photographs of their relations and friends and of places of interest to them, art would have been more effectively brought to the people than if one and all delighted to dabble with brush and pencil and were capable of showing the most lively interest in "The Fine Arts." Of course, painting and sculpture provide an excellent training for the mind, but it must be pointed out that they have this merit only when the mind is brought to bear upon the problems they present; and one of the first results of the application of intellect to these arts is a recognition of their subordinate character.

It is not intended here to imply that painters and sculptors have with cunning malignity conspired to centre upon their own activities the attention which ought to be directed to the major arts. They are quite incapable of any such

nefarious scheme. It is but natural, however, that they should take advantage of the situation in which they are placed, and that they should show no reluctance to monopolise to themselves the title of artist. But if they wished to preserve a sense of proportion in æsthetic matters they would call themselves either painters or sculptors as the case might warrant, and they would not employ a phraseology which seems to suggest that they are guilty of an act of usurpation. It is not altogether their fault, however, that, in this instance, the part takes upon itself the title that belongs to the whole. The major arts have suffered neglect because of the difficulties attending all attempts to discuss them, difficulties which we found to be largely due to the attitude of those moralists who are so very hard to convince that the love of human beauty is an honourable predilection and that a reverence for "The Things which are Seen" does not imply a disregard of spiritual values.

In this account of the visual arts I have conceived of society as a self-contained whole, and have treated the arts as the means by which the welfare of society can be maintained. But human society does not comprise the whole of the universe, it is only a small specialised part of the animal world. If there is to be a true philosophy of æsthetics it is not sufficient to consider the relation of the arts to human society; one must also define their relation to the universal principles of vitality. That task will be attempted in the next part of this volume, which deals with the distinction between Form and Subject.

PART TWO.

FORM AND SUBJECT.

CHAPTER I.

On the Nature of Form.

Besides the interest and vitality which objects possess through their relation to human society, they have an interest and vitality of their own, so that even if we divest them of all human associations, uses and purposes, there is still left a residuum. What I mean is that everything, besides having a subject, has also a form. It would be premature at this stage of the argument to try to define form and subject, for the distinction between them cannot be explained without the help of the diagrams which are to be found in the next chapter. But it is fitting here to state that while the purpose of an object of art is human, in its form it transcends humanity, it has a relationship to organic life as a whole, as it has characteristics which are common to every kind of living creature. What these characteristics are the artist must determine, for otherwise he will not be capable of imparting to his creations the quality of beauty.

Hence a recognition of the hierarchy of the arts will not alone suffice to enable an artist to design. It was desirable, however, first to assert

a standard of social values so that art might not be considered something frivolous. The artist must not dote upon beautiful china and pictures and at the same time appear indifferent when men and women are being stunted in their growth and deprived of the beauty which should by right belong to them. Such an attitude on his part indicates a false sense of perspective, and it irritates the average man who is led thereby to despise the æsthetic ideal. On the other hand, the ill condition of men will not make the china or the pictures any less beautiful, in so far as the beauty of these objects is vested in their *form*. But having essayed to do justice to the social aspect of the arts, without fear of misconstruction I am at liberty to point out that with respect to form all the arts are upon terms of equality, for the same principles of design are exemplified in each.

It may be remembered that in the introduction to this volume the opinion was expressed that the advanced state of development which the art of literature has reached is largely due to the practice of making a distinction between the style of language and its sense. We recognise that a clumsy and ungrammatical sentence can express a worthy sentiment, whilst one which is elegantly composed may contain false and misleading assertions. Language would be a most dangerous instrument if people could not separate its subject from its form. But the desire to criticise the sense of what is spoken does not make anybody blind to the virtue of grammar. The formal relation is an essential factor because it is the

condition without which it is impossible to express anything at all.

The word "form" is here employed in a restricted sense, but in a sense which is nevertheless confirmed by popular usage. For instance, one might say of a shapeless piece of rock that it has very little "form." On the other hand the rock may also be described as a vast "form," the word in this case indicating not organic relationship between the parts of an object, but merely brute matter. It will make the following chapters very much clearer to the reader if he will bear in mind that it is in the first sense only and never in the second that the term is here used.

In commenting on the following diagrams I shall not express any opinion as to the purpose of the things they illustrate, but shall confine myself to considering whether their subjects have, in the language which is peculiar to the arts, been rendered grammatically. It may be asked: "Where did you obtain this grammar which you are going to expound?" I reply that I found it in Nature. The objects designed will speak the same language as Nature speaks, and thus they will be brought into relation with Nature. But as their subjects will be different from those of Nature, the act of copying from Nature will not help us to design. It is necessary to comprehend the grammar of design which is in Nature and to use this grammar to utter a message different from that of Nature—a human message. We must observe the formal relationships which are exemplified in the shapes of animals and plants,

and, abstracting them from their context, thus obtain a language which we can use to express whatever we like. This process of abstraction is a logical one, and is dependent for its success upon the operation of human reason, and so the rules of grammar must be expressed in terms of categories of reason.

It will be found that we are not receiving instruction from an extraneous source, for we ourselves, including our intellects, are part of Nature; and the assent of the reader to the propositions which will presently be enunciated will be complete and instantaneous, because the law of Mind has an intimate connection with the law of Nature, and it is impossible to acknowledge the one without paying an equal deference to the other.

CHAPTER II.

The Grammar of Design.

(*i.*) THE METHOD OF CLASSIFICATION.

The formal relationships which will here be exemplified are the chief connecting links between things and ideas, between matter and mind. They are Number, Punctuation and Inflection.

In the exposition of the principles of design the examples will be arranged in the following manner. First, I shall take animate nature—human beings, quadrupeds, birds, fishes, insects and plants—and then dress, architecture, painting and sculpture in the order with which the reader has been familiarised in the "Hierarchy of the Arts." Illustrations will also be derived from miscellaneous sources not mentioned in this list.

I have tried to make the diagrams as simple as possible, for it is essential to their purpose that they should be devoid of irrelevant detail.

(*ii.*) ON NUMBER.

The only aspects of number which need be given special consideration in this analysis of "The Grammar of Design" are Unity, Duality and Plurality. It may be objected that a duality of

objects already belongs to the plural number. There is a profound distinction, however, between the number "two" and any number which is more than two, and in many ancient languages this distinction is observed. In Greek, for instance, substantives besides having the singular and plural forms have also a special form to denote the dual number. It may be well here to explain the origin of the distinction. The great difference between the character of the number "two" and that of any number which is more than two, is that the latter can be regarded as a group and so may constitute a unity, whereas two separate and conflicting wholes cannot be so conceived, for their duality is so pronounced that it is impossible to avoid thinking of them as "two." Such a joint being as they may be held to possess is characterised by an element of ineradicable weakness, for any association consisting of only two things seems to invite the act of severance. In fact, in this case the idea of division is expressed very much more powerfully than is the idea of union. One might even say that while a plurality has always a certain measure of unity, duality is the exact opposite of unity—*it is itself the very soul of disunion.*

If we study examples of animal and vegetable life, we find that organic nature deals most freely in the singular and plural numbers, but it does not tolerate duality, unless this duality has been so modified as to partake of the character of unity. This necessary modification may be held to have taken place when two pronounced features are either dominated by a third or else so constituted

that they are not complete wholes by themselves, but merely halves whose sum is unity.



FIG. 1.

The illustrations of the alternative to the correct treatment make it clear what an unsatisfactory result is obtained when the canon of number is defied. I begin with the most elementary shapes. Examples of both methods of resolving duality are shown in Fig. 1, where in A there are groups of three and in C there are partly unified groups of two. It is just as unpleasant to have two separate wholes unsupported by a third (see Fig. 1 B) as it is to have a single form, which is obviously a half, unsupported by the other half.

I next pass on to the forms of human beings. It will be observed that in every case in which human features are arranged in pairs their duality

has been resolved. For instance the hands (see Fig. 2 A) are so shaped that each of them is, as it were, a half.



FIG. 2

They complement each other and are not the two separate symmetrical wholes such as are shown in Figs. 2 B and 2 C. The very idea that hands could be shaped like that is repulsive, for such an arrangement would seem to be a violation of an elementary principle of vitality.



FIG. 3.

And not only the feet (see Fig. 3, A, B and C) but the arms and legs obey the canon of number. Of course, these pairs of limbs, although they show by their configuration that they are pairs, each member of which is conscious of the other, do not, even when added up, make complete wholes, and they must be dominated by a third

entity which comprises the rest of the body. Legs extremely long in proportion to the body, although they might appear to be well shaped in that they are complementary to each other, could not have their duality altogether resolved, because in such circumstances the third element would not be of sufficient magnitude to dominate the whole figure. For that reason a man on stilts always seems somewhat of a monstrosity.

Again the duality of the eyes is partly resolved,

FIG. 4.

for they are delicately shaped so as to be opposites, right and left (see Fig. 4 A). Eyes represented as in Fig. 4 B remind one of the crude drawings of a child or of somebody who has not learnt to observe the subtleties of natural forms.



FIG. 5

But the eyes are still further unified by means of the nose and mouth, which dominate the pattern of the face (see Fig. 5 A). If the nose and mouth were duplicated (see Fig. 5 B), the result would be

as freakish as a man with two heads. But if there were only one eye, there would still be unresolved duality but of a different kind. In this instance the three central features would form a vertical line which would cut the face in two in a most irritating manner (see Fig. 5 C).



FIG. 6.

It is obvious that an eye with two pupils would be an abomination, but the lips, too, can be very ugly, if they disobey the canon of number. The ordinary " Cupid's bow " mouth is beautiful, for each half of the mouth is like a half (see Fig. 6 A); but if the curve of the lips is a juxtaposition of two parts which are not facing each other but have two distinct centres (see Fig. 6 B), the mouth has an unnatural expression.

In the duplicate drawing the curves are bounded by vertical lines in order that their characteristics may be more clearly apparent.

The lower animals provide innumerable illustrations of the principle we are considering. The fore and the hind legs of quadrupeds are

always in pairs consisting of right and left members complementary to each other, and any other pairs of features such as ears, horns or tusks, the wings and feet of birds or insects are similarly disposed. A very few examples will suffice.



FIG. 7

Fig. 7 A shows the natural form of antlers, while Fig 7 B shows the impossible form.

FIG. 8

Fig. 8 A shows the shape of a bird's wings,

while Fig. 8 B shows an abortive shape which violates the canon.



FIG. 9.

Figs. 9 A and 9 B illustrate birds' claws of the natural and of the unnatural variety.

FIG. 10

Figs. 10 B and C represent impossible kinds of insects. In the first case the legs form an unresolved duality, and in the second case the body does so, as it consists of two members instead of the normal group of three shown in Fig. 10 A.

The butterflies (see Figs. 11 A and 11 B) exhibit the same contrast between possible and impossible types.



FIG. 11.

In Fig. 12, B and C show what a freakish result would be obtained if the canon of number were violated in the design of a fish.



FIG. 12.

Plants of every kind seem to have just as strong an objection to duality as have the animals. When a young plant comes out of the seed and displays its two little leaves as in Fig. 13 A, the



FIG. 13

duality is already partly resolved because the leaves bend away from each other and so make a single pattern. But that pattern is somewhat crude and the plant hastens to throw up a central shoot, which soon grows large enough to dominate the lateral members (see Fig. 13 B). No plant could come out of the seed in the way which is represented in Fig. 13 C, nor could there be a spray of leaves as in Fig. 13 D. Figs. E and F illustrate beautiful forms exhibiting a plurality of members, while G and H if they occurred at all would immediately be recognised as very rare freaks.

No flower could have only two petals as in Fig. 14 A.



FIG. 14.

Even flowers which have two larger petals on top, such as the pansy and many orchids, always have their dualities resolved by the petals underneath (see Fig. 14 B). A flower with two centres (Fig. 14 C) would be a monstrosity.

To multiply the examples is quite unnecessary. It is sufficiently clear that animate nature, being a perfect expression of mind in terms of matter, never runs counter to the law of mind. One of the necessities of mind is that it cannot find

repose in the complete dissociation either of ideas or of objects, and such dissociation is nowhere more obtrusively manifested than in an example of unresolved duality. For, as was stated at the beginning of this section, unity has an opposite. But its opposite is neither zero nor is it plurality. Its exact opposite is duality.

Now, the design of inanimate objects is the attempt to endow such objects with the characteristics of life. We have seen that one of these characteristics is the result of the habit of obedience to the canon of number. A living thing, whether an animal or a plant, is constitutionally incapable of violating the canon, but objects manufactured by men are often unresolved dualities. When they are so formed they cannot be described as works of art. Their subjects may be quite commendable, that is to say the things may fulfil a necessary social function, but their imperfect composition is a great blemish. They may be compared to statements which, although perhaps urgently called for, yet exhibit an utter disregard for grammar.

I now give a few illustrations from the art of dress. As dress is a covering for the human body we find that many forms of garment conform to the canon of number because their shape is regulated by the shape of the limbs, which themselves conform to that canon. Hence the tailor is not so likely to be guilty of setting up an unresolved duality as is the designer of objects which have no immediate connection with our persons. Nevertheless, one sometimes meets with

articles of clothing which violate the canon of number.

Fig. 15 shows three hats. A and B are satisfactory, but the duality of the feathers in C is most offensive.



FIG. 15



FIG. 16.

Fig. 16 shows three other hats. The effect of A and B is quite agreeable; but in C the ribbon, which covers exactly half the crown, is neither narrow nor broad, but lies uncomfortably between the two.

In the next figure, a pair of ordinary boots (see 17 A) is contrasted with a sharply pointed pair (see 17 B) which is not only injurious to the toes but actually ugly because the two members, being nearly symmetrical, constitute an unresolved duality. 17 C shows a glove which has two obtrusive ribs on its back. 17 D is the better treatment, because here the ribs are three in

number and form a group which is pleasant to behold.



FIG. 17.

Fig. 18. illustrates three skirts. A and B have a plurality of tucks and so obey the canon of number, and in C the tuck cuts the skirt in two and completely destroys its unity. If a dress be tucked at all, it must be tucked at least twice, and preferably at the bottom as well, so that there may be not only a plurality of divisions but a plurality of tucks.



FIG. 18.

The effect is unpleasant whenever any

symmetrical feature in a costume is duplicated, and this is especially the case when this feature is circular and so has a pronounced unity of its own. Morning coats generally have either three bottons in the front (see Fig. 19 A) or else one button (19 C). Sometimes tailors in their desire

FIG. 19.

for novelty put only two, with the result that the eye necessarily goes from one to the other and can find no final resting place; and the discordant arrangement of the buttons makes them much more conspicuous than they ought to be. It may be objected that in this instance the subject is so trivial as to be hardly worth mentioning. But in giving the illustration it is not my object to proclaim the importance of buttons, but to establish more firmly the canon of number by showing that it is applicable to things both great and small.

Of course there are certain garments, such as a pair of trousers, which, however designed, must violate the canon. Thus it comes about that while coats, jackets, tunics, skirts and kilts all have a certain dignity, and can with propriety be mentioned even in poetry of the highest rank, a pair of trousers seems to invite disrespect, for it suffers from the irremediable defect of duality. Trousers when seen in conjunction with the rest of the costume of which they form a part are quite tolerable and may even appear elegant, but conceived in isolation they become a subject of ridicule.

I now come to the consideration of architecture. It is much easier to make a mistake in the design of a building than in the design of a dress. In architecture the variety both in subject and in form is so great, and, moreover, there are so many practical difficulties which limit the artist's freedom, that the application of principles of composition is by no means easy.

Let me first treat of façades. One of the most troublesome problems with which architects have to deal concerns the composition of a façade which has only two rows of windows. Unfortunately this kind of façade occurs more frequently than any other, so the proper disposal of its parts is a matter of great importance.

Fig. 20 B shows the typical mean street of one-storeyed houses. In Fig. 20 A one of the façades is drawn in elevation. The problem presented by this kind of street is an almost insoluble one.

A

B

FIG. 20.

Something can be done by grouping door and window into one as in 21 A, or by applying an order as in 21 B. In this instance the pilasters, being complete wholes, tend to attract attention to themselves with the result that the duality of the rows of reveals is not so noticeable. The pilasters will fulfil their function even better if they are fluted (see Fig. 21 C). A third solution is to emphasise the doorway as in 21 D. The main pattern of the façade then appears as in 21 E, which depicts a single row of large rectangles to which the windows become subsidiary. Of course, the solutions 21 A and

21 B can be combined by adding the arches to the order, but as the houses are presumably intended



FIG. 21

to be cheap it is useless to discuss any very elaborate treatment.

In the design of detached houses one meets with the same problem. The ordinary five-windowed front can be made quite satisfactory by the simple device of accentuating the porch as in 22 A. But the stages must not be divided by a stringcourse as in 22 B.



FIG. 22.

When the façade has nine windows the case is more difficult, for then the doorway cannot be made big enough to dominate the composition (see 23 A).



FIG. 23.

In 23 B there is an attempt at a solution. The three middle openings are grouped together, and the windows do not appear to be in two obtrusive rows, but are arranged round a central feature.

Besides the three methods here named, there are two other ways in which the duality of rows of windows can be resolved.



FIG. 24.



FIG. 25.

Either the ground floor can be reduced to a basement (see Fig. 24 A) or else the top floor can appear to be an attic and thus be quite subsidiary to the lower, as in 24 B, C and D. By these means the conflict between the two rows is mitigated.

It may be remarked that the canon of number applies equally to all the styles of architecture. 25 A shows a spire built up of tiers of Classic orders, 25 B is part of a Gothic church, 25 C a Chinese pagoda and 25 D a Turkish minaret. Each of them has a plurality of divisions. It is easy to realise what a disagreeable effect they would produce if they had only two stages.

Any even number is a duality in that it is obviously divisible at the centre, but groups of four are not nearly so objectionable as groups of two, as four is a plurality. However, even when dealing with four horizontal divisions it is desirable to make one of them subsidiary to the other three as in 26 A.



FIG. 26.

When there are six or eight or any larger even number of stages one is apt to lose count, and the

duality ceases to be offensive. If a building has three rows of windows, as in 26 B, the problem of composition is made very much easier. There are countless detached houses, terraces and public buildings which give pleasure to the eye because they are disposed in a trinity of stages.



FIG. 27.

I have perhaps taken sufficient examples of the horizontal division of façades. But buildings besides being divided horizontally may be divided vertically, and the vertical division, unless it is a subject of careful consideration, may result in unresolved duality, as it does in Fig. 27 A.

The central feature here (27 A) cuts the façade in two, but in 27 B it is big enough to dominate it, so the result is quite satisfactory. In 27 C, although the central feature is small in comparison with the length of the façade, the duality is resolved because there are three pronounced features which together form a group. In 27 D the central part is still very small, but the wings are designed in the shape of halves which face each other. In this case the building has some of the beauty which appertains to a butterfly.

FIG. 28.

Fig. 28 illustrates six churches. A and B both suffer from the very great defect of having two very prominent features, insufficiently unified.

C is better because the spire behind provides a third element. This, however, is not big enough to dominate the towers, but the latter are in a certain degree bound together by the row of



FIG. 29

sculptured niches. It will be seen that D, E and F satisfy the canon of number. Many Gothic churches exhibit unresolved duality because their central towers have either been burnt down or else

were never finished owing to the weakness of the vaults intended to support them.

The town represented in 29 A is of a common type. The single spire which is, as it were, the climax of the composition appears to advantage.



FIG. 30

The effect of 29 B with the two conflicting spires is one of extreme restlessness. Be the churches ever so beautiful individually, their association in this manner is productive of the maximum of discord. In Fig. 29 C the conspicuous features form a group which, in spite of the dissimilarity

of its members, is very much more of a unity than is the configuration shown in 29 B.

Fig. 30 A shows the very worst way in which a row of trees can be planted in a street. It will be observed that the foliage divides the street in the very centre and completely destroys its unity. In Fig. 30 B the trees divide the roadway into three parts, of which the centre is the largest. It is obviously a more satisfactory treatment than the first.



FIG. 31

Of the four plans in Fig. 31, A and C are faulty. In the former case a hall is divided equally by a row of columns; in the latter the division, although only partial, produces the same kind of discord. Figs. B and D provide two solutions. In B a third room is added, so that the divisions achieve unity through plurality; in D one of the

divisions is made subordinate to the other and thus the conflict is avoided.

It is needless to point out what a very unpleasant effect is obtained when a room has a dado the top of which is exactly in the middle of the wall, or when it has two equal windows on one side, or when it has a beam right across the very centre of the ceiling.



FIG. 32.

In considering the principle of number, confusion arises if the distinction between objects and intervals is not clearly recognised. In 32 A the two posts form an unresolved duality because the transparent gateway is too frail to unite them. In 32 B, however, the two posts cease to be offensive because here instead of two obstructions we have a single interval and the posts appear to be merely the boundaries of the wall on either side of the gateway. Fig. 32 C shows a still more satisfactory design, for the posts, being supported by abutments, are shaped as halves which

complement each other, and so tend to form a unity. In 32 D, the unity is further consolidated by the design of the gate the two parts of which comprise a single pattern defined by the curved profile of its upper edge.



FIG. 33.

Fig. 33 illustrates the same contrasts. Fig. 33 A is satisfactory, because the four columns



FIG. 34.

enclose three intervals; but B is wrong, for the three columns, although in themselves they

constitute a group, are not so prominent as the duality of the intervals which they enclose. Hence no pediment looks well if it has a column immediately under its apex.

The canon of number is exemplified in the proportions of the classic order, which is nearly always arranged in three main divisions. Fig. 34 A shows podium, column and entablature, while in 34 B the place of the podium is taken by a pedestal. If the columns are shortened as in 34 C, the order loses its grace because the central part, namely the row of columns, does not supply sufficient material for it to constitute a member of the trinity. Hence the columns appear to be crushed between the entablature and the pedestal. But it is obvious that the idea of mechanical crushing has nothing to do with the æsthetic criticism which is here passed, for, mechanically considered, the columns in C are much stronger than those in B, as they carry the same load but are shorter and less liable to buckle. Of course, the columns must not be so slender that they cannot bear their burden, but an attention to the constructional aspect of the orders will not alone enable the designer to give to the column and entablature true and satisfying proportions. C fails to please because it is an unresolved duality; here the columns are only joining members; but in A and B their length makes it possible for them to be conceived as the central feature of a group composition. It may be noted incidentally that both the entablature and the pedestal must comprise three parts. D and E appear most incomplete because they have no central member.

Fig. 35 explains itself. A and B are good designs but C and D are not. E and F are bridges which satisfy the canon of number. The reader can in imagination construct for himself the inartistic effect which would be produced if these structures were composed of only two divisions.



FIG. 35.

In the design of ships also the canon of number must be observed. The steamer A with two funnels is very crude, but 36 B in which the harshness of the duality is softened by the addition of masts has a certain degree of elegance. A row of four funnels looks best if it can be arranged in such a manner that the intervals, which are three in number, appear more prominent than the

obstructions. This could be done by emphasising the space which the funnels enclose as in 36 D, where the row is conterminous with a raised part of the ship. Where there is only one funnel as



FIG. 36

in E, it appears to cut the boat in two. The design F in which the funnel is placed near a cabin at the stern is æsthetically far superior. Figs. G. and H. show the contrast between a two-masted and a three-masted sailing vessel. The latter is the more mature design and the one which is better calculated to give pleasure to the eye.



FIG. 37



FIG. 38

It will be immediately obvious to the reader that the bedstead A is preferable to B, the cupboard C preferable to D, and the chair E is preferable to F.

It will likewise be clear that in Fig. 38 the piano A is more beautiful than the piano B, and the arrangement of pictures in C is more beautiful than that in D.



FIG. 39.

In Fig. 39 A and C are better designs than B and D. The vase F is inferior to E because the body and the neck, being of about equal dimensions, compete with one another. The vase H is unsatisfactory because its handles, being of circular form, make up two complete wholes, unlike the handles in G which are grouped right and left to form a pair.

Fig. 40 shows two pairs of tongs. In B the two members are insufficiently united and thus the design is faulty. In A they appear conscious of

each other's presence, for they are so disposed as to be component halves of a single pattern. For



FIG. 40.

a similar reason, the dumb-bell C is elegant while that depicted in D is crude.

Let us now consider painting and sculpture.



FIG. 41.

In the case of painting the problem is simplified, because generally we are dealing with an

elementary form, namely a rectangle. To take proper regard of the canon of number the artist must avoid cutting the rectangle in two either vertically or horizontally. This seems such an obvious necessity of good composition that it is surprising how often painters are guilty of making their canvases display unresolved dualities of a most offensive kind.

Figs. 41 B and D are unsatisfactory because they are cut in two by prominent lines. B is divided vertically by the poplar tree, D horizontally by the boundary of the sky. A and C are better compositions, because in the former the tree, being placed on one side, is no longer an element of discord, while in the latter the sky, occupying more than half of the picture, does not contribute to the formation of an unresolved duality.

Most pieces of sculpture consist of single figures which, being representations of the human form, cannot violate the canon of number. The possibilities of bad composition are very much greater in the case of painting than they are in sculpture because the painter has to try to combine into one pattern a set of objects, many of which are neither animated by life nor naturally united in any formal relation.

The principle which we are here discussing is applicable to all the arts. In music no composition can comprise merely two movements unless these are, as it were, facing each other and mutually complementary. In literature, it is obvious that unity of theme must be accompanied by formal unity. A sonnet, for instance, would fail to give

æsthetic satisfaction were it to consist of two groups of seven lines having identical sequences of rhyme. Such a literary form would really be two separate verses which could not logically be conceived as a single pattern. Either it is only one verse or else its unity must be achieved through plurality, that is, it must consist of at least three verses.

I may now conclude this first section of "The Grammar of Design." The reader can doubtless find for himself innumerable other illustrations of the canon of number. But before proceeding to an analysis of the second of the three formal relationships which were mentioned at the head of this chapter, I shall give one more instance of duality resolved. I refer to the Holy Trinity. It is common knowledge that when once the divinity of Jesus had been declared and accepted, the nature of the Godhead presented a very difficult problem to the Christian theologians. The person of Jesus could not be entirely merged in that of God the Father, because Jesus recognised a distinction between himself and God the Father. On the other hand, it was considered derogatory to the deity that it should admit of degrees. Hence the early Christians were left with God the Father and God the Son, each of equal majesty, might and power. But the mind is so constituted that it cannot worship an unresolved duality. If both the divinity and the separate personality of Jesus were to be retained, it was necessary to postulate a third person in the deity which, in addition to the other two, would form a group, a unity. When once the divinity

of Jesus is accepted, the existence of the Holy Ghost becomes an æsthetic necessity. Here is an explanation of the origin of a belief which exponents of church doctrine usually try to found upon textual evidence. In so far as they were instrumental in founding temples and churches, and were the creators of religious ceremonial, theologians, both pagan and Christian, have done much to inspire the artist. It is a becoming interchange of services, therefore, that a principle of art should be applied to elucidate one of the problems of theology.

(*iii.*) ON PUNCTUATION.

When the beginning or the end or any boundary of a thing has been given formal emphasis, the thing may be said to have been *punctuated*. Things completely unpunctuated could not become the subject of thought at all, and it is impossible even to discuss them. I shall confine myself to contrasting things which have been well punctuated with things that have been badly or insufficiently punctuated. It will be found that punctuation is a mark of beauty and that the higher an organism may be in the scale of life, the more subtly are its parts punctuated.

As in the previous section, I begin with some quite elementary examples which are expressed in terms of general forms. They contain suggestions of some of the particular forms which we shall afterwards consider.

Fig. 42 shows ways in which a rectangle can be punctuated at one end. It will be observed



FIG. 42.



FIG. 43.



FIG. 44.

that the first rectangle is plain while the others are accentuated at their lower extremities.

The next figure illustrates shapes in which the punctuation has been carried a stage further. A, B and C are punctuated at both ends, as are

also D and E, the difference in the latter cases being that the two ends are dissimilarly punctuated. F shows the ordinary border treatment, while in G the border is carried round the rectangle.

We may now consider some of the parts of the human figure. The hand provides a good illustration. Figs. 44 A, B, C, D, E, F, make a progressive series showing increasing degrees of punctuation. A is a simple geometrical shape, B is the same accentuated at one end by means of divisions, in C a taper is introduced, in D the extremity is further emphasised by the insertion of a small rectilinear figure, in E the end is rounded, while in F we have the normal human finger. It may be observed that the nail itself is punctuated at top and bottom.



FIG. 45.

Fig. 45 A shows the punctuation of the eye, while 45 B reveals the effect when part of the punctuation is omitted. C portrays the normal ear, and D an ill-shaped one, which looks ugly

because it seems to be a mere flap, crude and unfinished.



FIG. 46.

46 A is the front view of a mouth, while B enables one to realise the undesirable result produced when the lips are without the punctuation which is proper to them.



FIG. 47.

The profile of the mouth illustrates the same principles. The type 47 A, which is just a slit in the face, is hideous. B is slightly better for the lower lip is punctuated. C is better still, for both lips protrude, but it is still rather ugly because the dividing line is perfectly straight. D is the normal mouth, which is superior to C in that the dividing line is curved at either end, and so becomes a self-conscious whole.

It is needless to point out how, in the human figure, all the limbs and the principal parts of limbs are punctuated. The hand punctuates the



FIG. 48

arm, the fingers punctuate the hand, and the nails punctuate the fingers. And even the bones of the body are punctuated, for they get thicker at each end. Fig. 48 gives a few examples taken from the forms of quadrupeds—a horse's hoof and tail, and the trunk and foot of an elephant. Fig. 49

FIG. 49.

shows the shape of a snake, a fish, a bird and a butterfly. A and B are punctuated at both head and tail, and so are C and D. In the two latter

instances the markings of the wings complete the emphasis of the extremities.



FIG. 50

In 50 A and B a leaf and a spray of leaves are depicted. Each is pointed at the apex which is further accentuated by the disposition of the parts; in the one case the intervals between the ribs grow wider towards the bottom, and in the other the intervals between the leaves. C shows a bulrush, a stalk which comes to a very definite end, whilst D is a daisy whose petals are tipped with crimson.

The diagram of a fir, Fig. 51 A, shows how the branches punctuate the tree not only by their intervals but by their angles. Towards the top the branches increase their upward slope, while towards the bottom they tend to droop. B is a type of tree deriving its charm from an apparent solidity of form beautifully modified at its boundaries which betray the character of foliage. C is a palm. It is difficult to conceive how a long stem could have a more lovely punctuation. It may be noted, in passing, how the trunks thicken

towards the ground and thus appear conscious of their extremities.

FIG. 51

I have taken enough illustrations from nature, and I now come to the art of dress.

Fig. 52 A shows a sleeve cut off square. It has not such a very bad appearance as the hand itself provides a punctuation to the form of the arm, however the latter may be clothed. But the design B is certainly an improvement, because here the cuff gives the sleeve a finish which is lacking in Fig. A. Another method of finish is shown in Fig. C, where the sleeve is turned back. D is a lady's blouse in which the punctuation is achieved by a conspicuous narrowing of the sleeve at the wrists.

An agreeable result can also be obtained by broadening the sleeve at the ends, as in the ordinary Chinese costume, and the presence of a few buttons as in Fig. F will often enhance the

beauty of a sleeve. It is needless to specify the numerous borders and flounces which dressmakers



FIG. 52.



FIG. 53.

employ, generally with the object of punctuating the various parts of a costume. Fig. 53 A shows a

skirt bounded by a frill, whilst B is a pair of trousers turned up in the usual manner.

This habit of turning the ends up has this practical disadvantage, that a receptacle for dust is formed thereby—but nevertheless it continues because it has such a complete æsthetic justification. A pair of trousers is not generally a very beautiful garment, kilts or knickerbockers being far preferable, yet it must be admitted that the " bell-bottomed " sort shown in 53 C, which sailors wear, is so admirably punctuated at its ends that it has artistic merit. It might be suggested that one could achieve as good a result by making the trousers appear narrower instead of wider towards the ankles, as in the " peg-top " variety. But the disadvantage of this latter is that as soon as its creases wear out it becomes a most slovenly garment. It does not follow the contour of the legs sufficiently closely to give a true indication of their shape, as does a combination of stockings and shorts; and on the other hand, unlike the type which has just been commended, it is not loose enough round the feet to have a



FIG. 54.

formal entity of its own. In fact, it is apt to resemble a very badly fitting pair of tights.

Fig. 54 B shows a silk hat. The crown is in the form of a cylinder cut off at random at the top and bottom, while the rim is a plain disc with a hole in it. The result is obviously very crude. The example A gives satisfaction because it obeys the rule of grammar which we are here considering. The profile of the crown is punctuated towards the top by being slightly bent outwards, while the rim is finished off by being turned up at the circumference. 54 C and D show the contrast between a punctuated and an unpunctuated coat collar.



FIG. 55.

The principles of design which apply to dress apply to architecture also. 55 A is a piece of wall which, although it may fulfil its utilitarian

purpose, is yet ugly and unfinished. In B the wall is punctuated at the top and bottom by the coping and plinth, and in C and D a lateral punctuation is also shown, in the one case in the form of a rustication, and in the other in the form of a pier. It is unnecessary to insist that C and D are architecture while A is merely engineering. The wall A may be perfectly strong and watertight, but nobody would contend that it possesses the quality of beauty.



FIG. 56

Fig. 56 shows how an architrave and plinth can improve the appearance of a façade.

FIG. 57.

In Fig. 57 the principle finds expression in a hexastyle front. Fig. A gives the usual treatment where the row of columns is punctuated by the

narrowing of the interval at either side. Fig. B showing equal spacing is a greatly inferior design.



FIG. 58.

Fig. 58 shows another contrast between architecture and engineering. In A the façade is finished off by a bay on each side having a window slightly wider than the others, whilst the windows themselves are punctuated by architrave and sill. B shows an undesirable treatment.

Fig. 59 is a row of houses on a slope. The six houses in the centre look exceedingly mean by themselves. Yet hundreds of examples of such a method of grouping can be found in modern towns. By the addition of the end houses the row is punctuated and immediately becomes an architectural composition. The group has now got a definite beginning and a conclusion, and

however unpretentious it may be, however unadorned its parts, it is at least a recognisable æsthetic entity.



FIG. 59

The omission to observe this canon is the cause of the unsatisfactory appearance of nearly all the buildings of the " sky-scraper " class. Fig. 60 A may be taken as a typical example. The fabric



FIG. 60

obeys the laws of composition in so far as it is properly punctuated at both top and bottom. Unfortunately, however, the designer has omitted to punctuate it at the sides with the result that in spite of the elaborate base and crowning features it appears crude and unfinished. In the diagram B a rough attempt has been made to supply the deficiency. Of course, the utilitarian may say that in this second design there is a waste of valuable window space at the corners. But sometimes such a sacrifice must necessarily be made if a proper architectural result is to be secured. Yet even in this instance, by means of skilful planning, the loss of accommodation may be reduced to a minimum; for the corners of such a building may often be used profitably for lifts or store-rooms.



FIG. 61

Many architectural forms have curved profiles, and therefore the punctuation of curves must be a matter of interest to the artist. In Fig. 61 A the curve is not itself punctuated but appears as the termination of a straight line. In B the curve is ended by an arrow, but the curve itself is not a

self-contained whole, being merely an arc of a circle, which is shown in Fig. C to be but a section taken in a quite arbitrary way from a larger whole. In D, however, the curve is itself punctuated by gradually growing straighter towards one extremity. This is a good profile for domes, the coves of ceilings and certain mouldings.

It may be well to mention another instance of the æsthetic treatment of curves, for this will perhaps afford a new insight into one of the most beautiful of all the historical styles of architecture. I refer to the manner of building that had its origin in China and Japan, a chief characteristic of which is the subtle treatment of curved lines.



FIG. 62.

Fig. 62 A shows the type of roof which belongs to this style. It may be noted that the ridge, the hips and the eaves are all punctuated at each end by being bent upwards, with the result that the roof is endowed with a kind of self-consciousness which no rectilinear example could possibly possess. The gateway depicted in Fig. 62 B owes much of its merit to the tilted ends of the

cross-bar which give cohesion to the design. Without these the gateway would be but an elementary group of pieces of timber devoid of the formal emphasis which is the prerequisite of beauty.



FIG. 63

In naval architecture the same principle must find expression. Figs. 63 A and B show two methods of punctuating the funnel of a steamer. In the one case the rim of the funnel is painted while in the other it is bent outwards. The latter treatment is the better of the two, for there the punctuation is visible from afar, even in twilight when the steamer is silhouetted against the sky.



FIG. 64.

Fig. 64 A shows how the legs of a table can be finished off. It is easy to imagine the unsatisfactory effect which would be produced were these members to consist of plain pieces of wood having no accentuation at their extremities.

The design of the book-case depicted in 64 B would be incomplete without the cornice and base.



FIG. 65.

Figs. 65 A and B show two tumblers with different types of crowning feature; the one has an ornamental band, whilst the other has a swelling at the top. The vase C is agreeable to the eye because the curve of its profile is sensitive and straightens out towards the bottom. In D, however, that part of the profile cut off by the dotted lines is made up of arcs of a circle wholly unpunctuated at their lower ends, and the result is very clumsy.

In the design of pictures it is generally some rectangular form which has to be terminated. Of course, the frame may help to supply a finish to the composition, but a well arranged scheme should contain the element of punctuation within itself. The problem is a somewhat complicated one because the artist, while providing that the boundaries of his canvas have sufficient emphasis, must be extremely careful not to overweight them

with a pictorial interest which exceeds that of the centre part.

FIG. 66.

Fig. 66 A is a very simple sketch. The bottom is accentuated by the river, the top by the spreading foliage of the tree which tends to form an alignment with the upper edge of the rectangle; the tree, by being put at the left-hand side closes the pattern at that place, while the summit of the mountain gives a similar emphasis to the right-hand side of the composition. In 66 B the sky has a crimson line at the edge of the picture. This treatment is often adopted by Japanese artists and may seem at first sight to be rather strange, because the reddening of the sky cannot here be attributed to the effects of a rising or a setting sun. But as soon as we bear in mind the canon of punctuation the mystery disappears, and the pictorial convention is completely justified.

In Fig. 67 two sculptured friezes are contrasted. In A the row of figures has a special member which closes the group at each side. In B, however, there is a series without either a recognised beginning or end; we seem to witness but a small

part of a composition which is not æsthetically related to the rectangle enclosing it.

FIG. 67.

The principle we are now considering not only finds its expression in the forms of living things and in objects of art, but may serve to throw light upon some of the beauties of natural scenery. In an attempt to analyse our appreciation of Nature it is necessary to draw a sharp distinction between the two chief elements which may comprise a landscape. In the first place we have animal and vegetable shapes, and secondly we have dead matter—plains, hills and valleys and the grand effects of water and sky. The former cannot fail to exemplify the grammar of design for they are instinct with life itself, but the latter, being governed by more elementary laws, do not display the same subtlety of composition. Nevertheless, inanimate Nature provides many instances of an obedience to the canon of punctuation. The sea in nearly all its moods is edged by a kind of frieze. When the wind is blowing hard the shore line is emphasised by row behind row of breakers which form a magnificent border to the ruffled surface of the deep. At other times a thin thread of foam

may be the only sign that the expanse of ocean has terminated. Or else the shallowness which indicates the proximity of land may be the occasion of a change of colour, an additional translucency in the adjacent waters. Again, during the day the sky at the horizon is of a fainter blue than elsewhere, while towards evening it may turn to the most brilliant yellow and scarlet. And a similar phenomenon is observed in the cloud with a silver lining.

Streams look best when their banks are accentuated by a line of rushes or shrubs, and hills and valleys exemplify the rule not only by their gently tapering forms, but by the natural arrangement of the verdure which may be found upon them. A high mountain is conspicuously beautiful if it consists of a snow-clad peak surmounting grassy slopes, and has a rich growth of pines beneath. A bare rock, or an immense green knoll, or a tump entirely covered with trees cannot make so great an appeal to our senses, because here the element of punctuation is not so noticeable.

A brief reference to musical and literary forms will not be out of place. A long piece of music is obviously incomplete if it does not have a preliminary movement and a finale, while literary themes whether in prose or verse must always be skilfully introduced and concluded at a suitable point. Every author knows that the first and last chapters of a book, as they are the most difficult to treat becomingly, require the exercise of special care.

The same canon must be recognised in the

practice of good manners. In intercourse it may be observed that people generally comply with it. Salutations and farewells are not merely the expression of personal feeling but are a necessity of design; they are the formal symbols which mark the beginning and the end of a period of social communion.

I have now mentioned enough examples to prove that there is hardly a phenomenon in the realm of art or of nature which does not bear witness to the operation of this law.

(*iv.*) ON INFLECTION.

The canon of inflection, like that of number and of punctuation, provides a criterion of judgment which is applicable both to things and to ideas. When one examines the means whereby two or more objects can have a resemblance to one another and yet maintain an individuality of their own, one is burrowing at the roots not only of design but of thought itself.

The very structure of language would break down if it did not defer to the canon of inflection. Let us examine how this unity in diversity is exhibited in the forms of speech. Obvious examples of it will immediately occur to the reader. Nouns, verbs and adjectives, whilst preserving a certain stability, are subject to modification, and it is just this stability conjoined with modification which makes expression possible. The words "see," "sees," "seen" have a sufficient resemblance to one another to be symbolic of the same idea, the idea in this instance being that of vision, yet the modifications of the term, without depriving it of its usefulness as a symbol, increase its resources, so that it is able to enter into relationship with other ideas such as those of number and time. Of course, there are some quite irregular verbs, like the verb "to be" of which the parts are derived from several roots, but these do not comprise artistic wholes, for though there is a difference between

the parts there is no similarity between them. These verbs are accidents and exceptions and do not impair the validity of the general rule.

The form must vary when the subject varies, but the variation of the form ceases to have meaning as soon as the identity of the subject is destroyed thereby. This can be made clear by a reference to human conduct. In different circumstances people ought to behave differently. If a man has a large circle of acquaintances which includes many diverse types, he would be accounted stiff and lacking in sensibility if he behaved in exactly the same manner to them all; on the other hand he would be quite negligible if in whatever company he happened to be his temperament in turn became a mirror of that of each of his immediate associates. A man of great personality is responsive to innumerable influences, but at the same time is absolutely stable. He is the most perfect example of permanence co-existing with variation.

It would be an impossible task to give a concise description of the various ways in which objects can be inflected to show their relation to other objects. I shall here confine myself to illustrating one kind of inflection, the kind which is expressed in the use and disuse of symmetry. By this means the chief purpose of the argument will be as well served as by a more comprehensive treatment, for I wish merely to emphasise the universality of the principle and the close connection of the arts with one another.

Now, inflection is a certain sensitiveness to similarities and differences. The following

diagrams will show how this sensitiveness can be expressed in the forms of many familiar objects. The nature of the quality will be revealed to us still more clearly if we consider the effect not only of its presence but of its absence. In some instances we may find symmetry in positions where it is inelegant, and in others it may be the lack of symmetry which gives offence.

Let us first consider the human face.



FIG 68

Fig. 68 shows three examples of misplaced symmetry. In A a normal profile is depicted, while in B the nose is nearly symmetrical about a horizontal axis, and consequently looks very strange. In the normal front face the symmetry of the nose is justified because it is supported by that of the eyes, ears and mouth. But in the profile B the eye is made to balance, not with the other eye, but with the mouth and chin, and so a discord is set up. In C we have an ear symmetrical about a horizontal axis, and it appears ugly because the rest of the face takes no account of that axis. In this instance the ear is defying the rule which governs its environment. In D there is a similar defiance on the part of the dome of the head, which is symmetrical about a vertical axis. The symmetry is not upheld by a symmetry underneath, for on the left hand there is the face and on the right hand the ear and the back of the neck.



FIG. 69.

Figs. 69, 70 give illustrations of natural and unnatural animal forms. In 69 A, C and E, the canon of inflection is obeyed, but in B, D, and F there is a misplaced balance. 70 A is a normal



FIG. 70

fish, but in 70 B, C and D the dotted lines mark positions having a symmetry which ill accords with the shapes adjoining them.



FIG. 71.

The leaf 71 A is full of vitality, but that shown in 71 B is, as it were, machine-made, for it does not appear conscious that at one end it is attached to a stalk while at the other it is free. C is a graceful form, but D, in which the flower violates the regular pattern of the foliage, is clumsy. The artist is at liberty to conventionalise a plant for some decorative purpose, but it is incumbent upon him to defer to the grammar of design which is applicable to all forms whether natural or artificial. If, as in D, the leaves are arranged around a vertical axis, a single flower springing from the centre should occupy a central position. In E and F an ordinary pansy is contrasted with an imaginary one having a duplication of the top pair of petals. It is obvious that as the quatrefoil ignores the petal below it an ugly combination is produced.

In Fig. 72 the canon of inflection is exemplified in the art of dress. Three instances will suffice. In A, the lop-sided plume gives no offence because the hat itself is worn at an angle. But where the hat is straight the plume ought not to be set diagonally as in B. In C the lapels of the jacket are correctly disposed; in D, however, besides the proper symmetry from left to right, there is a meaningless and inappropriate symmetry about the axis shown by the dotted lines. The blemish in the design F will also become obvious after a little consideration. In this case the belt and the flounce have no inflection such as would connect them to the main part of the garment, being arranged in a regular manner about horizontal axis. In E the false symmetry is done away with

by the addition of intermediate members which tend to unite the skirt to its top and bottom appendages.

FIG. 72

In architecture good composition cannot be secured unless this rule is borne in mind. There is no need to dwell upon the enormity of the example 73 A. Here we are deliberately led to expect complete symmetry and yet part of the pattern is withheld from us. If for any reason apertures are not wanted in one half of the front, the introduction of blank windows as in B does much to improve the design. In C the equilibrium is destroyed by the introduction of the attic on

the left hand. The house D, however, has raised portions which although unequal in height and width seem to balance one another. The middle part has been slightly inflected towards one extremity, as the centre of the group of windows is not quite in the centre of wall space between the wings. Hence we do not expect the latter to



FIG. 73.

be an exact replica one of the other. Again, the wings themselves are inflected towards the centre of the building, for their symmetry is compromised by the addition of lateral features. Without these they would appear to take no cognizance of the fact that they are not standing in complete

isolation but are on one side attached to the main body of the house.

The design 74 B seems mechanical because the windows are all of the same size and placed in a pattern which is similarly disposed towards both top and bottom. In A, however, the necessary inflection has been introduced.



FIG. 74.

There is no need to multiply the architectural illustrations any further as many of the diagrams in the previous sections exemplify this canon. In Figs. 24 C and 26 A it is obvious that either of these façades would look highly unsatisfactory if by the introduction of a basement storey equal to the attic it were made symmetrical about a horizontal axis through its centre. Fig. 32 is also a case in point. It is noticeable that in this instance all three canons are satisfied at once. The abutments in C and D are the means of resolving the duality of the piers and also give them an inflection away from the opening, while the piers themselves are terminal features which punctuate the walls. By looking at Fig. 34 it is possible to realise how important it is that in the

Classic Order there should be a marked distinction between the form of the entablature and that of the pedestal. The columns, too, by being slightly thicker at the bottom than at the top and by having a different punctuation at each end are duly inflected; by virtue of their shape they have been endowed with a certain self-consciousness as if they knew which were their heads and which were their feet, and it is obvious that they could not with propriety be turned upside down. In Fig 55 it will immediately be apparent that the coping stone should not have a value equal to that of the plinth, while in Fig. 59 a great error would have been committed if the two end houses had been of an identical design.



FIG 75

Figs. 75 A and B depict an old-fashioned cab and a waggon. It will be observed that in each case the hind wheel is larger than the front one. By this difference between the size of the wheels

not only is the function of the vehicles expressed, but the formal element in design also receives recognition. For both cab and waggon are created mainly for the purpose of going forward and therefore are not symmetrical from front to back as if the direction of movement were a matter of complete indifference; and it is proper that the lack of symmetry in the main body of the structure should be formally recognised in the parts beneath. But in the motor cars C and D where the wheels are all of the same size we have a marked symmetry below which finds no support whatsoever in the framework above. No matter how high a degree of external finish these cars might possess, they are essentially inartistic because they violate an important rule of composition. It may perhaps be pleaded that the arrangement in question is the outcome of a regard for convenience and economy. In the opinion of an engineer it may be desirable that the utmost simplification should be attained by making the four wheels equal, as the structure is slightly cheapened thereby. But where money is so lavishly expended upon the fittings it is illogical to urge that the manufacturer cannot afford to create two different types of wheel for the back and front, especially as all the parts are made wholesale. The prevailing fashion owes its existence to thoughtlessness and to ignorance of design rather than to any utilitarian need. It shows a spirit of vulgarity when the elegance of a vehicle is supposed to depend upon the price of its constituent materials. Resplendent silver plate and the costliest leather will not atone for

the crudity of outline that most surely mars the beauty of every vehicle in which the canon of inflection is thus flagrantly defied. The arrangement of wheels displayed in A and B has received the agelong sanction of mankind and is the result of a mature taste firmly founded upon reason. The dignity of city life is so much affected by the nature of the traffic with which the streets are thronged that the design of vehicles has great public importance, and any general deterioration in this latter respect is expressive of a decline in a people's culture.



FIG. 76

The steamships and boats in Fig. 76 show a similar contrast between good and bad composition. A and C seem by their very shapes to express the idea of movement, and B and D have a formal stability which belies their function. In whichever direction they advanced a discord would be set up between the symmetry of their profiles and the utter lack of symmetry in the waters contiguous to them; for at just a little distance in front there would be the natural formation of

waves which wind or stream might determine, while at the stern the surface would exhibit an agitation due to a displacement of liquid by the vessel.



FIG. 77

The reader will have no difficulty in deciding that in Fig. 77 the bed A is better designed than B, the chair C better than D, the side-table E better than F,



FIG. 78

and that in Fig. 78 the door A is superior to B, in which there is a false symmetry owing to the

equality of the top and bottom panels. In C it is obvious that the lack of balance displayed by the shelves disturbs the unity of the pattern, for the lower half of the chiffonier is symmetrical and the whole is enclosed in a symmetrical figure.



FIG. 79.

Fig. 79 explains itself. The pieces of crockery A, C, E are more beautiful than B, D, F.



FIG. 80.

Objects of the commonest use can all show deference to the canon of inflection. Two simple examples are given above. In Fig. 80 the knife A

is properly shaped, but in B the blade and handle seem to take no cognizance of each other, for neither is inflected towards its point of junction. A similar fault can be found with the shovel D, which provides an unfavourable contrast with C.



FIG. 81.

In works of painting and sculpture, complete symmetry is a somewhat rare phenomenon, but the artist must always be on his guard against a partial regularity which is inconsistent with the balance of his whole scheme. Fig. 81 A shows a bad composition. The left-hand feature, being similarly disposed towards each side, seems out of place when situated at the edge of the picture. In B, however, we have a more harmonious treatment, for as its branches are inflected towards the right the tree is made a subordinate member of the design and lacks the irritating self-sufficiency of the tree in Fig. A.

Enough has now been said about the particular aspect of inflection which has to do with symmetry, and I may conclude with a brief reference to the general problem. Inflection is manifested not only in the single unit but in the group. Any kind of obvious group will serve to illustrate the argument. I may first mention a set of china.

In a tea-set, for instance, it is desirable that the tea-pot, milk-jug, sugar-basin and cups, while preserving their essential characteristics, should have some element in common. A simple way of achieving this would be to give to these pieces of china a uniform colour. The set would have a certain merit by virtue of this uniformity of colour, but as a work of art it would still be of a low order, because the element of similarity between its parts would not have been sufficiently emphasised. In addition to the community of colour there must be a community of form, and this latter can be secured in various ways. The larger pieces may reveal a suggestion of the profile of the cups, while the shape of the handles and the printed pattern on the china itself may provide opportunities for the establishment of an æsthetic relationship between the members of the set.

It is useless, however, to try to enlarge the family, so that it includes all the objects in its immediate neighbourhood, such as the upholstery of the room in which the china is situated. The furniture and the china are alike in that each in its sphere may give expression to the principles of design, but the affinity is not so close that it is necessary for them to have any particular feature in common, such as a type of ornament, for instance; they belong to different species. It is essential to point this out, because otherwise the artist is encouraged to attempt the impossible, namely, to reduce countless objects to a common denominator while at the same time creating variations sufficiently numerous to indicate the

purposes for which the objects are designed. There must be strict limits to inflection, or else language becomes too difficult. If we try to modify a substantive in such a way that it expresses not only number, case and gender, but also its precise relation to all the other concepts which a sentence may contain, we soon come to the end of the permutations of form of which that particular word is capable, that is if its identity is to be preserved. So an attempt to charge a single word with too great a significance would defeat itself.

An illustration from architecture will make this more obvious still. A building may by its design bear witness to the fact that it is a private house. It may show that besides being a private house it is a town house and not a country house. If the dwellings in the immediate vicinity are finished with stucco, it can express its association with them by adopting a livery of like colour and texture. If it is a detached house in a common highway, it can pay deference to the street by so disposing its parts that the most elegant front and the one containing the main entrance should face the street. Moreover, its height may be regulated by the width of the street, so that it does not destroy the proportions of the thoroughfare. The house may thus be subject to five separate inflections. But it cannot be made so sensitive to its surroundings that one might by merely looking at it realise at once that there was a church of a certain kind at one end of the street and a shopping centre at the other or that it was otherwise disposed to the city as a whole.

It is sometimes said that if we had a truer insight into organic life than at present we possess, upon being presented with a single feather, even if we had never seen its like before, we could in imagination construct the bird of which it is a part, and from that bird other classes of birds, and so on, until we embraced the whole of nature. In the form in which this statement is put it is profoundly misleading; for a true insight into organic life implies a knowledge of the whole of nature, and to understand the feather we must grasp the symphony of which the feather is but a tiny unit. But the feather studied by itself does not give the clue to the whole of nature any more than a single bar in a piece of music contains within itself the clue to the whole piece. We must first hear the piece through before we can understand the significance of that particular bar. If there is to be design, the part must be related to the whole, but it cannot be so delicately inflected that it is itself completely expressive of the whole. Of course, the forms of animal and vegetable life exemplify a single principle of vitality, but the universality of a principle is always measured by the variety of its manifestations. Besides association there must be dissociation before there can be expression.

(*v.*) ON DESIGN AND ACCIDENT.

After examining the three articles of grammar here illustrated, we are enabled to obtain a notion

of the formal element in art. In the next chapter we shall deal with the element that constitutes its subject. But before we make any further effort to describe how these two, though interdependent, can yet be separately conceived, it is necessary to apprehend a distinction of still wider significance —that between *design* and *accident*. This inquiry could not profitably have been undertaken in an earlier part of the book because the æsthetic idea did not become really definite until the grammar of form had been established.

For centuries men have engaged in a controversy concerning the relation between design and accident. Through a study of the arguments employed on either side it is possible to disengage two main currents of opinion which, although contrary to one another are yet alike in this respect, that they are both dangerously misleading. The first would drive us headlong to that intellectual position known as " determinism." According to this theory all events, important and unimportant, are tightly woven in the web of circumstance and thus are, with respect to design, upon terms of complete equality, for it is assumed that chance does not exist at all, but is only a name we give to causes which are beyond our comprehension. But the word " design " is bereft of meaning if everything is under the absolute dominion of fate. Some things are fashioned in such a manner that they exhibit a higher degree of government than do others. Design is an essence that is comparable to light. Yet light requires a foil before its true nature can become apparent to us. That foil is

darkness. And we are unable to distinguish the characteristics of design unless there also exists the absence of design—namely, accident. It is as foolish to deny the existence of accident as it is to deny the existence of darkness. Chance is not a fancy but a fact.

The second error is of the opposite kind. Instead of a denial of chance we have an unreasonable exaltation of it. Those who are imbued with such a sentiment are apt to repudiate all attempts to formulate laws of beauty. They think that a complete freedom from restraint is the only condition which is favourable to creative activity, and they even profess to find artistic merit in arrangements of matter which are quite fortuitous. Such an attitude is expressive of spiritual anarchy.

Accident is not altogether without significance, but its significance is merely negative. In the presence of accident we are enabled to make this one deduction from what we see—we deduce the absence of design. In all cases formality must be the standard by which we make our judgment.

Formality is a definite attribute; and we know what its nature is, as it is the result of obedience to the canons of form. Nevertheless it is subject to degree, just as are the quite definite attributes of heat and light. In fact, different degrees of design may be manifested in the several parts of the same object. This much can be stated without denying the essential unity of a work of art. For instance, everybody would admit that the face is the most beautiful part of the person. This is shown by the fact that we celebrate the beauty of

the face by making it the single theme of innumerable sketches and pictures. Of course the limbs have their own distinctive perfection of form, but a study of a hand or arm, however much skill in draughtsmanship it may reveal, cannot compete in interest with a representation of the human head. Naturally the significance of the figure, taken as a whole, exceeds that of any separate part, but we are quite entitled to make a comparison between the different members and to say that the head shows a more advanced degree of formality than does the remainder of the body.

In plants a similar concentration of purpose seems to be shown in the flower, which has ever been a symbol of excellence and beauty. The green leaf has a unique charm, and the gracious outlines of trees can never fail to exercise their spell upon the spirit of man; nevertheless it is in the bloom that we see displayed the acme of such loveliness as vegetable life can engender. This valuation acquires support in the very metaphor of language, as when we describe the best and noblest among us as the *flower* of the race.

In estimating the various degrees of beauty, it is right that we should draw a distinction between the formal and the informal. But the meaning of these terms must be clearly understood. One of the commonest errors with respect to design is that of identifying the formal with the symmetrical. There are symmetrical objects which are not formal, and formal objects which are not symmetrical. For instance an arrangement of twin towers not in any way united to each other nor dominated by a third member

may be quite symmetrical, but it is not formal because, being an unresolved duality, it violates one of the three canons of form, the canon of number. Again, there are many cases of misplaced symmetry which defy the canon of inflection. These, too, must be excluded from the category of the formal, for in an important respect they are lacking in the order and sensitiveness which characterise true form.

Wherein, then, does the peculiar virtue of symmetry consist? What is its meaning and use? In trying to answer these questions I must appeal once more to Nature. Let us take another glance at the human figure. It will be observed that the body is capable of assuming a perfectly symmetrical posture but that generally the greater portion of it is not similarly disposed from side to side. In walking and running and in many other kinds of motion the head, trunk and limbs are arranged in innumerable attitudes which, although governed by natural law, are yet unsymmetrical. There is always one part, however, that throughout all the multiform changes of the figure still maintains essentially intact its original pattern. I refer to the face. Now, the face is, of course, subject to modification in so far as the features may be affected by speech, laughter or by other expressive actions, but nevertheless it has this amount of stability which is lacking in the group made up of the body and limbs—that is, the main elements composing it have a formal relation to one another which is immutable. Whereas the legs are never stretched out rigidly except at rare intervals such as when a

man is standing at attention, the chin does not for a single moment cease to occupy an exactly central position under the forehead. The arms may upon occasion be placed horizontally or neatly disposed close to the sides of the body as in some course of physical exercise, but the geometrical arrangement of the parts of the face is not temporary but lasting; for the eyes are always in a line which is strictly at right angles to that of the nose and mouth. What do these facts suggest? Do they not indicate that this formal stability corresponds with a quality of permanence belonging to the parts wherein it is manifested? Obviously this is so, for the head contains the brain which is the organ of understanding. A man may with his body perform all manner of violent actions, but these actions, if they are in accordance with reason, will be controlled by a will that in some measure must possess the attribute of constancy. The face, then, has a special title to be called the mirror of the soul, for we regard the soul as something steadfast that preserves its identity throughout all the movements of the physical frame in which it is enshrined.

In the case of quadrupeds, birds and fishes, too, we look first to the face when we try to sum up their characters, for this provides the form of immutability which, contrasted with the ever-shifting configuration of the limbs, becomes such a wonderful vehicle of expression. An animal which had no permanent symmetry anywhere would appear weak and shapeless, but on the other hand a creature having head and body composed in one unalterable pattern would be

unbearably stiff, for it would be devoid of the quality of motion which even plants possess in a certain degree.

In vegetable life there is exhibited the same contrast between the fixed and the unfixed. Here there is no head-piece to give cohesion and purpose to the whole, but the æsthetic function of the face is performed by the bloom which is always possessed of a certain geometrical regularity of feature; the petals may radiate from a centre and so compose a circle or else they may be arranged in one of the many floral patterns which are symmetrical from right to left. It is but natural that the flower should receive this formal emphasis, for it expresses what is most essential in plant life. The flower is not only conspicuous on account of its own fleeting beauty but it has a special distinction owing to the fact that the seeds are germinated therein; it is both the consummation of the present and the hope of the future. But the leaves and branches, not having the same unique character, are free to assume countless kinds of unsymmetrical shapes, although, of course, they are always subject to the rules of number, punctuation and inflection.

Through a study of living forms we learn that neither the symmetrical not yet the unsymmetrical is in itself the hall-mark of design. They are both indispensable elements in every composition; but before they can show vitality they must speak the peculiar language of art, which, as we have seen, is governed by three chief articles of grammar. These articles are applicable to all forms, whether symmetrical or unsymmetrical,

so it is quite wrong to suppose that even unsymmetrical beauty can be the product of complete freedom from restraint. Freedom there may be, and mutability and motion, but these must be contained within the orbit of a law if beauty is to result therefrom.

The degree of rigour with which the law needs to be obeyed is dependent upon the nature of the subject. This will become clearer if we take an example from architecture. The precise measure of formality which it is proper for buildings to assume is determined by their social status. In the centre of a great city we ought to find a strictly ordered plan, for here there are public edifices expressive of what is most permanent and exalted in city life. This inner part should have the same relation to the remaining aggregate of dwellings as the face has to the body or as the flower has to the plant. Towards the outskirts of a town the planning may become more informal because here the subject is not so clearly understood. So we have a little less design and a little more accident. As the town increases, however, and becomes more conscious of its destiny the formal core ought also to increase. And whether the object under consideration be big or small the same rule applies. The more important a thing is the greater is the need that it should show a strict obedience to the grammar of form.

This analysis of the distinction between design and accident was necessary in order to supplement our knowledge concerning the nature of beauty. It is now clear that the absence of design is not the same as a direct violation of it. The former is

merely chaos and has no character at all, but the latter has a definite attribute which we call ugliness. A flagrant example of unresolved duality is more offensive to the eye than a mere hotch-potch where the semblance of order has not been attained nor even aimed at, just as very bad grammar immediately invites condemnation while a series of sounds which have none of the characteristics of language and are apparently fortuitous will perhaps incite no critical comment at all. There can be degrees of beauty without ugliness supervening anywhere. Ugliness is generally acknowledged to be reprehensible, and if we were committed to the opinion that the absence of beauty was the same as ugliness we should no longer be able to tolerate the significant variety of the things which make up our universe. The superlative alone would please us then. It is not desirable, however, that all objects should exhibit the same degree of organic complexity. One object may have more beauty than another without either of them being deformed. Similarly, one statement may contain a larger amount of truth than another, but it does not follow from this that the simpler statement is false. Ugliness is not a lesser positive quantity than beauty, it is a direct negative, and the greatest ugliness is the perversion of the greatest beauty. Nothing in the world can be more beautiful than the human face and figure, nothing in the world can be more ugly.

In order that this obnoxious quality of ugliness might be more readily detected and thus eventually be banished from our lives, an

illustrated analysis of form has here been attempted. If, as is claimed for them, the principles of design which have been set forth in these pages do not originate in any arbitrary choice but are based upon an acknowledgment of the laws both of Nature and of Mind, they may be commended to the test of practical application.

CHAPTER III.

Aspects of Subject.

A thing consists of Form and Subject and is naught else besides. In trying to determine the subject, therefore, we should be adopting an obvious course if we were to think of the totality of meaning which a thing may have and to deduct from this the particular element which we recognise to be formal. It is not an altogether satisfactory definition of Subject, however, to describe it as the residue after the Form has been abstracted. We wish to have more precise knowledge about it than that.

It may be remembered that in dealing with Form it was found desirable to consider certain aspects of it in turn. The whole matter could not profitably have been discussed as a single indivisible unit. Hence three categories of relation were established, namely, those of

Number, Punctuation and Inflection. When this analysis had been achieved the concept of Form immediately became intelligible. Is it not possible, then, to divide the concept of Subject in a similar manner and thus to arrive at an understanding of it? Before answering this question I must mention some of the difficulties which we shall here have to encounter.

In the first place, it may be remarked that the idea of Subject is very much more complex than that of Form. The nature of the distinction may be explained by an analogy from language. The act of defining Form can be compared with the production of a handbook on grammar, whereas any attempt to resolve Subject into its component parts would be as formidable an undertaking as a summary and codification of the whole of literature. Grammar can be taught to anyone, but the sense of all that it is possible to utter comprises a far larger study. Then, in the analysis of Form the relations to be considered were all of the same sort, being comprehended in the narrow bounds of an argument that had as its sole topic the character of the connecting link by which we can bind into an organic unity a beginning, a middle and an end; but in the case of Subject the relations differ from one another in kind and are not so easily expounded as was the simple homogeneous group of formal categories. Nevertheless this matter must not be left in a state of obscurity, and I shall try to obtain a bird's-eye view of the whole domain of Subject so that we can at least recognise the general contour and character of the land.

It would seem at first sight that while the form of an inanimate object is constant, its subject is variable. For instance if a razor is being used for shaving one might say that its subject is the act of shaving, if used on a table as a paper-weight its subject is the keeping down of paper, if used to cut sticks its subject is the cutting of sticks, and so on. There is, however, a great difference between the first case and the two others. In the first there was an obvious correspondence between the subject and the form. The razor was used for its natural purpose. In the latter there was a lack of such correspondence; the razor was employed in the one case inappropriately and in the other not only inappropriately but injuriously. Yet the form of the implement considered by itself was unchanged and continued to suggest its proper function. Which of the purposes shall we call its subject then, the one for which it was designed or the one for which it was actually used? I maintain that it will not advance the discussion to call either of these the true subject and to deny that title to the other. To adopt such a course would be to introduce confusion and unduly to limit the meaning of the word "subject." I am going to say instead that when a thing is employed for a proper end there is harmony in its subject and when not so employed there is discord in its subject. By this means we preserve a broad connotation for the term, while at the same time we introduce a useful standard of criticism.

If when attempting to form a judgment of something we ask whether there is harmony or discord in its subject, it is clear that we are

making an analysis which goes to the root of the matter in question. Many critics of art fail to arrive at just conclusions because they do not separate the subject from the form. A building may be beautiful to look at and yet entirely inappropriate for its function. Recognising it to be a bad building, such critics affirm that the whole design is worthless and they proceed to disparage not only the faulty theme but the style and composition also. Because some particular modern classic pile happens not to be adapted to its utilitarian objects they will seek to cast discredit upon the whole system of pedestal, column and entablature. If, however, in spite of the blemish which has just been mentioned, the fabric is of noble proportions, if it takes cognizance of the grammar of design, one ought to say that its form is highly commendable although there is discord in its subject. The ability to distinguish between these elements is the first prerequisite of good criticism. No matter what the topic of discussion may be, a picture, a piece of crockery, a garment or a house, it is impossible to appraise it rightly unless we ask ourselves two separate questions; we must first inquire whether it has the beauty that is due to a compliance with the laws of form, and then we must determine the degrees of its suitability to the occasion for which it was created.

In the case of animals and plants living their natural life there is perfect form and also complete harmony in their subject. But put a seagull in a cage and a discord is introduced. The soul of Man presents a more difficult problem, for we have

not come to any definite conclusion as to the type of life which is especially entitled to be called human. In general one may say, however, that when a man is employed in such a manner that his abilities find their fullest scope his soul is then harmonious.

Let us now look at the matter in a different way. So far we have only examined that element in the subject which is contained within the thing itself. But part of the subject of a thing resides in the mind of him who beholds it, who is perhaps influenced by it for good or for evil. This personal side of the subject is determined by the spectator's own philosophy of life. A thing which has been designed for a definite end by somebody of vigorous creative impulse makes no appeal to perverse and sterile minds; placed in unfavourable circumstances it may easily become as ineffective as an orator whose audience is not competent to appreciate him. In such a case it is bereft of its significance as a stimulus to thought and deed and as a utensil not merely of a person but of a society.

Before there can be complete harmony of subject the following conditions must be satisfied. In the first place a thing must be used for the purpose for which it was made and that purpose itself must be capable of justification; secondly, the people who come into contact with the thing must experience a mental reaction of such a kind as would prove them to have entered into the spirit of its creator.

We have now arrived at the stage where we can discuss an important distinction which concerns our outlook upon the various objects comprising

the external world. Two mental attitudes are to be considered—that of criticism and that of interpretation. The choice between them is determined by the nature of the thing which is being examined. Some things have no subject at all except what we ourselves put into them, whilst others appear to be quite self-sufficient. In the former class one may include all objects of art created by Man for his use and pleasure; in the latter there are to be found the vast majority of animals and plants.

Criticism implies the possibility of finding fault, interpretation excludes such a possibility. As a rule, when dealing with the majesty of life one may interpret but one must not criticise. When in the presence of domestic animals, however, or vegetables and flowers which are bending to our will, we are at liberty to be censorious. Since they are used for some human design we are justified in expressing an opinion as to how much they further that design. When trees are planted in a town for the purpose of giving shade one has a right to complain if they are scrubby, if a cabbage or a pea is tough that may reasonably be counted a blemish; but nobody should presume to pass unfavourable comment upon a daisy or a bramble or an oak-tree in the forest, that is if these have grown to their natural stature and have received no injury from without. One may criticise a collie or a race-horse but not a tiger or a wolf or an eagle. In the latter instances nothing but interpretation is permissible. We study such creatures, and the utmost we can hope to do is to gain a little insight

into their lives; for the members of the animal and vegetable world have their own ends to subserve and we have very scanty knowledge as to what these ends are.

If a man were to find fault with a swallow it would mean that he wished to exercise authority over swallows and to turn them into something different. Otherwise his intervention is utterly useless and irrelevant. The critical faculty is not, as is sometimes supposed, at variance with the creative, but is indispensable to it. In fact the act of criticism is itself the surest expression of the desire to create.

It must be noted, however, that discord is immediately introduced into the subject if people adopt the critical attitude towards a thing when they ought to confine themselves to interpretation. We must always separate in our minds the things which are of such a nature that they can and ought to be changed by us from the things which we cannot change; for their subjects differ radically.

The temporal element still remains to be discussed. As a thing's life may be lengthened it is desirable that the term " subject " should have reference to the total period of the thing's existence. We cannot judge the whole being by merely considering a particular moment in its growth. We shall form a wrong opinion of the soul of a caterpillar if we forget that a caterpillar is a prospective butterfly.

An object of use resembles Man and the lower members of creation in that it seems to be more alive sometimes than at others. Take a

bread-knife for instance. Say that it is an elegant bread-knife with its parts properly inflected and punctuated and free from the defect of unresolved duality. Also assume that it is just the right size, that it is very sharp and has a handle of a convenient shape for the fingers to hold. When one is presented with a beautiful implement such as that, one cannot help being moved by an affection for it, because it seems to have a personality of its own, small and elementary though this may be. If a case is designed for the knife, it is gifted with two kinds of experience, one when it cuts into the loaf and divests it of slices of bread and the other when it lies in its appropriate resting-place. Its status is enhanced by each separate attention which is bestowed upon it. When in addition to a special case it has a special rag to clean it, the knife grows visibly in importance. And if it is so shaped that it exhibits an affinity to the table-knives near it, an affinity to them and yet a suitable difference from them, it would have a social existence of its own, a headship and priority over knives. Put the knife in a museum. It will never cut bread any more. What, then, has become of its subject? We may say that it has undergone a modification, its centre of gravity, as it were, has been transferred from the objective to the personal side; being deprived of an opportunity to perform its obvious function, its existence is only justified in so far as it stimulates the mind of the spectator.

It must be insisted, however, that the true subject of a thing includes all its uses and its

natural and recognisable effects during the whole period of its existence. Effects which are neither natural nor recognisable cannot reasonably be held to be part of the subject. Things often have associations which are merely the product of chance, and it is a common error to fasten these upon the subject. Thus one may read long articles purporting to be a critical analysis of buildings and find little else but reminiscences of the famous people who inhabited them. The distinction between design and accident must be observed in the consideration of Subject just as it was in that of Form.

Lastly, it may be convenient if we contrast the *immediate* with the *general* subject. The former can be described as the obvious utilitarian purpose which a thing may possess; the latter is rather its social significance and function. Where a society is animated by a common ideal, all things share in the same general subject, but where this is not the case the innumerable small immediate subjects clash with one another and do not contribute to a grand effect. In composing the visual arts into a hierarchy my intention was to suggest a general subject for them; if the rival claims of these arts were once adjusted, each single thing that men made would serve as a supporting member of a noble structure of civilisation. There are many quite skilful craftsmen who can give to their creations an immediate subject, but, because they are not philosophers, they ignore the general subject, and so are incapable of great artistic achievement.

Four aspects of Subject have here been examined

and the analysis has been of a strictly practical kind, for it was made clear that if either critic or creator failed to acknowledge the distinctions which were formulated, his work would suffer accordingly. As was observed at the beginning of this chapter, the contrast between Form and Subject is exactly the same as that between grammar and literature. This idea is intelligible in itself and does not gain in definition through being elaborated overmuch. There are two different things—the sense, and a certain set of relations which are not themselves the sense, but which must be expressed before there can be any sense at all. The relations, it is true, have meanings of their own, yet these meanings are over and above the meaning of the subject proper and can be discussed without reference to it, as in the commentary upon the diagrams illustrating the Grammar of Design. The meaning of the form is common to all forms, but the meaning of the subject is particular. One might say that every separate thing is a junction of Subject and Form. These latter may be compared with two different sorts of ray, neither of which becomes visible unless it be crossed by the other. The same formal relations can be exemplified in subjects so multifarious as animals, plants, dress, architecture, crockery, and so on, but without a formal relation the subject is inconceivable.

This is an ultimate distinction which nobody can fail to recognise if he studies the nature of matter and of mind. As there are limits to the possibility of analysing elemental ideas, I shall not pursue the topic further. The evidence of

what is profound sometimes lies upon the surface and in trying to penetrate beneath the surface we may obscure our vision altogether. There are many whose ambition to plumb the depths of the spirit has but led them into its quagmires. Avoiding all intellectual hazard, I have confined myself to simple and obvious statements, not being ashamed to be as cautious as a mariner who would choose the safest possible route across dark and dangerous waters.

PART THREE.

THE HUMAN AGENT.

CHAPTER I.

The Artist in Society.

Art does not spring up spontaneously, but only comes into existence at the bidding of a human agent, an artist. An attempt will now be made to describe this agent and his relation to society. The human significance of the arts has already been insisted upon in the chapters in which they were ranged in their order of social importance, but in this volume little has hitherto been said about him whose mission it is to bring beauty into being. The personal qualities which I am going to discuss are not the exclusive possession of a privileged few but are shared to a certain extent by the average man. Everybody is appreciative of form and is engaged in the manipulation of it. This is especially true if one takes the arts which have to do with the body, manners and dress; in the case of architecture, painting and sculpture, however, the public interest is not so great, partly because these do not concern the average man so closely as the former and partly because a

more specialised training is necessary for the understanding of them. But although the search for beauty and its enjoyment should be a privilege common to all, the vast majority of men have to work so hard to earn a livelihood that they have very little time or energy for the proper cultivation of their senses. It is for the general advantage, therefore, that certain people should make it their profession to uphold the standard of the arts and to urge that in every activity, both public and private, due deference should be paid to the æsthetic ideal. It is not sufficient that these particular critics and guardians of society should apprehend the scope of the arts; it is their duty to study the practical means by which their concepts shall cease to be concepts merely, but can find expression in the state.

One cannot specify the human qualities which would be required for the successful performance of any given task unless the exact nature of that task is known. Hence it was a logical procedure to discuss the thing to be created before trying to arrive at any opinion about the creator of it. In the second part of the volume it was stated that certain objective canons comprising a grammar of form must be exemplified in the internal disposition of everything which can lay claim to æsthetic merit. Where these precepts of grammar are defied, there result only chance aggregations of matter having neither sympathy nor sense. Design is but the attempt to endow the inanimate with some of the qualities which an intellectual analysis has proved to be the distinguishing marks of the animate. Not until there has been perception can

there be creation. Many people hold that for the artist to acknowledge a set of æsthetic cánons is a spiritual surrender indicative of weakness. But the precepts of grammar which govern the constitution of works of art are not arbitrary nor is the practice of them destructive of his vitality, for they are founded upon an appreciation of the nature of life itself and contribute to an important extension of the vital process; and this very impersonality, this complete freedom from caprice which the artist attains through his acknowledgment of an objective standard of values, so far from causing him to be treated with disrespect, may eventually turn out to be one of the chief sources of his power.

On the occasions when he deals with form alone, his activity appears to be somewhat superficial, as for the most part he is engaged in giving proper shape to objects which fulfil the needs of others. He may be asked to design a house, a piece of earthenware, or perhaps a garment, and in recognition of their divers utilitarian purposes he has severely to restrict his creative fancy. A house must contain a given number of rooms arranged in a special manner, a coffee-pot must be of a convenient size and have both a handle and a spout, a suit of clothes must be adapted to the figure, eccentric or otherwise, of the person who is to wear it. Yet it is not the artist's sole function to find elegant solutions of problems he did not himself propound. To a considerable degree he must exercise control, not merely over the form, but over the subject-matter of art. In both of these tasks he is likely to encounter

opposition. It is contended here, however, that the more clearly his attitude both towards his art and towards society is explained, the less vigorous will this opposition become.

In trying to apprehend a highly complex whole such as society, one must attempt some kind of division even if one recognises that the resulting analysis is not perfect. Society can be dissected in hundreds of ways and each method of dissection may be useful for the purpose of some particular inquiry. The student of political economy may treat of it as if it were made up of wage-earners and those who possess capital, the medical officer may sort out the healthy from the diseased, the moralist may range all the world in two camps—the virtuous and the wicked, and so on. Of course, these types of grouping are very crude, yet they are of value in that they represent the necessary first steps in various kinds of analysis. Rather than shrink from the act of classification through the fear of departing from the strict truth, it is better to venture upon a single definite statement, for this can always be modified afterwards and be made to correspond more closely with the facts.

Into what categories, then, will the artist separate his neighbours? Will he say that they consist of the artistic and the inartistic? That would be to combine stupidity with arrogance. It is his business not to insult but to persuade. In fact, his attitude towards others is to him a matter of high politics, and therefore he must make a cautious examination of the forces, personal and other, which are likely to be arrayed

against him. He is obliged to bear in mind that there are many absorbing occupations besides that of art, and men of powerful will are engaged in them, ambitious men so anxious to extend their sway that they pay little heed to those who would assert a standard of values different from their own. The artist, if he is to make a place for himself in the world, must not only be able successfully to contend with these his principal rivals, but he must also win the favour of the general public, the great mass of people who, although not leaders of opinion, are nevertheless the chief dispensers of patronage.

For the purpose of this inquiry it will not be without advantage if separate consideration be given to two main divisions of mankind—the learned and the unlearned. These, when added together, make up society, and if we determine the relation of the artist to both we have determined his relation to society.

It is necessary to explain a little more precisely the nature of the distinction which is here implied. In every branch of activity some lead and others follow, yet it is not true to say that there is a definite cleavage between the rulers and the ruled. The founder of an important school of art or perhaps a great novelist whose writings have helped to fashion the manners of his time may be but an insignificant unit in a political party, while men pre-eminent in statesmanship, from whom parliamentary assemblies are accustomed to receive guidance, are often content, in matters such as architecture, music, or the drama, to defer to the authority of others. So the specialists, if they

are to be accurately judged, must not be envisaged as a class, for they are not a homogeneous body.

The several kinds must be dealt with individually, for the artist has a different opinion of each. In dealing with the public, however, it is right that he should conceive of his audience as a single denomination composed of people who have no absorbing personal interests such as would tend to make them hostile to the æsthetic ideal. It would here be his ambition to explain how his activities might conduce to the general welfare, as he is addressing himself to the main body of humanity, whose profoundest needs ought to determine the substance of his art.

The prominent human types which will be referred to in the following chapters have a message for the artist, and in some instances the message takes the form of an injunction. Society does not unconditionally submit to be ruled by such advisers, nor can the artist submit to be ruled by them. But he will naturally want to ascertain what these distinguished people are ready to teach him and to welcome their assistance in whatever form it be given. For obvious reasons, the artist cannot afford to ignore them. The statesman and the engineer impose restrictions upon his practical activity, the mathematician and the psychologist attempt to direct his method, the biologist and the historian would impugn his standards of criticism, while the moralist and the metaphysician claim the right to determine his motives. For him to try to domineer over these people would, of course, be most unwise, but to decline to explain his attitude towards them

would not only be an act of self-stultification but it would be discourteous as well. As the artist is impersonal, it cannot be said that he is self-assertive or addicted to wanton aggression; on the other hand it would be equally erroneous to compare him with a lamb set in the midst of wolves. He is the guardian of a certain spiritual estate, and he must be both willing and able to defend it.

In examining the artist's relation to the specialists who are engaged in various activities and studies, we shall be effecting an analysis not only of society but of human nature itself. In each individual mind there is enacted a drama that is an echo of the social conflict in which the artist is taking part. Thus, by means of the classification adopted here the interdependence of persons and the interdependence of faculties can be simultaneously discussed. The artist may be considered both as a separate being and as an abstraction. The æsthetic impulse which resides in every one of us, through being personified in him, becomes self-conscious.

CHAPTER II.

The Artist and the Statesman.

The relation between the artist and the statesman has already been touched upon in the first part of this volume. It was explained how the artist can help the statesman by so stimulating the æsthetic impulse that the ugliness which invariably accompanies bad government becomes intolerable to all classes of the community..

It is natural that some of the rich should wish to hide from themselves the result of their misrule, but if they escape to a little paradise of their own, they cannot lay claim to any high degree of culture on that account. The true artist is a public personage and his greatest pride is in those things which are free for everybody to behold. If he were to live in a splendid mansion surrounded by its park his desire for the beautiful would be far from satisfied. Rather than a splendid mansion to himself he would have splendid cities, and before he can take delight in the cities they must be inhabited by a well-favoured race of men and

women. He is not accustomed to open his eyes to one thing and to close them to another. His eyes are open all the time as he is forbidden to spare himself the displeasure which a truthful vision may cause him. If it be commonly supposed that the artist is a coward and runs away from what is ugly, art itself is brought into disrepute, with the result that statesmanship suffers too; for unless a nation pays deference to the æsthetic ideal it is powerless to cope with the many social diseases which sap its strength.

As human beauty cannot be attained unless people have adequate means of subsistence, it is natural that the artist should strive his utmost to remove the evil of poverty. But the welfare of the first of the visual arts is indirectly dependent upon the successful cultivation of the second, for this would lead to the abolition of those divisions of caste which do so much to hinder the equitable distribution of wealth.

If the artist's co-operation is necessary, before reformers can do away with poverty, his services will be even more urgently required in the uncertain and dangerous period which will follow such an act of social reconstruction. It is commonly supposed, and the opinion is substantially true, that most people have a natural disinclination to work. If, owing to a great increase in the resources of machinery, the necessities of life could be produced by such a small section of the population that the majority were left without regular employment, and if, moreover, the supply of food were so well arranged that nobody need starve, what would there be

to prevent a nation sinking into a sloth and into all manner of vices? Were the artist to fail to undertake the duties which these new conditions would impose upon him, then society itself would be a failure and would have proved itself unworthy of its material advancement. Leisure is not a blessing unless men are fit to choose their own tasks. In the pursuance of an æsthetic ideal there is sufficient work for everybody, for there is no limit whatsoever to the excellence which can be attained in the arts both major and minor, and nothing but good to mankind can come of their prosecution—provided that their order of precedence is strictly observed.

It sometimes appears desirable that there should be a certain measure of state control of art. The question, therefore, arises whether this state control would constitute an assault upon the legitimate privileges of the artist. In the light of what has here been written the problem ceases to present any difficulties. If art were nothing more than the expression of the artist's peculiar temperament, all the artists who were left outside the official coterie would be very jealous and would conspire to malign the work of the officials. But if there were an agreement as to principles, as there certainly would be if art were elevated to the rank of a science, the question of state control would not then be one of æsthetic theory but of organisation. Were the state to intervene before any definite principles had been established, numerous abuses might easily follow, and a small clique might seek to impose its own personal interpretation of art upon the whole community.

And if there were no critics capable of a philosophic judgment, there would be no remedy for the evil except that supplied by the envious intrigues of the other sects whose rule might be just as objectionable as that of the men they were trying to replace. But when once æsthetic principles have been securely established it makes no difference who gives effect to them, whether official or unofficial agents; on the other hand, no feat of organisation can be an adequate substitute for the effort of thought which is required for the attainment of order in the domain of art. The ultimate responsibility here rests with the impersonal artist. For him, however, this matter of state control is not a vital one. Whether the machinery of the state is more capable of furthering the cause of art than that possessed by private agencies is a question to which every country and period will supply a different answer.

Besides the various political concepts which have to do with the internal organisation of a state, there is another which is often spoken of in connection with art—the concept of nationality. People often say that art expresses "national temperament" and they talk of English, French or German art as if these adjectives were self-explanatory and had a constant meaning. We shall presently find, however, that geographical terms can have no place in the vocabulary of æsthetic criticism, except in so far as they are used in a strictly geographical sense. It is easy to understand how the phraseology originated. For untold centuries there was only a limited degree of intercourse between the different

parts of the world, and there have come into being not only great societies each of which forms a separate political entity, but separate languages and traditions as well. But uniform methods of industry and commerce, a literature which is rapidly becoming of cosmopolitan appeal, and boundless facilities of travel are destined to do much to establish one single civilisation all over the globe. Short-sighted statesmen are apt to foster national schools of art for their own purposes, but it is clearly the duty of an artist to turn a deaf ear to their appeals, remembering that his achievements are more likely to add lustre to his nation if he holds himself free to use every method of artistic expression that is known to mankind than if he jealously ward off all foreign influences. Statesmen have a right to demand from an artist the same kind of public service as they demand from other people; they may expect him to serve in the army if occasion arise and to perform the ordinary duties of a citizen; but they exceed their function when they attempt to make artistic activities serve political ends. The most famous artists of the past have never striven to express the genius of their countries. If they had done so they would have abused their powers, and, becoming parochial, would have failed to win lasting honour even among their compatriots. A great artist, without in any way restricting his field of vision, labours to do the best of which he is capable, knowing that his nation will claim it for her own.

That this concept of nationality has nothing to do with art is clearly established by the fact

that it was found possible to make a detailed analysis both of the form and the subject of art without ever once mentioning national temperament. The laws of composition have been shown to be directly related to nature, and no breach of these laws is permissible either in the Old World or in the New. And the order of precedence of the visual arts has a determining influence upon their subject, and this order of precedence is not confined to any one particular country. That is not to say that there must be a sort of hotch-potch consisting of an indiscriminate mixture of all the partial styles which existed before the great period of mutual interaction between the various parts of the world had begun. For instance, nobody would suggest that there might be designed a church having pointed arches enclosed in a Classic order, and a tower in the shape of a pagoda. Such a building, so far from being an example of a cosmopolitan style would have no style at all. Attention to the grammar of design would save the cosmopolitan artist from any crudities such as that. The chief style of architecture, namely the Classic, has incorporated harmoniously within itself both the dome and the spire, and it will eventually incorporate features even from those styles which are now known as Chinese and Japanese.

But if the artist resents any attempt on the part of the statesman to impose on him a narrow "national" style, he does not thereby commit himself to internationalism in the political sphere, he does not commit himself to the advocacy of universal peace or of a single centralised

government for all the world. A cosmopolitan style is an intellectual necessity, for the laws of logic are the same in whatever country they operate; and once a successful attempt has been made to obtain an intellectual synthesis of æsthetic forms, there can no more be English, French, German, American or Japanese art than there can be separate sciences of arithmetic peculiar to each country. That science is international does not lessen political differences, neither would these differences be rendered less acute if art also were to become international. But universal peace is not an intellectual necessity as is a cosmopolitan style. Where there is a conflict of principles one of them must be wrong, and before they can exist side by side there must be a reconciliation between them. A conflict of nations, however, has the character of a competition, and there is nothing necessarily illogical in the idea of competition. So the cosmopolitan artist may be intensely patriotic, and, without doing violence to his principles, he can fight for the country that gave him birth.

Political nationality is an affair of government, and it would very soon cease to exist if universal peace were once established. If the possibility of war is removed, national consciousness will languish, and the result may not be altogether desirable. At present every country has powerful and restless neighbours. If the statesmen of any one nation fail to provide an environment favourable to the physical and intellectual development of its citizens (from whom its soldiers are recruited), if they cannot prevent the inception

of civil feuds within its own borders, if in any important respect they fail to show powers of organisation, they are aware that swift punishment may ensue and that the nation whose custodians they are may suffer the loss of territory or some other appalling injury. Universal peace may lead to universal sloth. But whether or not the human race will ever be so transformed that without spiritual deterioration it could dispense with the occasional stimulus of war is a question to which I do not at this point attempt to provide an answer, for this matter can more conveniently be discussed in a subsequent chapter which deals with the relation between the artist and the moralist.

The opinion may here be expressed, however, that while war is a political phenomenon which makes a very great stir so long as it lasts, it does not necessarily do anything either to help or to hinder the progress of art. A cosmopolitan style is dependent for its existence not upon any political activity but upon operations of the mind conducted within a sphere which is far removed from politics.

The state is an important thing and the artist must take note of it, but he cannot be a blind tool of the state. While serving the state he must try to make it an instrument for the purposes of art. For the state is not the whole of society. If the state were all-embracing, that would be to imply that the object of government was merely government, whereas it is commonly recognised that the value of government must be tested by its success in providing conditions favourable to

civilisation. But "what is civilisation apart from government?" it may be asked. Is not a people most highly civilised if it has the sagacity to secure for itself the blessings of order and liberty? The answer is that order and liberty are not ends in themselves. They are the indispensable means of culture, but they do not comprise the sole object of culture. Order and liberty fail in their purpose unless they lead to accomplishment in those vital arts to the examination of which this book is devoted.

It is sometimes held that good government may be very dearly bought, and that there is an ever-present danger of too great a proportion of a people's talent being spent in affairs of politics and in administration. But although occasionally the arts may suffer on account of such an over-emphasis of the political side of human activity, statesmanship cannot possibly deteriorate through any increase in the popularity of the æsthetic ideal. For this ideal, especially in so far as it is identified with a desire for the perfection of the human type, itself provides the strongest of all the impulses which are directed towards the proper organisation of the state.

CHAPTER III.

The Artist and the Engineer.

The main aspects of engineering are the mechanical and the constructive. These are not altogether distinct from one another, but for convenience they may be given separate consideration. In its mechanical aspect, engineering is a mighty force, profoundly influencing our habits and in fact the very quality of our culture, for it is responsible for that social tendency which, occasioned by the improvement of machinery and of the means of communication, has resulted in the establishment of "the industrial age." A discussion of the constructive aspect would be concerned with the engineer as designer, using this term in its widest sense to mean the architect of things both great and small. It is thus apparent that engineering has two consequences; the first is a discernible effect upon our persons, while the second is a still more obvious modification of our environment.

In spite of the fact that the engineer is vested with such great power, there are various influences which will prevent him from obtaining the complete disposal of our lives; and chief of all the spiritual forces destined to make impossible the paramountcy of the engineer must be reckoned that practical æsthetic ideal which the artist conceives and formulates. But before the artist can determine his proper attitude to the engineer it is necessary for him to bear in mind that the latter is not personally responsible for all the results which may be attributed to his inventions. An appliance which to its designer has little interest except what attaches to the solution of a somewhat difficult technical problem may create a most important change in men's condition. Thus the mechanician may let loose forces which he is unable to control, and although he deserves our gratitude for such benefits as he confers upon us, he cannot be blamed for the evils which ensue when scientific discoveries are put to an ignoble use by others.

If the artist wishes to concern himself effectively with the social consequences of the activities of the engineer, he must seek to wield the instrument of political administration. The unhealthy conditions caused by the too rapid growth of towns, which followed the introduction of railways, can only be mitigated by suitable housing reform; the economic disturbances due to the prodigious development of machinery for the manufacture of articles of use call for an act of industrial reorganisation which will not be performed with success unless artists and statesmen work in partnership.

When the engineer adopts the rôle of constructor, however, he is a fully conscious agent, and if his designs are ugly he may with justice be called to book. In this matter the artist cannot ask the statesman for help, but must take upon himself the whole burden of the encounter.

The engineer builds ships and vehicles of all kinds, he makes railways, roads and viaducts, and since the advent of reinforced concrete he has in a large measure taken into his province the construction of buildings, especially tall buildings with steel framework. Is the time approaching, then, when the architect will have most of his work taken from him and will be obliged to confine himself to knick-knacks, perhaps the ornamentation and sculptural embellishment of buildings and the design of furniture and of small domestic utensils? That is for the architect himself to decide. Let us consider for a moment the sources of the engineer's power, so that it may be possible successfully to cope with him. That it is necessary to restrict his influence will be obvious to many, since the opinion is widely held that mere construction does not suffice, and there is something ungracious about the work of an engineer, if it be not transformed into art.

The reason for the engineer's apparent victory over the artist lies in the fact that the former proceeds with the determination and energy which are due to the possession of a scientific method. Architects are wont to disagree with one another, and to scoff at any attempt to propound a theory of design. Hence the members of the average municipal authority have faith in their engineer

and take his advice even about subjects upon which he is incompetent to give any counsel at all, while it frequently occurs that the recommendations of official architectural bodies are scornfully brushed aside as if their members were merely charlatans, or at best amateurs. Recognising this state of affairs, and envious of the prestige of the engineer, certain architects lay claim to the same kind of ability as the engineer possesses, and even go so far as to assert that good architecture is nothing else but sound construction. But instead of advancing the interests of their own profession by this, they do just the reverse. For if architecture is merely sound construction, clearly the practice of it had better be controlled by engineers, who by training are expert constructors. It is even contended that the exaltation of the constructive element is the result of applying *reason* to architecture. But this is a claim which architects have been far too quick to concede. Thus the intellectual method is not generally viewed with favour by those acquainted with the social and æsthetic aspects of building. In fact, many people point to the folly of the sectarians who over-emphasize construction and say: "That comes of trying to reduce art to terms of logic." Unfortunately, however, a bad argument may often prevail over a quite creditable emotion, if the latter be not justified upon philosophic grounds; so the artist, if he wishes to triumph, must consent to be intellectual too, and prove that the doctrines to which he objects are not only contrary to taste, but contrary to reason.

Now it may be remembered that in the foregoing chapters two different kinds of test, two critical weapons were created; the first test owed its origin to an analysis of society, an analysis which resulted in the establishment of the hierarchy of the visual arts, while the second was provided by the resolution of organic form into certain categories of relationships which were the basis of a grammar of design. In each case the method employed was strictly logical. For, obviously, as every work of art has a social content, it was necessary to obtain an idea of the relative place of each of the arts in the scheme of society. And in studying form one would naturally turn one's attention to the structure of those bodies which are animated by life, and thus have a formal excellence far transcending that of any objects made by Man.

It was found that architectural excellence cannot be achieved unless the order of precedence of the visual arts be strictly observed. Buildings, no matter by whom they are erected, should pay deference in the first place to the art of the cultivation of human beauty, and in the second place to the art of manners. The engineer does indeed give a direct attention to the welfare of our persons when he devotes himself to the improvement of sanitary appliances and conditions, but he has no standard of values which would ensure that his creations are possessed of the attribute of manners. He constantly flaunts in our eyes things in which nobody could conceivably be interested, and, moreover, he is concerned solely with his own

structure and never seeks to modify it, so that it might be brought into harmony with other objects in the vicinity.

The chapters on the Grammar of Design show clearly how even in objects usually manufactured by the engineer the canons of composition can be observed, and these agreeable excellences of form would not be arrived at by an observance of constructional needs alone. Of course it is true that in certain instances, notably in those appertaining to the canon of punctuation, the rounding off happens to coincide with constructional convenience, but this is merely an accident. For instance, a brick wall must as a rule have a coping stone, which combines two functions—it protects the wall from wet, while at the same time it is a terminal feature. In the case of walls made of big blocks or of concrete, however, the coping has no utilitarian justification. A stone column generally has a capital of some sort in order to spread the pressure, but in concrete piers the capital is often omitted because not constructionally necessary. But how crude and unsatisfactory a support becomes if it has neither base nor capital! It is found, then, that sometimes, by accident, the engineer may give effect to the canon of punctuation. Of the other canons—of number and inflection—he takes no cognisance whatever. And yet by illustration it has been proved what ugly forms result when these canons are violated.

The procedure of the devotees of mechanical construction is apt to be exceedingly unphilosophical. Instead of trying to obtain a grasp of

the whole of architecture they would make one particular aspect of it embrace the whole. Sometimes in defence of their theories they appeal to nature and they point out that every limb of an animal has a constructive object, that it is exactly adapted to the performance of some particular function. It must be noted, however, that the constructive features such as the bones are obscured from view. The organs of our bodies, too, serve a most important purpose, but nobody would guess their presence by looking at our exteriors. These organs are an essential part of ourselves, but they are a subordinate instrumental part, they are the supporting members of a being whose function immeasurably transcends the mechanical operations by which its bare existence is secured.

A few words may be apposite here on the subject of mediæval architecture, a manner of building which has sometimes been extolled on the ground that above all other styles it expresses constructive candour. It is true that Gothic is essentially an engineer's style, but this is just its weakness and the cause of its ultimate extinction. Although the Gothic builders showed brilliant artistic ability, much of their work was vitiated because they allowed the engineer to determine their chief units of design. I speak here of the pointed arch and vault, the characteristic features of Gothic architecture. Initially the pointed arch was determined upon because it was the means of solving the difficulties experienced in the attempt to roof over a meeting-place of aisles of different width. At first the Gothic builders were loth to

use it on account of its ugliness. This is shown by the fact that they employed the round arch in the windows for some time after the pointed vault came into fashion. They were faced by a choice of evils. Either they could have retained the more beautiful round arch in the windows and suffered the discord between it and the vault, or else they were at liberty to make use of the pointed form in both places, and at least secure harmony between the units. In adopting the latter alternative they did not embrace the theory of the " truthful " architect who mistakes good construction for beauty. On the contrary, they laboured incessantly to modify the crudeness of the pointed form; they tried to change it into a pattern, so that by this means the artist might be able to transcend the engineer. The vault went through a remarkable series of transformations in each of which the æsthetic emphasis was increased and the constructive diminished.

The mediæval designers strove to distract attention from the vaults by ornamenting the junctions of them. But they were not satisfied with merely decorating the constructive forms, for they strove to re-arrange those forms into definite groups bound together by æsthetic relationships. The English fan vault (see Fig. 82 A) represents the final stage. Here the roofing is resolved into a series of contiguous cones, the interstices being filled up with ornamentation. But that was a laborious method and had the æsthetic defect that the central feature was not really sufficient to bind the cones together. It shows,

however, that there was a distinct tendency towards forms of circular section. Three attempts



FIG. 82.

were made to deal with the difficulty in the windows. In the first place self-contained patterns were introduced, which distracted attention from the imperfect form which bounded them; secondly the curve of the arch was punctuated as in 82 B. Thirdly the curve was resolved into a cusp, and we have the flamboyant stage as in C. The point to be insisted upon is that the Gothic builders did their utmost to overcome the disadvantages which engineering necessities had imposed upon them.

It is to the credit of our mediæval ancestors that they were well aware of the imperfections of their architectural style, and as soon as they became acquainted with other methods of building their conversion was rapidly brought about. The singular thing is that the style is often praised for its faults, the very faults which its authors themselves recognised and did their best to disguise.

It is needless to point out the countless instances where æsthetic canons are complied with in Gothic architecture. The punctuation of pillars with

their complex bases and capitals and that of walls by plinths and cornices is admirable. Moreover, the canon of number is duly recognised. Nearly every cathedral which has two front towers is, or was intended to be, dominated by a central tower, and the fault of unresolved duality is generally avoided. Moreover, in their invention of the spire, which feature was not in the least a constructional necessity but the outcome of a desire to obtain æsthetic emphasis, our mediæval ancestors made an eternal contribution to architecture. And the tower form, first elaborately conceived in mediæval times, is also destined to stay. Both of these are quite independent of the pointed arch or vault, which latter elements, along with the flying buttress, have very little future before them. Many a Gothic church reminds one of nothing so much as a man who has put on his braces outside his coat and waistcoat. The buttresses have delicate pinnacles and exquisite carving. Perhaps they have. And the braces might be beautifully embroidered, but that does not mitigate the offence. The fault in each case is the same. There is an over-emphasis upon the constructional aspect.

It must be acknowledged, however, that engineers themselves are not prone to the intellectual vices of "the truthful architect." The only danger is that the weaker spirits among them will succumb to the influence of his flattery and, imagining themselves to be perfect artists so long as they attend to the utilitarian aspects of design, will perpetrate all sorts of vandalism with

a good conscience. But the vast majority of engineers have saner views. If they build a bridge with bare girders, they are under no illusions as to its beauty. They know that it is cheap, that is all. And if work is thrust upon them for which they are unfitted, this is due to incompetence and lack of organisation among architects rather than to an overbearing disposition on the part of engineers. Indeed the latter show in many ways that they are susceptible to the æsthetic argument. One generally finds that they take a pride in the neatness and elegance of the casing of their machinery and in the careful finish of its least piece. Do we not find, in the design of locomotives, for instance, that the funnels are often punctuated with brass rims and that the appearance of the engine is simplified by emphasising the funnel, boiler and canopied working-place for the driver? No attempt is made here to obtrude the complex machinery upon the attention of the spectator.

The engineer is no sentimentalist and, being brought up to have a respect for reason, if the canons of art were placed upon an intellectual basis he would be the first person to listen with an open mind. The ancient breach between engineers and artists would then be healed not through an adoption by artists of the standards of value which belong to engineering, but by an acknowledgment of the validity of æsthetic principles on the part of engineers, who would thus either develop into artists themselves or at least become willing instruments for the promotion of the purposes of art.

CHAPTER IV.

The Artist and the Mathematician.

The view is often expressed that the mathematical and artistic talents are mutually incompatible. It is my object here to discover the origin of this belief and to advance reasons for holding the opposite opinion. I shall contend, in fact, that these two talents are closely allied to one another. I do not speak now of that application of mathematics which is directed to the solution of problems of engineering. No artist could possibly have any objection to a resort to numerical calculation in this instance, for the mathematician is simply employing his gifts in a utilitarian manner, he is perfecting an instrument of construction. If an architect has decided to erect a roof of a certain shape, he does not consider it to be an invasion of his rights if mathematics are used in the design of a steel truss to support it.

A quarrel sometimes arises, however, when it is alleged that the mathematician, instead of being

the assistant of the engineer (in which capacity he is welcomed), seeks to dominate over the artist himself and, having no knowledge of art, yet presumes to determine æsthetic forms. I shall give a few instances of the wrong application of figures to architectural composition. It will be pointed out, however, that this wrong application is never to be attributed to mathematicians themselves but is in all cases the work of men profoundly ignorant of the very meaning of exact science. I shall then proceed to show that the artist and the mathematician have good reason for communing with one another not only because geometrical forms are frequently used in design but because certain mathematical laws are capable of an æsthetic explanation.

For the purpose of the present argument it will not be necessary to pursue the subject to a point beyond the easy comprehension of the average reader, who, presumably, is not a specialist in mathematical studies.

Let me first present an example of the wrong use of figures. Architectural proportion is sometimes treated as if its principles could be expressed in terms of numerical relations. archæologists have measured ancient specimens of Classic building, and have divided the order into tiny fractions. There are students who learn these figures by heart, and when they design a column and its entablature they reproduce the relative lengths of the different parts, derived from their code of numbers. They fancy that they have learnt something about proportion, and the process of reference to the table of figures

is described as "working out the order by mathematics." The assumption is that because mathematicians treat of figures and this copyist treats of figures, the copyist is therefore employing the science of mathematics. But a woman selling fowls in the market-place is not an ornithologist simply because she deals with birds, and a man who makes practical use of a scale of numbers is not necessarily a mathematician. If he is to lay claim to such a title he must not only deal with numbers, but deal with them in a mathematical manner. In the instance just quoted no attempt is made to justify the proportions nor to show that they are governed by an intelligible relation.

A similar objection can be brought against all those little "geometrical" rules for obtaining the proportions of rooms, windows and other architectural features. These are nothing but a series of personal dogmas utterly devoid of any rational basis. For example, it is said that a room in the shape of a double cube has some particular merit. Why? We are not expected to ask! Let us inquire into the matter nevertheless and see whether we cannot apply æsthetic canons to this question of rooms cubical and others.

Let us take the cubical room first. This might seem a "mathematical" solution, but it is the most objectionable shape a room could possibly have, for the reason that here there is no formal emphasis supporting the emphasis of the subject. The floor has not the same function as the walls, and therefore it should not be the same shape and size nor be exactly similarly disposed towards the

contents of the room. A cubical room appears to lack stability, for it is of a shape which could indifferently be turned on any of its sides. A cube has no recognisable top or bottom. It is a self-contained whole like a sphere, and like the latter it is only naturally comfortable when suspended in space.

The double cube shares the defect of the cubical room in that the shape of the floor is not sufficiently differentiated from that of the two longer wall planes. The double cube has another fault in that it violates not only the canon of inflection but the canon of number as well, for as soon as one notices that the room is an exact double cube it ceases to seem a unity, being formed by the juxtaposition of two very complete wholes. Square and double square windows can be criticised in a similar manner. In the foregoing instances it may be remarked that I have applied æsthetic canons to the subject of proportion, and have abstained from trying to determine the forms of art by mathematical valuations.

There are certain geometrical forms, however, which the artist frequently makes use of, and it is incumbent upon him to be acquainted with their true character in order that he may employ them in a proper way. I speak of the numerous curves which are to be found in ornamentation and in the design of all manner of objects.

The easiest way to judge a curve is to think of the rate of its bending. In a mathematical curve the rate of bending is governed by a law, and it is this law which gives organic unity to a curve. If any part of the curve is taken away, the remaining

part strikes one immediately as being incomplete. Thus every mathematical curve, whether it is contained in a small space, or whether it stretches to infinity, is in itself a perfect artistic whole. It does not follow therefrom, however, that you can take fractions from this whole and introduce them at random into patterns which are supposed to have a law and a unity of their own. Thus the great bulk of mathematical curves are utterly useless for the purposes of design, for being so entirely self-sufficient, they do not readily submit to taking a minor and subordinate part in any pattern, however grand.

Of the few types of mathematical figure which can appropriately be made use of in artistic composition, the most common is, of course, the straight line; but the straight line extends to infinity and any segment of it requires an artificial punctuation before it can be said to belong to the category of art. Another simple form is the circle. The peculiarity of the circle is that its rate of bending is uniform. This is its natural law and the source of its vitality. It becomes obvious at once how well the semi-circle is adapted for bridging over an opening.

Fig. 83 A shows that in three critical places the semi-circle pays deference to its environment. At its extremities it slides naturally into the vertical sides of the aperture, which touch the curve, while the cornice or string-course lies parallel to the direction of the curve at its highest point and may even be tangential with it as in B. Thus, a series of round arches can always be made to accord with the horizontal lines

of their superstructure, and elliptical forms share in this advantage, but they have not the grandeur



FIG. 83.

and stability of the circle. 83 B seems to have been squeezed laterally, while C looks as if it had been flattened from above. The pointed arch is unsatisfactory in that its apex impinges upon the coping in a restless manner, having no æsthetic relationship with a horizontal line. The segmental type D has an imperfection of a different kind; in this instance the discord is not at the apex but at the lateral extremities, which cut across the jambs of the opening at a quite arbitrary angle.

The semi-circle can be used in the profiles of domes, as in 84 A; but B, where the top has been truncated, is faulty because at their upper ends the two sections of the curve seem broken off at random. The design 84 C, in which complete quarter circles occur, is preferable.

The circular form may also be adopted on plan as in round rooms, bays and in the design of open spaces and in patterns of road-way and grass. And in horizontal sections it is entirely appropriate, as in columns, legs of tables, vases, plates and innumerable common objects.

Now suppose one wanted to make use of a curve (say for the profile of a dome) as clean and neat as



FIG. 84

the circular but yet more sensitive, more conscious of its position and function than is the quarter circle, how would one set about it? Suppose one wanted to *punctuate* the curve so that by its form it knows it is coming to an end? It may be that the quarter circular form in Fig. 84 C is considered bad because the dome bulges too much and tends to obscure the cupola from view. I

shall here design a profile which obviates the difficulty but which is yet an orderly curve. It must be noted that at the upper end we are deliberately going to sacrifice the element of cohesion which would have been obtained had the curve been tangential with the base of the cupola. Having denied ourselves one subtlety of composition we must compensate ourselves by another. I shall draw a curve starting vertically with a certain rate of bending and shall gradually but *uniformly* decrease the curvature. There will come a time when the curvature is zero and the curve at that particular point will be a straight line. Immediately afterwards it will proceed to bend the other way. If at that particular point I stop drawing, it will be found that the curve produced is a very graceful curve, and adapted to its position because at each end it is related to its environment. At the lower end its direction is vertical and accords with the perpendicularity of the wall, while at its upper end, instead of being cut off in a quite arbitrary manner, it comes to a conclusion at a critical place (see Fig. 84 D). There are an infinite number of these curves, each of them having a similar mathematical equation and the identical property of gradually straightening out, and they can be applied not only to domes but to entases of columns and mouldings too. Fig. 85 shows six examples of this kind of curve.

Sufficient has here been said to show that very great caution must be exercised in the adaptation of any of the well-known mathematical curves to design. If an artist does not bear this in

mind, he will commit great errors, and nowhere will his failure be so manifest as in his



FIG. 85

attempts to conventionalise natural forms. Here the employment of mechanical means of draughtsmanship is apt to be particularly disastrous. For instance, a leaf drawn as in 86 A is an abomination. Such a shape is both contrary to nature and a violation of art. Obviously the two arcs composing the leaf must be punctuated towards its apex as in Fig. 86 B.



FIG. 86

Nobody with even an elementary knowledge of art would draw leaves with compasses. Both animal and vegetable shapes can be transformed into highly artificial patterns without

being altogether deprived of their natural characteristics. Geometry, however, teaches the difference between a curve and a scribble, and artists, having through this study become more appreciative of the potentialities of line, will the more easily be able to endow such curves as they may have occasion to employ, either in objects of use or in decoration, with those elements of form which exemplify the grammar of design. And artists, in thus deigning to learn a lesson from exact science, so far from having yielded their rights to the mathematician, will have added a new field to the domain of art.

While certain geometrical forms are of interest to artists, it is also true to say that the grammar of design has a significance for the mathematician. The first of the three canons will naturally seem to him to be a platitude, for anyone acquainted with the nature of number ought to be able to distinguish between one and two; the canon of punctuation will appear less axiomatic, because mathematicians often have to deal with fractions and incomplete parts of series and geometrical figures which, if taken in their entirety, would stretch to infinity; the canon of inflection, however, has an obvious bearing upon every kind of calculation, even the numerical, for it is the logical principle which governs the association of similarities and differences. It would be possible to produce innumerable examples of the application of this principle in exact science, for every advance in mathematical argument is either the result of taking account of some new factor or condition which has been

introduced, or else it is due to the acknowledgment of the similarity of certain elements in the discussion, and this is equally true of arguments in physics, chemistry, botany and the other branches of natural philosophy.

The canon of inflection not only serves to explain and to extend the certainties of science, but it may even throw some light upon its mysteries. It will be remembered that according to the grammar of design an object should be inflected in order that it might take cognisance of other objects in the vicinity. If this sensitiveness is not displayed among the group, there has not been that co-ordination between its members which is necessary before it can exhibit the quality of beauty; and the rule applies to animate as well as to inanimate objects. If a man were sitting alone in a room and somebody entered with a message, it would be extraordinary if he took no notice of the newcomer and remained immobile as if quite unaware of the other's presence. Such a person would be more like a dummy than a human being.

Now let us apply this principle to objects in space and see whether it will not give us some insight into the meaning of a phenomenon which has hitherto appeared most mysterious, namely, the phenomenon of gravity. Imagine that a solid ball is freely suspended in space, and that another ball is introduced some distance away from it. Would it not be a most unnatural thing if the first ball were unaffected in any way whatsoever by the entry of the second? That would indicate a lack of order and of mind, an

indescribable deadness in our universe, which is extremely unpleasant even to contemplate. In that the first ball tends to approach the second it displays a consciousness of the latter's existence and provides an instance of inflection. It has, however, a complex inflection, for not only does it take notice of the presence of its neighbour but it exhibits a change which shows that it is capable of taking into account the distance separating the two balls from each other, and also their respective masses. If the mass is increased the strength of the force exerted by it is increased, and if the distance is increased the force is diminished. There are, however, two forces exerted, for there are two bodies attracting each other. What is their total attraction then?

One might hastily surmise that this total attraction due to the juxtaposition of two masses would vary as the sum of the masses, but a little further thought will convince us that this cannot possibly be the case. As no inflection takes place unless there is a cause for it, no force is exerted by the first body unless the second body is present. If the combined attraction varied as the sum of the masses it would still have a definite value even if one of the masses were zero, but this is contrary to the law of inflection.

Actually the combined attraction varies as the product of the masses, and thus the double inflection is properly achieved, as both masses are seen to have their distinct effect, while their interdependence upon each other is made manifest, because when one mass is reduced to zero the combined attraction also becomes zero. Again,

the attractive power of each mass contributes a separate element to the combined attraction, and in each case the separate element varies inversely as the distance between the masses; but the combined attraction varies as the product of these two elements, hence it must vary inversely as the *square* of the distance, because the inverse of the distance is equally present in each of the factors which make up the product. Hence it is in accordance with the requirements of the canon of inflection that the force engendered by the juxtaposition of two masses should vary directly as their product and inversely as the square of the distance between them. The law of gravity is not such a mysterious phenomenon as scientists have hitherto supposed, but an obvious and overwhelming æsthetic necessity and an inevitable result of the coexistence of matter and mind.

An objection, however, may be raised to the application of this argument concerning gravity. It may appear to be an unwarrantable assumption that the inflection should cause the attractive force to increase when the mass increases and to diminish when the distance between the masses diminishes. What is there to prevent the inflection from operating in exactly the opposite way? Could we not imagine, for instance, that as a mass increased, its power of attraction might diminish? But that would be contrary to reason because every large mass is composed of smaller masses, and it is unthinkable that it should exert an attraction less than the individual attractions of its parts. Again, suppose that instead of attraction there were repulsion which became

stronger the nearer the masses were together and thus infinitely strong at the points where things touch. This would lead to a universe in which matter would be entirely dispersed because no two atoms or fractions of an atom could exist side by side.

The inflection which actually takes place is of the simplest possible kind and in the only possible direction. And in accepting this theory of gravity we need not presuppose a greater intelligence in the universe than is revealed by the evidence of scientific fact, for even inorganic matter is everywhere subject to the laws of logic which are essentially intellectual. Thus it is possible at last to discard all those unsatisfactory hypotheses which have their origin in the assumption that there can be no such thing as action at a distance through an intermediate empty space. According to one theory masses are subject to gravity because they are situated in "a gravitational field." One can explain many things in the same manner. Why did two nations go to war? The answer is they went to war because the atmosphere was warlike! This inability to conceive how objects can react upon one another at a distance is the outcome of too mechanical an interpretation of the universe. Once assume space, matter—*and logic*, then gravity follows as a matter of course.

The formal connection between art and mathematics has perhaps been sufficiently well established in the foregoing paragraphs, and it is hardly necessary at this stage of the argument to insist that there ought to be a spirit of comrade-

ship between artists and mathematicians. If this amicable relation has not been generally attained it must be confessed that the fault has lain with the artists, for among those who take the liberty of adopting that cognomen there are so many who imagine that their own taste is a law unto itself and who are hostile to everyone that takes a special delight in submitting opinions to the test of logic. Yet it would be a great advantage to artists as a body if they could all acquire something of the impersonal spirit which the study of mathematics inculcates. The mathematicians have an honourable status because it is universally recognised that in their professional activities they are incapable of deceit. In the domain of art, however, charlatanry is rife, as among artists there is not a sufficient respect for intellectual discipline. In the attempt to refute the theorists who maintain that art cannot possibly have a logical basis and who even go so far as to say that there is no such thing as objective truth, it may be of advantage to bear in mind the mighty fabric of mathematics which is an enduring monument to the integrity of human reason.

Since reason has such claims upon us, we ought to spare no pains to refute all the anti-intellectualist arguments which can plausibly be brought forward, as otherwise the philosophy of æsthetics will not be securely established. In the next two chapters an attempt will be made to subject such arguments to a scrutiny.

CHAPTER V.

The Artist and the Psychologist.

The mind works most easily and has won all its chief victories when it has turned its gaze outwards, when it has concentrated its attention upon the thing which was thought rather than upon the manner of thinking it. Recognising this peculiar property of the mind, I have adhered strictly to the objective method, that is to say I have dealt with the material world comprised in animate and inanimate nature and have not so far concerned myself with the mental reaction which the presence of any particular spectacle may cause in an individual. That the mental reaction exists is of course undeniable, and this mental reaction may legitimately become the subject of study; but it may perhaps be affirmed that we learn more about thought by studying things than we can learn about things by studying thought, for thought is an activity and this activity is most clearly revealed to us in its true character when it takes place in natural conditions and is attended by solid results.

Let us examine the position of those who would question the validity of the objective method.

There is a powerful body of theorists who contend that an object is beautiful for no other reason than that we think it beautiful. The only reality they recognise is the emotional reaction, and they think the first step towards the establishment of an æsthetic philosophy should consist in an analysis of this reaction. Thus they are in entire disagreement with the doctrine expounded here, namely that an object is not beautiful unless it conforms to certain canons of beauty, and that all æsthetic judgments are determined by the presence or absence of certain qualities in the thing observed and by the ability of the spectator to recognise those qualities.

The controversy is concerned with the determination of the respective parts which must be assigned to intellect and to emotion in the creative and critical faculties. It may be objected that such a fundamental question ought to have been discussed at the beginning of this volume rather than at this late stage of our argument. It appeared to me, however, that it would have been useless to try to judge between the relative claims of intellect and of emotion until at least one of these forces had been shown in operation. In the foregoing pages the application of reason to the subject of æsthetics has resulted, in the first place, in an assertion of the order of precedence of the visual arts, and, secondly, in the apprehension of formal relationships constituting a grammar of design. When one examines the attitude of the emotionalists, however, it is not immediately apparent that they are capable of throwing much light upon the present topic. They are fond of

telling us that art is an affair of taste. Art merely exists to please. If we find pleasure in art, they say, then we have the æsthetic sense; if we do not, then we are hopelessly inartistic and that is the end of the matter. But the term "art" would be of no value to anybody unless it had acquired a significance through its association with certain things which have certain qualities in common. People may differ as to what the qualities are, but only in so far as there is some slight measure of agreement about them is it possible for this term to be used with effect. Those who deny the existence of an objective æsthetic standard are in reality parasites that fatten upon a tradition they are seeking to destroy. They exploit the stability of the term "art," while at the same time they try to do away with the sources of that stability.

The emotionalists, however, cannot be completely disposed of in this summary fashion, for many of them maintain that their attitude has a scientific justification. They say that it is the result of a study of psychology. Now, as everybody knows, psychology deals with the relationships subsisting between memory, will, instinct, reason, emotion and other elements which are supposed to comprise the human personality. It claims to be a science because it concerns itself with a rational analysis of mental phenomena. Unfortunately, however, people who undertake this analysis often arrive at the conclusion that reason is an untrustworthy guide. The weakness of the position of the psychologists is that they are apt to begin by discrediting the intellectual instrument, which is the only means

they possess of expounding a philosophic thesis whether about mental phenomena or about anything else. It is not surprising therefore that in some quarters the opinion should be expressed that their science is lacking in true vitality.

Psychology is held to cover such a very wide field that it is necessary most strictly to determine the limits of the enquiry which will be undertaken in the following paragraphs. I shall now confine myself to a consideration of the bearing of psychology upon the criticism of art, and shall make special reference to that group of psychologists who are most likely to impugn the method of procedure which has been adopted in this volume. I refer to the people who would say to us " You arrived at your æsthetic judgment before you began to reason, and you deceive yourselves if you imagine that it was reason which led you to your verdict. If your feeling had been different you would have found a plausible justification for that also." Thus they have but a moderate respect for reason, for they believe that their particular form of astuteness enables them to go behind the arguments a man may bring forward in support of an opinion and to reveal the emotions or desires by which the direction of his thoughts is really determined.

Let me consider a few examples of the " psychological " analysis of mental phenomena and try to discover whether the method employed is altogether a satisfactory one. A man who for several years has been a member of a political party suddenly severs his connection with it. He seeks to justify his action by elaborate arguments

whereby he does his utmost to bring into disrepute the principles of the party he has just left. The psychologist pays not the slightest attention to the arguments, but, burrowing into the private life of the man, discovers that he had quarrelled with the secretary of a local parliamentary association. The assumption is that the outraged man conceived such a hatred for the offending secretary that he refuses to acknowledge any virtue even in his political beliefs. Hence his apostasy from the party. The psychologist does not prove that the man was actuated by pique, he merely asserts it. In fact, the knowledge of this private affair would in his opinion almost exempt one from the necessity of examining the truth of the man's contentions. Of course it is indisputable that people often employ reason to justify personal spite. The proper course then is to expose the reasoning which is almost certain to be faulty, rather than to assert immediately that the speaker had unworthy private motives. Public discussion would degenerate into a mere squabble if the arguments used in debate were not taken at their face value. This particular sort of psychologist reminds one of the lady who on hearing that a male friend of hers was strongly opposed to the extension of the parliamentary suffrage to women, remarked, " Poor man, he must have been crossed in love."

Let me apply this entertaining psychological method to these psychologists themselves. Let me see if I can find some ulterior objects in their propaganda. I might advance three different explanations of their attempt to discredit the

intellect. In the first place I might point out that as scientists have sometimes tried to deal harshly with Christian dogma, any attempt to prove that intellect is a bad guide and that ' instinct,' ' intuition ' (easily translated into ' faith ') is a much surer one, and is certain to be popular with the clergy. Many of the professional psychologists are ambitious young men seeking for posts in the academic world, and the holders of these posts are chosen by governing bodies which are perhaps subject to clerical influence, so any candidate having views which might become a basis for a Christian apology might find considerable favour. In fact I might say of these psychologists that they are place-hunters and sycophants. Of course these are not my own opinions. I am only applying one of the methods of psychology.

Secondly I might point out that all the critics, the honest but objectionable people who make it their business to expose frauds, usually make use of an intellectual method and processes of reason, and that by the standards imposed by the intellect a definite order of rank is established. In a democratic age there are many people who like to consider that they are as good as anybody else, and when instinct is the guide there is nobody to point out their imposture. Besides, it needs great will-power and self-restraint to follow the path of intellect, so many people who are deficient in these qualities are pleased if they are told that brains do not matter very much. I might say that in the sphere of the spirit these psychologists are demagogues, and they belittle the intellect in order to make themselves popular with the crowd.

Thirdly I might introduce the sex question, and this procedure would be after the psychologists' own heart, for there is nothing they love more than to find a sexual explanation for every human phenomenon. They revel in all the aspects of sex. I might contend that the influence of women upon literature is very great, that women have more leisure than men and often employ some of their leisure in attending public lectures given by fashionable philosophers, and these philosophers propound such doctrines as they think will be particularly pleasing to an audience of women. It is well known that women have been encouraged to pride themselves upon their "intuitive" faculty, so much more sure than that of men, who have got to grope along, as best they can, by intellect. And if women are told that the intellect of man is after all only a servant of instinct, the instinct which women possess so abundantly, then women are indeed exalted. In fact, I might assert that the advancement of this psychological theory is nothing else in the world but *a species of flirtation.*

So much for the anti-rationalists. I have applied to them their own standards of value and have endeavoured to address to them the kinds of argument which they have done so much to popularise. Whether their motives are really revealed by the analysis I cannot presume to say. If by any chance a professional psychologist should read these pages, he will doubtless search his own heart. But enough of these pleasantries! I have said enough to show how unsatisfactory, how insulting, how devoid of dignity and

persuasive force all argument becomes as soon as we try to give instinct the priority over reason.

The personal ends which a theorist may have in view are a proper subject for inquiry. The determination of these ends, however, is not a criticism of the theory advanced. First the theory must be criticised on its own merits, and if it be found contrary to the dictates of reason, one must enquire further into the sources of the error, and the error will in most cases be due to the very fact which the psychologist is so fond of pointing out, namely, that the theorist has not been impersonal, but has sought to bolster up a prejudice by means of reason. But why does he think it necessary to do this? Because he cannot help admitting to himself that reason is the measure by which people give evidence of some integrity of soul. The advantage of the logical method is that bad logic can always be exposed. But there is no way of pointing out the fault in a misleading emotion unless the person who feels that emotion can be induced to try to justify it on logical grounds. In fact the worth of an emotion can only be judged by the character of the reason which is required to support it. When people have a prejudice which they wish to disguise as a rational conclusion they are generally in such a hurry to arrive at the last stage of their argument that they slur over the other stages and so become guilty of all manner of inconsistencies.

Let us examine whether, without using any technical terms or performing complicated feats of introspection, we can explain the source of our pleasure in art. But instead of proceeding to

study the reaction of our mind before we study the cause of this reaction, let us build upon the objective basis which has been established in this volume.

Is it necessary to explain why the animal wants to live, why it resents any weakening of its power, why life has faith in itself? Life is its own justification. Neither psychologist nor biologist can give a better answer than that. Then must we ask why we should wish to be surrounded by objects which share, as far as inanimate objects can, the qualities of life, must we ask why life is so pleasing to life? Suffice it to say that the objects of art with which man surrounds himself form a transition between himself and the inanimate, and in their presence he feels less lonely in the world. These objects which he has created are an extension of his personality, an increase of the sum of his life. The psychologist may here intervene and say, "So you believe in the subjective criterion after all, and you speak of an increase of vitality. In fact æsthetic pleasure is a feeling of increase of vitality in the presence of form." Let him have it so, if that please him, but he must remember that the word "vitality" would be very vague if it had not been subjected to a critical analysis, and without that critical analysis he would be quite unable to say whether the objects surrounding a man represented an increase in his vitality or not. Just as before he exploited the word "art" he would now exploit the word "vitality."

It will be instructive to watch how a psychologist, having obtained this definition of

art might attempt to determine æsthetic forms by psychological methods. He thinks that the subjective standard is a true standard of criticism. Let us see how he will apply it for instance to painting. He has two pictures hung upon the wall and the members of his class stand round in a semi-circle. Knowing nothing definite about art, he is now going to give instructions upon art. Or perhaps he would say that with the help of his pupils he is going to investigate art by experiment. It will be observed that he is scientific and yet charmingly modest. There are perhaps twenty people in the room of whom fifteen vote for the first picture and the remaining five are more attracted by the second. The psychologist will take these opinions as facts and proceed to draw deductions from them. But one may point out two errors in his method. In the first place he has no guarantee that the opinions are honest. Members of the audience may have some knowledge of the instructor's own preferences and seek to curry favour by supporting them. Secondly the opinions are not of equal value. The psychologist makes the mistake of supposing that everybody sees the picture equally well. But a man who has sharpened his senses by the use of the mind sees and notices far more than he who has not. The mind enters into the very act of *noticing*. For instance, if one listens to anybody talking a foreign language one hears nothing distinctly. It is only by an effort of the mind that one can disengage the sounds from each other. The reaction of one person who has trained his senses to such an extent that he notices such

objective relations as the picture may express, is worth the reaction of all the others combined. The assumption that the opinions are of equal value flatters the ignorant, but it does not enlighten us concerning art.

The psychologist has invented an electrical appliance which he considers most valuable. It consists of a little handle enclosed in one's fingers, which is supposed to register the increase or decrease of animation of the person who holds it. If the pupils are in turn submitted to the test and react to the pictures in front of them, the psychologist is presented with a kind of record of the reactions.

Let us imagine that the class is confronted with a composition on what is called "still life," which portrays a table laden with knives and forks and a basket of fruit. The first subject of the experiment is Miss A. who reacts most violently. Her emotion has indeed a truly æsthetic significance but it is occasioned not by pleasure, but by disgust. Having a highly trained mind, she is able to note at once all the blemishes of the picture, its lack of cohesion, its bad draughtsmanship and crude colouring; and she is filled with resentment at the thought that such an incompetent performance should be designated by the name of art. Miss B. is also deeply moved. As soon as she catches sight of the representation of the carving knife she perceives that it is an exact replica of one by means of which, without the knowledge of her friends, she had recently committed a most brutal and abominable murder. She may be agitated by remorse or perhaps at the recollection of the deed

she may be experiencing a thrill of exultant joy. But who can tell? Certainly not the recording instrument, which, in the opinion of the lecturer, will bear witness to nothing but the capacity for appreciating pictorial art. The visible excitement of Miss C. is due to a different cause. When she sees the basket of fruit she suddenly remembers that she had promised that very morning to order oranges and bananas for dessert, as there is going to be a dinner-party at her house. Being possessed of a vivid imagination she trembles at the thought of the discomfiture which awaits her on returning there empty-handed. She feels herself already the victim of her father's quiet sarcasm and her mother's ungovernable rage.

The case of Miss D. is a much simpler one. She looks at the picture with utter indifference, yet as she knows that if she fails to respond at all she will be branded as the only philistine in a glorious company of æsthetes, she surreptitiously holds her breath until she is black in the face in the hope that the recording instrument will not be able to distinguish between physical agony and the raptures of the spirit. Miss E. and the others may be left to the imagination.

The subject is too complex to be treated in that way and the only method of simplifying it is the intellectual method. Whatever the picture is, it is a far more elementary self-contained thing than the emotion it arouses, and the attempt to explain it by reference to the latter is doomed to failure. The emotion caused by the picture immediately becomes merged in the whole personality of the man or woman who feels it, and it can only become

isolated from that personality by analysing the object which originally caused it, and by referring the emotion back to that object.

Of course if the experimental psychologist were to make use of the grammar of design which was expounded in the second part of this volume and show the pupils alternative diagrams, one of which represented an object that obeyed the canon and the other an object that violated it, there would undoubtedly be uniformity of judgment, for the matter to be judged would be clearly presented. But this would not be a triumph for the psychologist. He can support the theory by experiment, but experiment without the act of intellectual analysis involved in the recognition of the canons would have been of no avail. He could never have discovered the canons by experiment. He may say: "But would you not be grateful to me for proving the validity of the grammar of design?" I answer, "Not at all." His verification of the theory does not make it any more clear to me nor to anybody else. The mathematician, having proved by means of reason that the sum of the two sides of a triangle is greater than the third, does not have his conviction strengthened if some kind friend of his measures the sides with a tape.

Before the vitality of the spectator can be increased by the observance of an object, there must be some vitality in the object. A kinship must exist between the two if an æsthetic relation is to be expressed. Now, inasmuch as they defer to the same laws of form they may be said to resemble one another and to have a common bond.

An intellectual companionship can be thus established between the person and the object, and it is just this intellectual companionship which stimulates us and gives us a feeling of content when in the presence of works of art. As the grammar of design is exemplified in nature, it also provides an explanation of our love of nature, for it is obvious that through an understanding of this grammar we learn more clearly to recognise the perfection of animal and vegetable shapes.

It is a mistake, however, to suppose that by the sharpening of a man's æsthetic sense he necessarily becomes happier, for while it is true that he derives greater pleasure from what is beautiful than he did before, he suffers a greater discontent when in the presence of ugliness. The æsthetic sense is not merely a contemplative one which leads people to go into special raptures about a sunset; but it is an active reforming spirit which finds much in the world that it cannot endure. There are some people who, thinking that the domain of art must be increased, profess to find beauty in hotch-potches, who sentimentalise over docks and drain-pipes, who say that chimney-stacks and factories are quite entrancing if we only knew it. The artist says that docks and factories *ought* to be beautiful, but unfortunately, as a rule, they are very ugly. This praise of objects which are not usually held to be praiseworthy is often quite insincere, and it is a weakness of the psychological method that it provides no criterion by which such affectation can be exposed.

There is a danger that unless artists make haste to define an intelligible æsthetic philosophy they

will one day wake up to discover that in educational institutions the psychologist is already installed as instructor in art. Professors of education must certainly have some knowledge of psychology if they are to arrange a routine of study which is adapted to the capacities of the young and which does not impose an undue strain upon any particular mental faculty; but there is no need for them to encourage those experimental psychologists who in the interests of education feel impelled to devote pages to statistics in order to establish propositions which must be self-evident to anybody possessed of a little humanity and common sense.

It has often been stated that adults ought to have a proper respect for children. There is no better way of showing this respect than by appealing to the intense love of logic which is characteristic of the normal child. Always flattered and pleased when treated as a rational being the child responds readily to an attempt on the part of his instructor to give a genuine explanation of any matter, whether it be of science, literature or art. And when pedagogues are unsuccessful, it is not generally through ignorance of the psychology of the young, but through ignorance of their subject, through a failure to state adequately the reasons underlying the facts they communicate. By a study of psychology we may indeed learn to avoid doing violence to the physical constitution of our brains, but introspective glances will never teach us anything new about *things*. To gain knowledge about *things* we must look outwards.

CHAPTER VI.

The Artist and the Biologist.

Let us now see what the science of Biology has to teach us about the relation of instinct to intellect. Without such a discussion it will be impossible to complete the refutation of those emotionalists whose influence is so detrimental to the cause of art.

It may be remembered that I declined to use against the psychologist the controversial weapon so dear to himself—the imputation of personal motives. That method, I showed, only resulted in rudeness, and even if in some cases the rudeness is excusable inasmuch as it may be a just reflection upon the character of particular debaters, it does not lead us any nearer to an understanding of the subject of debate. I am here going to assume that the psychologist is an entirely honourable person moved by a spirit of disinterested scientific inquiry and that his view of intellect is the outcome of a consideration of the facts of biology.

Many biologists contend that intellect is a very late product in the evolution of species and that for æons animals subsisted on instinct only. It must be submitted that if this were true there would be some justification for the psychologist's high-handed attitude towards intellect, and he would be entitled to hold that if instinct by itself accomplished so much, and only created intellect to fulfil some of its own ends a little more easily, then intellect must be put down to its proper subordinate place. I am here going to deny this theory and shall affirm that intellect is prior to instinct and is present in all animals and in all plants down to the very lowest in the scale of evolution.

As in the argument concerning the Grammar of Design, I shall resort to an appeal to Nature. Reason is not really in need of any such confirmation, for reason is, as it were, at the very core of things and in making use of it we are going behind the phenomena of nature to the principles by which these phenomena are guided. The appeal to Nature may help us to correct an error but it does not in itself lead us to the truth unless it be couched in such a form as to imply a recognition of the logic which is expressed in scientific fact. Yet a man who is afraid to test his doctrines by the degree of their correspondence with reality is an imposter, and if it be said that the philosophy of the intellectualist is implicitly contradicted by the course of Nature as revealed to us in the manner of the development of animals and plants, that is an important statement which cannot be ignored. It is incumbent upon me,

therefore, to show that the theory of evolution here propounded is upheld by historical evidence.

The biological method has a great advantage over the psychological, for as soon as we enter the domain of biology we are in the objective world, the world of fact, and the evidence consists in real objective phenomena and not merely in statements about their mental conditions on the part of people of whose capacity to speak the truth one may be exceedingly doubtful. Moreover in the study of biology one is not trammelled by limitations either of time or of number; the changes observed are spread over thousands of years while whole species are involved in them, so the argument is not likely to be overladen with the irrelevancies which nearly always obtrude themselves when individual and accidental cases are under consideration.

The particular doctrine which I shall try to refute is a highly popular doctrine and it is held by many metaphysicians and others who have no great love for the psychologists, and the latter cannot be given the credit or discredit of formulating it. It would therefore be idle to accuse them of deliberately falsifying biology in order to prove their favourite thesis. That would be again to adopt the bad psychological method—the imputing of motives before the examination of the argument.

What is this biological fallacy, then, which it is in the interest of every artist to expose? Is it not the notion that some men are possessed of a creative faculty so sure and so benign in its operation that it is an insult to them to apply to their work an intellectual standard? If this be

accepted all attempts at æsthetic criticism are nugatory, because reason is the only effective weapon which a critic can use. Of course, if animals have performed various functions by the aid of instinct alone, men may be able to produce art by instinct alone; we shall do well, however, to withhold our assent to such a proposition until we have inquired into the nature of instinct a little more closely. I am not denying the existence of instinct—that would be absurd, for there are clearly many actions which are performed without conscious effort; but my contention is that all instinct has come through the crucible of intellect, and that there is nothing we do unconsciously which our ancestors, either human or pre-human, have not done consciously; and if we are ever to acquire the faculty of designing by instinct (which, of course, is superior to and a sign of greater power than the faculty of designing with much conscious effort) this can only come about after generations of men have learnt to design consciously, having a regard to the dictates of intellect and the hard facts of objective reality.

Let us examine some of the evidence. There is one central fact to which I wish to draw attention and this is an undeniable fact of experience. If one consciously performs an act again and again in the same way, that act will eventually become a habit. The act is performed deliberately first and afterwards instinctively. In fact, in this particular instance, instinct is capitalised intellect, it is intellect which has been, as it were, saved and stored so that it continues to give returns although one does nothing further to it.

In learning the piano one has laboriously to go through certain operations until the performance of them becomes "second nature." In time a student can obtain a familiarity with the keys so that he can produce the most complicated music such as the mind could never have coped with at one trial.

Consciousness is not a thing having a fixed quantitative value, for various degrees of it are manifested. Some things we do knowing at the same time exactly why we are doing them, other things we do from habit or impulse although we do not trouble to ask the reason for our conduct, and there are yet other things we do without even knowing that we do them at all.

Those who seek to disparage the intellect may claim justification for their attitude in the fact that the organs of our bodies, provided that we do not abuse them, perform their functions perfectly, and it is only in our conscious activity that we are liable to make errors. They imagine that animals and plants during the course of their development have proceeded without the aid of that intellectual faculty which everybody will acknowledge must necessarily be employed in any attempt to interpret the results achieved. But if we suppose that intellect is a late product in the evolution of species, we have no means whatsoever of explaining the order and rationality of our universe. It is indeed possible to take refuge in the dictum that this order and rationality provide proof of the existence of a beneficent creator, and that it only remains for us to accept his gifts with gratitude, abstaining from the attempt to probe

into unfathomable mysteries. When a student of science, however, is asked by his instructor "Why does the earth go round the sun?" it is not an adequate reply to say, "Because God made it so." No phenomenon can be completely explained, but if the student in the instance just quoted were to answer that the earth goes round the sun because, though inclined to follow in a straight line any direction given to it, the attraction of the sun compels it to deviate from its natural path and to run in an orbit, and as the speed of the earth is such that the centrifugal force is approximately equal to the force of gravity, its orbit is approximately a circle, such an answer would at least show a slight acquaintance with science.

If we are told that animals are able to divine by instinct things which men cannot divine even by the aid of their intelligence, we must not accept such an assertion as a proper answer to our query "How did the animals divine these things?" Instinct, in this context, is only a word behind which learned ignorance tries to conceal itself. Let us consider an example of animal ingenuity which is sometimes quoted in support of the view that creatures of a lower order have a super-intellectual faculty enabling them to accomplish results to which reason could never have guided them. There is an insect which lays its eggs in the body of a caterpillar so that when the grubs issue forth they are already provided with food. Two conditions are necessary, however, for the success of the insect's plan to make provision for its young. In the first place,

the caterpillar must not be so severely injured by the incursion of the parasites as to perish immediately, because these particular grubs require fresh meat for their nutrition and not a decaying carcase. Secondly, the process must not cause pain to the caterpillar, for otherwise it might lose its appetite and die too soon. Hence the insect stings the caterpillar at such a part of its nervous system that it is no longer capable of feeling pain, yet can continue to perform its digestive functions as usual. So the caterpillar eats and grows fat utterly unaware of the fate in store for it. Now, how did the insect find the exact place at which to sting its victim? It is surely no explanation to say that the insect found the place by instinct or that it was part of God's design that it should find it. We must have a better understanding of the phenomenon than is revealed in such replies. "How else can one account for it, then?" the reader may ask.

Of course, the answer is that the insect *knew*. It had an intellectual apprehension of the structure of the caterpillar. It may be objected that if this were the case the insect would have more intellect even than a human being. But that is not the true inference to be drawn from our premisses. This very knowledge which the insect possesses marks it out to be in an elementary stage in the evolution of species. While among men the internal processes of the body have operated so long that they have passed through the intellectual period and have become unconscious, in the case of creatures of a lower order these processes are partly conscious. The smallest and

simplest kind of creature has its mind entirely occupied in the performance of animal functions. It is intellectually inferior to Man, for it has not the superfluous mental energy which has enabled Man to establish a great civilisation, yet it possesses an apparent advantage over him inasmuch as it has a knowledge of certain things which in his case have now for ever passed into the realm of the unconscious. He also knew them once, but he has forgotten them now as it is no longer necessary for him to retain them in his memory. When I say "he" knew them I am using the personal pronoun to denote that continuous being which comprises not only a man himself but also his direct ancestors, human and pre-human. Each one of us is a summary of æons of development.

When a human being eats he is indeed conscious of the act, but it does not take up his whole attention; when a dog eats, he is so entirely absorbed in his occupation that it is only with great difficulty that his mind can be distracted from it; when an insect eats it is probable that it is not only conscious of the act of eating but even of some of the processes of digestion. The insect knows very much more about its own body than a human being knows, and that is why, in the case of the caterpillar, its assailant was able to hit upon the exact place to sting it so that a partial paralysis of its nervous system should be attained. Naturally, it would not have much knowledge of the physiology of a man, but its familiarity with that of a caterpillar can easily be understood because in its youth it had been a caterpillar itself

and might very well retain a recollection of its existence in that form.

It is reasonable to suppose that living things in a still more elementary stage of development than the insect have a knowledge of certain facts which the insect has no need to remember, having already established habits of correct action based upon knowledge acquired long ago. If we descend further, even to plants, we may find personality in such a primitive state that intellect, the most advanced and conscious part of personality, is still occupied with the transmutation of inorganic matter to organic. There is no justification whatsoever for denying that plants have minds. Because a plant has not the cerebral structure of beings that have feet and hands, that can walk and talk and read, and make innumerable articles for their use, it does not follow that it lacks such an elementary nervous system as would enable it to be conscious of some of the organic processes vital to its well-being. And are not all the things that the plant does eminently reasonable, do not they show at every stage the operation of mind? Not only does it adapt itself to its surroundings with remarkable skill but in its very shape and structure it shows an acquaintance with the formal laws of Number, Punctuation and Inflection. And the mind is in the plant itself, of course. Granted that all minds are contained within one greater mind, it is necessary, nevertheless, to postulate in each individual organism a mind of its own, for otherwise we are committed to an attitude which is the negation of philosophy and science. A result which is in accordance with intellect could not

have been brought about by any other agency than an intellectual one, and if this agency works through instruments, these instruments must be imbued with some of its own intellectuality; for the instruments are not mere mechanisms, but living beings whose individual and separate spirits are the best evidence we have of the existence of the all-pervading Spirit. They have no true appreciation of the wonder of our universe who seek to excuse themselves the trouble of understanding it by maintaining what is known as the "argument from design"—the assertion that everything has been carefully arranged beforehand for the support of life and that living things are guided by some mysterious power to such actions as are good for them. The "argument from design" is hardly an argument at all, for it merely allays our curiosity and acts as a mental soporific.

The process of development is not from instinct to intellect but vice versa. If we were to acquire the faculty of doing consciously what previously we did unconsciously we should not be making any advance. None but a very foolish man would busy himself with his internal organs and try deliberately to direct their operations. The function of intellect is not to claim something from the province of instinct, but to add to that province. Intellect must occupy itself with something new and teach us to perform acts which no creature has ever performed before either by instinct or by any other means. And when by long experience it has been proved that the new type of activity is advantageous to the species,

it will be repeated again and again until our aptitude for it has become instinctive. After this has been accomplished, the human intellect will be set free for other conquests. Thus shall man develop both in instinct and in intellect.

Instinct is rightly held to be reliable, but its reliability is due to the fact that an aptitude is only elevated to the rank of an instinct when its usefulness has been fully established as the result of long intellectual experience. When people say they design by instinct it is obvious that they have put themselves in a highly vulnerable position. If those who elevate instinct, emotion, or taste to be the motive power in design really did create something beautiful one might be inclined to condone their inaccurate use of words, but the charge which must be brought against them is that in nine cases out of ten they fail to establish the organic relationships between the parts of an object which are necessary to beauty and the hall-marks of design. What they call their emotion is nothing in the world but bad reason, and their objection to any criticism based on logic is an instinctive objection to the good reason by which their pretensions would be exposed. It is the old animal instinct of self-defence, but in this case it has not been brought up-to-date, it is clumsy and requires to be supplemented by intellect before it can become really serviceable. Of course, artistic intuition and taste most certainly exist, but they are the result of mental training. A long study of the grammar of design and its practical application to every kind of object will enable a man to arrive at an artistic

judgment so rapidly that his act of criticism may be described as intuitive. But his intuition is founded upon knowledge, rather than his knowledge upon intuition.

The fashioning of inanimate objects into forms of beauty is a recent activity on the part of Man, and a very recent one indeed, for we are not now speaking in terms of history but in terms of biology, a science which deals with evolutionary changes occupying many thousands of years. Art is still in the experimental stage and so is under the direction of intellect. An object of art has a vitality of its own in so far as it possesses certain formal attributes which belong to all living creatures. It has been shown that these attributes are capable of being described in terms of reason. Moreover, the reason which is thus expressed is coextensive with eternity, the eternity both of the future and of the past, and biological research will never conduct us to a pre-intellectual period nor make us familiar with any state of things in which change and development were for one moment free to take place without reference to some logical condition.

CHAPTER VII.

The Artist and the Historian.

The transition from Biology to History is an obvious one, for these two studies have much in common. Both are founded upon an observation of past and present events, and the only difference between them is that whilst the former endeavours to throw light upon the development of the whole family of living things the latter confines its attention to that highest branch of the animal species which is known as humanity.

It is natural that historians should have authority over us, for it is only through a knowledge of the circumstances of other ages that we are enabled to form a true measure of the destiny which awaits our own race or nation. Historians concern themselves with every kind of human activity and they are called upon to be judges and commentators. The artist must consider, therefore, what is their special message to himself.

The easiest way for him to estimate the value of history is to imagine the handicap from which an artist would surely suffer were he to disregard

such lessons as may be derived from a study of the past. At this point we must guard ourselves against a possibility of misunderstanding. It might appear that if we acknowledge a debt to our forbears we are in danger of paying authority the deference to which only reason is entitled; for according to the argument of these pages an understanding of art is obtained by the exercise of a man's unaided intelligence and is the product not of learning but of logic. In tracing the outlines of both the form and the subject of art the rational method was employed, and the conclusions arrived at were shown to be merely the frank acknowledgment of an ever-present necessity.

How, then, can we assert that an acquaintance with history is an essential part of an artist's equipment? Are we not thereby surrendering the very foundations of the æsthetic philosophy which has here been expounded? In answer to this question it may be remarked that the use of an historical parallel is not the same as an appeal to authority. The one is an exemplification of reason, while the other is but an attempt to find a substitute for it. The nature of our dependence upon the past is nowhere better illustrated than in the science of mathematics, which is the true and perfect pattern of all intellectual studies. Here the sovereignty of logic is undisputed and yet nobody can acquire distinction in this subject unless he is acquainted with the work of his predecessors. All that Euclid knew about geometry would readily be mastered by many a schoolboy of a subsequent generation. Reason is

something cumulative and no single individual, however brilliant, can hope to add to the common stock if he ignores the past, which is itself a grand treasury of reason. This is equally true whether the study be that of exact science or sociology or art. In the case of the two latter the logical element is somewhat obscured, but it is there nevertheless, and it is one of the tasks of philosophy to dig it out.

No matter what the subject of inquiry may be, the chief justification of the laborious attainment of knowledge is the stimulus which it may give to the reasoning faculty. Owing to a failure to recognise this fact, many people acquire an excess of learning most injurious to their minds. And hence the term "scholar" carries with it a certain amount of opprobrium. It suggests an insignificance of character, an impairment of vital force due to the strain of memorising too great a multitude of details. The process of mental growth cannot go on smoothly unless a man is determined to practise the difficult art of forgetting—the art of forgetting what is not important.

Yet a familiarity with the principal achievements which belong to various ages and peoples is necessary to everyone who wishes his work to be distinguished by the title of "modern." This adjective has two senses, a general and a particular, and it is in the second sense that I now use it. The word can be made to designate everything which is of present or recent origin, as when we speak of the "modern age"; on the other hand one occasionally hears

people remark of a quite new building, picture, book or piece of music that it is not "modern," and they intend to convey by this phrase that the work in question, although the very latest in point of time, is yet lacking in originality and does not show an improvement upon what has been done before. Clearly, then, if a critic, employing this term in the manner just described, affirms that some newly-created thing possesses the attribute of modernity, he is pronouncing upon it the highest praise. For civilisation is so ancient and so many great men have laboured to establish it that an artist must find it a most arduous task even to approach the limits of previous accomplishment, and as for opening up fresh avenues which are likely to lead to a cultural advance, that is a more difficult matter still. Untrodden paths there are in abundance for a seeker after novelty, but few of these may profitably be followed. All the arts have eccentric phases which represent a complete break from the familiar traditions, and these phases are novel inasmuch as their like has never been seen before; the authors of such developments, however, have not achieved anything meritorious, for, in ignoring antiquity, they have repudiated the element of reason exemplified in antiquity, which same reason must find expression, albeit in a slightly different manner, in the future also. The punishment which befalls those who cut themselves off from the past is that they can never be really modern, they can never make new conquests for the human spirit.

There is a third reason why a wide knowledge

of history is indispensable for the artist. Not only does it nourish and sustain his logical faculty and incidentally save him from wasting his energy in the laborious repetition of ancient performances, but in an important measure it increases his self-confidence, for it gives him strength to combat what is but a passing fashion, what is not deeply rooted in the soil of human necessity. In connection with this, a particular reference may be made to the collapse of Mediævalism at the time of the Renaissance. The men by whose genius that fundamental change was brought about found in the standards of antiquity a confirmation of their own preferences. These existed before, but in the prevailing atmosphere of ecclesiastical bigotry they were rendered inarticulate. Becoming familiar with an epoch when the free exercise of the reason was not counted a crime, when the promptings of the senses were not considered altogether evil, the masters of the Renaissance proclaimed the essential goodness of human nature and made bold to give expression to their true selves. It was not so much that their opinions altered as a result of the enlightenment received, but for the first time they had the courage of their opinions. These men had the makings of greatness in them, but if they had lacked an acquaintance with classical antiquity they might have remained obscure.

Let us now consider some of the wrong uses of history. Many students exaggerate the value of erudition, and their labours are in vain because they lose sight of the guiding principle of reason.

If a man imagines that he can learn anything from a history of art without first having acquired a philosophy of art, he will accomplish little, for history is nothing else but the confirmation of philosophy. Political history tells us in what manner the principles which determine the constitution of a state and its relation to its neighbours have been exemplified throughout the ages; the history of art describes the development of æsthetic forms and the adaptation of such forms to the needs of different climes and races. As philosophy advances, history requires to be re-written, in order that the full significance of new truths should be made apparent to us.

The study of fact and example will teach a man nothing about art, unless he already knows that the elements of Form and Subject must be separately conceived, that art has a grammar of its own. Those authors, and they are very numerous, who try to arrive at æsthetic judgments without a preliminary analysis of their theme, take refuge in various literary devices in order to conceal their ignorance of the principles of criticism. When confronted with a work of art their first thought is to gather such information about it as an unintelligent industry will enable them to obtain. They will inquire into the nationality, rank and personal habits of its author, and will expatiate upon the extent to which he was influenced by his contemporaries and by his predecessors. This gives them an opportunity for an imposing display of knowledge which is likely to make a great impression upon simple folk, but the fact remains that they fail to

lead us to an understanding of the work in question.

Let the critic first banish from his mind all these extraneous circumstances connected with the object of his study, and by the aid of logic and of direct observation alone seek to determine its characteristics. Suppose he is examining a piece of architecture. If he is acquainted with the grammar of form he can immediately pick out the salient features of the composition. The merit of the design will, in a large measure, depend upon its compliance with the canons of number, punctuation and inflection, and we can judge of the mentality of its author by his power to make his building an organic whole. Again, the purpose of a work of art is nearly always made evident by the disposition of its parts; so, without any aid from the historian, we ought to be able to affirm of every design, no matter to what time or place it may belong, that we have knowledge not only of its form but of its subject also. And when the nature of a thing is not truly indicated by its appearance, we are entitled to condemn it as an imperfect specimen of its kind, for in such a case there has not been *expression*, there has not been that revelation of character by virtue of which inanimate objects can be brought into the category of art. The temple must look like a temple, the theatre like a theatre, the private dwelling like a private dwelling whether it be ancient or modern, European or Asiatic; and the same correspondence between shape and function ought to be apparent in smaller objects of use.

Artists are provided with a criterion by which

they can take the measure of a civilisation, and it is far more true to say that the historian is indebted to artists for knowledge of his own subject than that artists need look to the historian for enlightenment; for the quality of a people's culture is revealed in its works of art, and no one is competent to form a correct estimate of past ages unless he has an acquaintance with æsthetic values. Persons can be judged by reference to the things they have created, but if anyone tells us that we cannot understand things unless we first become acquainted with the characters of the persons who brought them into being, he suffers from a strange inversion of the intellect. Nevertheless, the personal associations connected with a work of art are a quite legitimate object of study. It must be clearly recognised, however, that the authors who enlarge upon such topics are merely giving us little scraps of biography, and contribute nothing to the criticism of art.

Epithets, such as archaic, classic, mediæval, Egyptian, Greek, Roman or Italian, when applied to art are liable to constant abuse. The critics who employ them are apt to imagine that if they dabble a little in history they need not make the mental effort which is required for the analysis of form and function. Moreover, the learning which is here displayed is not always associated with broad-mindedness. When features of design are connected in people's minds with periods or places, in some quarters it is sure to be regarded as an offence for anyone to use them in a modern work. The doctrinaires, according to whose view it is wrong to adopt in England the architectural

forms indigenous to ancient Greece or Rome, show the same kind of affectation as do those literary purists who go out of their way to avoid all words of Latin origin. Scholars have enriched our speech with thousands of terms derived from the dead languages because they realised that by such means they were improving the native medium of expression. It would be well if artists were guided by a like policy. Before rejecting any form found in the visual arts, they should inquire "Is it useful to us, is it reasonable?"

A misunderstanding of history may give rise to yet another fallacy. This is inherent in the doctrine that it is the duty of the artist to express the spirit of his age. Here we have a second example of the inverted reasoning to which reference has already been made. The student of the past observes that every period has dominant characteristics, and he may possibly conclude that the men who are now judged to be outstanding personalities of their own time were animated by a desire to reflect the tendencies around them. But some people are famous not because they expressed the spirit of their age, but because they successfully resisted it. Prophets, statesmen and artists may find it incumbent upon them to be like rocks that stand against a torrent. The fallacy, however, is quite explicable, for the formidable protagonists who were ready to go counter to a whole generation are frequently chosen by the historian to personify the character of the period in which they lived. It is only natural that the most highly significant forces should be considered the most worthy of permanent record. A man of

genius is a representative of lesser men, but he is not their delegate. Of inspiration he must give more than he receives. If he is the embodiment of great reason and great will he need have no ambition to be named after his age, because his age will take its name from him. This is not to say that artists are to ignore their generation. Although their work is of such a nature that it can only be conceived by individual minds, its subject is social. The attempt to interpret society will not be successful unless they guard themselves against the erroneous suppositions which readers of history are liable to entertain.

According to one view, the character of society is revealed in tradition, and many learned artists adopt as their motto "Follow Tradition." Unfortunately, when they try to put this doctrine into practice they find that no true guidance is to be derived from it, as there is a bewildering variety of historical traditions. The members of this school are responsible for the many revivals of by-gone styles; they have not, however, succeeded in creating a true language of art but have produced instead a Babel of discordant voices. Some of them, indeed, are able to lay claim to a certain amount of method, and they would justify their adoption of a particular style by saying that it belonged to an age closely resembling their own. Yet although they may show considerable talent they will never be anything more than sectarians, for they reject a goodly portion of the heritage of human experience.

The argument concerning the respective merits of Classic and Gothic architecture can never be

settled if the disputants on either side base their claims upon tradition. It is true the members of the Classic school have the advantage over their opponents, inasmuch as they can point out that modern civilisation has more in common with that of Greece and Rome than it has with the Middle Ages, but they have no right to banish from our lives all influences emanating from the non-Classical periods.

The artist must make use of the element of logic present in all the styles and so construct a vehicle of expression possessing the complementary virtues of pliancy and stability. This cosmopolitan style, based upon the same principles that govern and make perfect the constitution of animals and plants, will put the stamp of beauty upon everything it embraces. It will bear witness to the truth that the maximum of freedom is only attainable when combined with the maximum of order, and that for every "Thou shalt" there must be a corresponding "Thou shalt not."

Those who distrust the spirit of freedom and who think it can only be properly chastened and subdued by the spirit of tradition, do not exhibit any sturdiness of character, and their historical knowledge, so far from being a source of strength to them, is nothing but a burden. The love of tradition is not really a conservative influence, as many artists follow first one tradition and then another as the fancy suggests. If we wish to prevent freedom from degenerating into licence, instead of following tradition we must follow reason, for reason is more venerable and more stable than tradition.

CHAPTER VIII.

The Artist and the Moralist.

In the chapter dealing with the cultivation of human beauty there was a brief discussion about the conflict between moral and æsthetic standards. A few more remarks on the same subject may appropriately be introduced here, for as additional light has in the meantime been thrown upon the nature of art, it is now possible to bring the argument to a further stage.

By giving to art a broad connotation, by making it have reference to the general advancement of the race rather than to such secondary activities as painting and sculpture, the traditional quarrel between the artist and the moralist was rendered less acute, for it was shown that the well-being of society depended upon the fulfilment of the æsthetic ideal.

It may be well, however, more closely to investigate the causes of the old antagonism. Now, some theorists contend that art has nothing to do with morality. This opinion is sure to be expressed when a man whose private life is

immoral produces a great book or picture. Of course, the book or picture ought to be considered on its own merits apart from the private life of the person who created it. But the moral law is of such a nature that it does not readily admit of exceptions, and society is apt to take affront if a breach of its rules be condoned on the ground that the offender has achieved success in literature or the Fine Arts. If everybody wrote books and painted pictures and at the same time defied the moral law, society could not exist. Society would prefer to dispense with the work of art than endanger the basis of its own structure. Therefore it is desirable that those who have artistic ability should not bring into disrepute the crafts they practise by associating them with offences against morality. If an artist is mentally so constituted that he must needs lead an irregular life, it were better for him to indulge his habits in secret and pay to his neighbours the tribute of hypocrisy rather than take pride in being a pariah. But if he openly flouts society and expects to be excused on account of his special talent, he is a simpleton, and it may be expected that his weakness of judgment will find some reflection in his art, for such works as he might produce are likely to be devoid of the intellectuality which alone could give them the distinction of great style.

This is not to say that the conventions of society are to be exempt from criticism. If at any time the prevailing moral code is found to be defective, a defiance of it may be interpreted as a virtuous act, but only if such defiance is accompanied by a

declaration in support of a more excellent code which would serve the purpose of protecting society better than did the old one. For instance, if a particular marriage system were held to be incompatible with race culture, the devotee of the first of the visual arts would seek to overthrow the system and to establish another in its place. Here the beautiful and the good are not put in direct antagonism, for in combating false ethical standards the artist does not deny the necessity of social conventions. But he insists that a morality which is not ultimately directed to the furtherance of race culture is not worthy of the name.

Another occasion for misunderstanding arises when the artist proclaims his objection to *didactic* painting or sculpture. As he dislikes pictures which convey a specific moral lesson he might be suspected of being indifferent to morality. It is easy for him, however, to rebut the charge, for his view is founded upon an appreciation of the fact that a particular kind of sermon can better be conveyed by literature than by the visual arts. On the other hand it is an error to suppose that a restriction placed upon painters and sculptors should also set a limit to the activities of poets, novelists or playwrights. Of course, many of the plays written with a moral are bad. But it must be remembered that they may be bad for two distinct reasons. The blemish may be either in the structure of the play or in its purpose. In the first case the author has not realised the formal conditions which should govern the art of the theatre; even if his message is a good one he brings

discredit upon it by misusing the medium in which it is delivered. In the second case he has proved himself to have a wrong philosophy of life, with the result that his preaching is in vain; his play is not faulty because it contains a sermon but because it contains a weak, illogical and misleading sermon. A skilful dramatic plot is enhanced in æsthetic merit through having a profound moral.

Sometimes the dispute is of the opposite kind. Instead of the artist being made liable to the reproach of moral insensibility, the moralist may be taxed with a disregard of beauty. But here, too, in trying to arrive at a true judgment one must draw a sharp distinction between literature and the visual arts. In the latter, ugliness is always to be condemned, because their products are part of permanent reality in the sense that they include our persons and the utensils of our lives; they are supposed to represent definite achievement and are something more than the vehicles of propaganda. This point may be made clearer if we compare a piece of stage scenery with the objects of which it is a copy. A drama may be set in a street made up of miserable, unsightly dwellings. It may be essential to the author's purpose that his characters should have such an environment, and we should be wrong in concluding therefrom that he has any predilection for ugliness, for he is not creating squalor but merely giving a transient theatrical representation of it.

His realism will be justified, however, only in so far as it is the means of remedying the evil which

is portrayed. If the drama is to promote the causes both of morality and of art, in laying bare the defects of our civilisation it must also provide an impulse towards reform, it must herald a new order. The playwright can take part in the work of social reconstruction without encroaching upon the proper domain of the pamphleteer; his task is not to advocate special measures either political or economic, but to enlarge our sympathies and to deepen our knowledge of the soul. An ignorance of human nature is the cause of nearly all the shortcomings of the statesman, and it should be the function of the drama to give information concerning the springs of action, to present to us the individual in all possible relations with his fellows and to teach us the difference between the great man and the small.

Literature is at liberty to describe what is repulsive and evil, for it is necessary for us to have an understanding of these things in order that mankind may be redeemed. But if a draughtsman with no revolutionary aim is addicted to the portrayal of drab scenes, if for him the most hideous products of industrialism have a morbid fascination, if he appears himself to be satisfied and tries to make others satisfied with what to every normal mind represents a failure and an abortion, his technical skill is utterly wasted. And those painters and sculptors who delineate depraved or stunted human types merit a severe condemnation. Ugliness whether in people or in things must never be accepted as a necessity, moral or of any other kind. Such virtue as may be associated with poverty and

destitution is not of the highest order unless it is derived from an aspiration towards beauty.

It is obvious, then, that an ugly building or monument or article of use is a ceaseless fountain of corruption, for in creating such we are perpetuating ugliness; whereas books which have a disagreeable theme are sometimes justifiable inasmuch as they may act as a medicine for the body politic. Yet, although the visual arts cannot directly be employed to instruct us in the elementary virtues, they yet serve an ideal which is the same ideal as that to which the moralist in his own way strives to attain. As they are the means to the production of a beautiful race in a beautiful environment, the practice of these arts brings about conditions which are favourable to morality.

There is a still more direct relationship between good art and good morals, and I cannot give a better instance of this than by referring to architecture. When studying the nature of form we found that every properly-designed object has a sort of personality of its own. The buildings which make up a city constitute a group of personalities in stone and brick, and they are, or they ought to be, united by a convention exactly corresponding to the social morality which binds together the members of a tribe or race.

Before proceeding to develop this analogy further, let me give a few examples which will establish the basis of this social morality. Now morality, according to the usual acceptation of the term, is that course of conduct which could become general without injury to society. When

a man performs an action he can find out whether or not it is moral by asking "What if everybody else acted similarly? Would society then flourish?" If he obtains a negative answer to this question, the action is immoral. The application of the criterion makes it obvious at once that it is wrong to murder, for if everybody were allowed to get rid of his private enemies at pleasure the whole structure of civilisation would crumble to the ground. It is immoral to be untruthful, for the welfare of a community demands a certain amount of mutual trust between its members. And there is no need to insist that it is wrong to steal or incontinently to break the marriage laws. But each article of the code may be subject to relaxation provided that the particular licence is due to a desire to serve the state and is effectively safeguarded against abuse. For instance, although murder is immoral, it does not necessarily follow that war is immoral. In an encounter between nations, the act of killing is not the result of individual malice, for it has a public significance and is restricted by the severest conditions. War is only an occasional manifestation of the human spirit, and it may be beneficial in so far as it leads to a rearrangement of national boundaries, which takes into account the fact that the different people of the world do not all possess the same genius for government and therefore have not the same right to the occupation of territory. If, however, wars became so frequent and so awful in their consequences that they threatened to destroy society itself, they would then be immoral and new checks would have

to be imposed in order to diminish the chances of conflict.

An action, before it is proved to be justifiable, must be submitted to this test of generalisation, but the efficacy of the test is dependent upon our ability to distinguish between the exception and the rule. Exceptions are nearly always tolerable if it be understood that their number is limited. For instance, were a man to write an essay extolling the superior advantages of a celibate existence his influence would be most mischievous if many men were persuaded by him to remain bachelors for life. But if it be urged that those who intend to devote their years to the severest intellectual studies are well advised not to dissipate their energies by taking upon themselves the cares of a family, that is a different matter; for a few philosophers can abstain from marriage and the race will still continue.

This moral criterion can be applied to art. Let us picture to ourselves a street disposed in the following manner. Towards one end of the street the vista leads up to a church spire. Half-way down there is an opening out, a square. On one side of the square is a town hall with a dome, on the opposite side is a library having as the main feature of its front a great row of Classic columns. The other buildings in the vicinity are either shops or private houses, which have flat façades and are crowned with low roofs and parapet walls. In this arrangement none but buildings of special importance have been characterised by any very prominent architectural features. Imagine, however, that more licence were introduced, and

that one of the shops had a large dome. Now, a shop is not an exceptional building; there are perhaps hundreds of shops in that very street. One is compelled to ask "Suppose every shop were guilty of a like presumption?" Obviously the result would be ruinous to the appearance of the city. Not only would the multiplicity of domes have a most restless effect, but the town hall would be deprived of the position of honour to which it is entitled. Hence, if one conceives of the street as a group of buildings each of which is vested with a definite character of its own, the shop that has a dome seems to be a recalcitrant and immoral member of the community. It is pursuing a course of conduct that could not be made general without grave detriment to the city of which it forms a part. But if this right to have a dome were hedged round with restrictions, if we were to specify that certain very large shops or stores, which we knew beforehand to be limited in number, should be allowed an inconspicuous flattened dome or perhaps a small one amounting to little more than a cupola, then every domed edifice would exhibit, as it were, an architectural conscience and would be giving effect to a code which is in its essence moral. The use of spires, also, and heavy external orders and all such highly pronounced features should be regulated by a fixed canon, as otherwise a city will lose its character and become a mere jumble expressive of barbarity.

One becomes aware of this aspect of morals when studying the art of dress, for most of the conventions which govern costumes are the result of eliminating eccentricities, and we only recognise

an eccentricity by generalising its effects, by multiplying it in our imagination. But of all the arts, architecture is the one which best illustrates the principle we are considering, as the buildings of a city are permanently exposed to public view and in an obvious social relation to one another.

The social code which binds together a group of people or of things is of very great significance, yet it must be pointed out that morality is not entirely a social phenomenon. Where the æsthetic ideal is not respected there is a tendency to identify morality with the behaviour of those amiable and very prudent persons who abstain from all overt acts of aggression towards their neighbours. In a town it is not sufficient that the buildings should be properly inter-related; for good quality in each building is necessary. So also in a community of men it is not sufficient that the members composing it should live together in harmony; each person must have an individual worth over and apart from his social worth. It is no exaggeration to say that the æsthetic ideal itself provides the highest incentive to virtue, for good conduct is not an end but a means, it is the means to the creation of an estate both spiritual and material which cannot come into being until a certain much desired type of society is seen to dwell in a certain much desired environment. Without a definite formal vision the moralist is doomed to a species of mediocrity, and especially is this mediocrity apparent in the character of those who find the justification of their actions either in the pleasure

derived therefrom or in the good conscience which they imagine themselves to possess. These theorists consider a man's person to be bounded by his sensations and motives, with the result that for them the moral end is not directed to the modification of the objective world in accordance with spiritual laws but merely to the attainment of a mood. Whether this mood be one of natural delight or of pious exaltation, it is just as dangerous to make it the end of human endeavour. If such a valuation is adopted, the door is held wide open to many kinds of deceit, for people can easily indulge in a feeling of joy or of complete moral content without performing any beneficent actions at all.

Perhaps someone may object that the formal aspect of things is here being over-emphasised. Would it not be truer to say that if we take care of the spirit then matter will take care of itself? This seems at first sight to be a plausible statement, but we shall find that a subtle error is implied therein. The proper manipulation of matter leads to achievement in the arts, and it cannot be anything else but a spiritual activity. Those who give a false kind of priority to the spirit, however, tend to identify it not with the all-pervading vitality which finds its expression in "The Things which are Seen," but with what they call their own spirit, their individual souls, in fact; and as soon as they concentrate a great deal of attention upon their own souls, they become insignificant, for they prove themselves to have a most inadequate idea of human personality. A man's thoughts and sentiments comprise only half

of his being. The other half resides in the world outside him. So it is illogical to advise him to try to save his own soul, unless this word " soul " is given a far wider signification than it usually possesses. He must not only cherish the spiritual force which is incarnate in his own body, and which dies with his own body, but he must establish his being elsewhere, he must help to modulate the forms and practices prevailing in the objective world wherein he has a lasting heritage.

In this conception of human personality the moral and the æsthetic ideals receive their final reconciliation. The animate and inanimate beings which constitute the material universe are part of ourselves and we are part of them. When a man can truthfully say of his neighbours that if one of them is injured he feels himself to be injured also, he is imbued with a sympathy and understanding which will make his conduct moral. And if he sets such great store by beauty that he regards beauty in people and in things as his own personal possession and its absence as his own personal disgrace, we are justified in describing him as an artist.

CHAPTER IX.

The Artist and the Metaphysician.

In order to conclude my remarks concerning the subjective and objective sides of human personality, it is necessary for me to carry the argument into the domain of metaphysics. The reader need not be afraid, however, that I am going to indulge in abstruse speculations about matters which are beyond the comprehension of the human mind. What I shall say upon this topic will be quite obvious; in fact, I intend to state a metaphysic which will probably be considered by professional metaphysicians as too much like the product of a child-like simplicity to be a settlement of their difficulties. How far my proposed solution is really a satisfactory one the reader will shortly be enabled to determine.

The present treatise has been devoted to the exposition of an æsthetic philosophy, and so far I have made but a few passing references to the subject of metaphysics. Nevertheless, the omission to deal with it has not prevented me from examining many of the problems which beset the

student of art. Metaphysicians themselves would have it that nearly all the problems of philosophy are problems of metaphysics. If I take a contrary view and affirm that metaphysics constitute a very small part of philosophy I do not mean to imply that anybody is entitled to ignore them altogether. Yet this science—if indeed a study so unproductive of result deserves to be designated as a branch of knowledge—has been a danger to the weak and a mischievous diversion even for the strong, and there are many people who would gladly attend its obsequies. But by no other science can that of metaphysics be overborne, so it will never cease to trouble us until it commits suicide. We need a metaphysic which will put an end to metaphysics.

Before investigating the nature of the famous "problems of metaphysics" about which so many volumes have been written, I shall attempt to define the attitude of the average man to this subject. It may be remembered that in the argument dealing with the hierarchy of the arts great deference was shown to the views of the average man. The conclusion there arrived at was in accord with popular opinion and contrary to that of the "expert," who was led to identify art with Painting and Sculpture alone and almost to neglect the more vital arts which concern reality itself.

I do not think I am misrepresenting the average man when I say that his attitude towards metaphysics is one of unmitigated hostility. For the most part the metaphysicians are aware of this, and they take comfort to themselves in the

assumption that the average man is a Philistine and incompetent to appraise the value of their studies. They are fond of making him out to be a severely practical type of person who must judge of every activity by its immediate concrete results. Perhaps in this particular matter they do him an injustice. It is true that such narrow-minded folk abound, and their attitude is worthy of severe condemnation, but a distrust of metaphysics is not confined to them.

The average man is apt to be exceedingly humble. He has, if anything, an exaggerated respect for studies which he knows to be beyond his ken. For instance, he generally entertains a sincere admiration for anyone who is adept at the higher mathematics, although the application of such mathematics to practical affairs may not at once be obvious to him. Again, he will look with respectful homage at two acquaintances engaged in playing chess, even if he cannot follow the moves himself, for he realises that a game of chess is an intellectual occupation which, provided that it does not interfere with more important activities, redounds to the credit of those who take part in it. Jugglers, too, generally succeed in winning the applause of their audiences, despite the fact that their antics do not add very much to the happiness of mankind. In fact, almost any kind of skill is appreciated if it leads to a definite result. The mathematical theorem is proved, the game of chess draws to a conclusion, the juggler succeeds in his appointed task whether he is trying to keep a dozen balls going at the same time or to balance a chair upon his nose. Now, a

metaphysical dispute is often regarded by the ignorant as a mere juggling with words. People might tolerate and even commend the juggling if it gave proof of an obvious superiority in some kind of attainment, but the peculiarity of the metaphysician is that for all his arguments concerning the nature of space and time, being and not being, the absolute, the freedom of the will, and so on, he knows not a whit more about these subjects than any country yokel knows. This is the charge which the average man brings against the metaphysicians—he says that they are uniformly unsuccessful in the very task they have set themselves.

It is notable that a very considerable proportion of the writings about metaphysics are concerned with a refutation of the metaphysics which preceded them. A still stranger phenomenon is that the further the metaphysician advances the more does his position approximate to that of "the plain man." The progress of metaphysics seems to lie not in the provision of answers to the questions asked, but in a series of wonderful discoveries that these particular questions ought never to have been put at all, for they were illogical questions containing an abuse of language which was itself the cause of all the subsequent difficulties. Probably the time will come when the metaphysician will gladly surrender all his "problems" and with a contrite heart will declare himself to be in complete spiritual accord with "the plain man."

Unless the metaphysician be reconciled with "the plain man" the artist cannot commune

with him, for the artist, like the scientist, believes implicitly in the existence of his material and in the reliability of the mental instrument which guides him in the manipulation of it. Where the metaphysical problems begin there both art and science come to an abrupt conclusion. Yet everybody must have a metaphysic. The only metaphysic, however, which is true and satisfying teaches a joyful acceptance of a great unanalysable reality, it is a simple affirmation and has no truck with problems.

There are many in whom a study of these elemental matters induces a morbid curiosity which can never be satisfied. The greater number of new riddles they can find to baffle them, the more profound they imagine themselves to be. There is something pathetic in their spiritual state, and in proclaiming the peculiar inadequacy of their minds they invite commiseration. The artist has good cause for quarrelling with these metaphysicians. His complaint against them is that they bring intellect into disrepute.

It may be a matter for surprise that anyone who professes to champion the mind could be hostile to metaphysics; at first sight this study seems to be an ideal occupation for an intellectualist, for in it he is called upon to deal with the most abstruse matters by the aid of reason alone. Unfortunately, however, he uses reason in an unnatural manner, depriving it of its proper sustenance, with the result that all his efforts come to naught. Some people are therefore led to suppose that intellectual activity is apt to be sterile, and so we have the rise of the so-called

practical man who scoffs at reason and who, on the occasion when he attains any influence, is a danger to the state to which he belongs. It is imperative for art that the claims of the intellect should be asserted, for successful practice is dependent upon true theory. Nevertheless there is a certain bond between the metaphysician and the artist inasmuch as they have common enemies. The artist will naturally look on with approval when the metaphysician deigns to expose the anti-intellectual fallacies of the psychologist or when he interrupts his studies to refute the crude ideas of those empirical scientists who do not know that to reason without experiment is more likely to lead to good results than to experiment without reason. But although experiment can never be a substitute for reason, reason is impotent unless it has as its subject the objective world. The metaphysician's attempt to transcend the objective world is the cause of his failure. His excuse is that he wishes to understand the nature of spirit itself, but in order to do this there is no need to transcend the objective world for, as has been said so many times in these pages, the spirit is enshrined in "The Things which are Seen."

Now we come to a second matter, and this is one to which æsthetic canons can be immediately applied. I refer to the quality of the language which metaphysicians affect. The nature of the problem they have set themselves causes them to employ a peculiar dialect which cannot fail to give displeasure to anyone possessed of even a rudimentary literary sense. Knowing what an

intimate correspondence there is between subject and form, we are entitled to ask if the sacred truth can really reside in such an ungainly habitation. Of course, there can be a great soul in a deformed body, but then the soul did not make its own body and is not completely represented by it; the ugliest man may through his creative genius produce much beauty. In the case of literature, however, the same agent who conceived the subject conceived the form also, so it is extremely unlikely that the style of an obscurantist could reveal clear and elevating thoughts. The metaphysician seems to be born with a propensity to abuse his native language. Somehow he would get beyond the material universe and view it from a new perspective, but unfortunately for him his ideas cannot even be hinted at without frequent resort to metaphors which are descriptive of the relationships obtaining in that universe and which are utterly meaningless when divorced from their original context.

The most important of the metaphysical problems is the problem of knowledge, and it can appropriately be discussed in these pages, because we shall find that it has a bearing upon the subject of art.

When dealing with this abstruse topic the metaphysician is entirely in his element. Surrendering all ambition to increase our mastery of any particular subject, he is able to put aside as quite irrelevant to the question at issue the positive achievements of the race in the realms of literature, science or statecraft. He does not try to discover a means of getting to know more

than we know already, but with the utmost seriousness he asks himself the question how it comes about that we are able to know anything at all. And indeed this is a mystery, for outside ourselves there are solid material things, but our brains contain only ideas of such things. What is the connection, then, between the idea and the thing? They differ totally in kind and yet in some strange manner the one is a representation of the other.

Various answers to the riddle have been propounded. One opinion is that space and time are but "forms of thought" and that there is a "thing in itself" outside both space and time which is the cause of our impressions. These "things in themselves," however, are inconceivable to us unless they have a spacial relationship with one another; we cannot get rid of the idea of space when we think of things. It has also been suggested that the objective world does not exist but that we have only ideas of it. He who believes in such a theory must consider himself to be the only reality, while all other people and things are but figments of his brain and he would be under the quaint delusion that upon his own decease the whole universe would be extinguished. But the reader may here interpolate "You sneer at these theories both of which are attempts to explain a great mystery. You, as a philosopher, must either solve or resolve the problem." The challenge must be accepted, and my answer is that the problem cannot be solved but it can be resolved, that is, it can be envisaged from a mental plane at which it ceases to cause

any discomfort. The average man might be inclined to say that about the relation of space to time and of object to idea of object there is an agreeable inevitability and that, mysterious though these things may be, it would be far more mysterious were they disposed otherwise. These elemental things he accepts; they are, as it were, the jumping-board from which he springs, and he is pleased with their stability and their unaccountability.

The metaphysician resembles a man who is possessed of a marvellous pair of pincers, very powerful and yet supremely delicate, with which he is enabled to clasp innumerable kinds of objects. There is only one thing, however, which the pair of pincers cannot clasp, and that is its own self. The metaphysician is so annoyed because he cannot employ the implement for this latter purpose that he loses interest in its normal use and devotes all his efforts to attempting the impossible. But the fact is that the inability of the prongs to grip themselves is a necessary condition to their being able to take hold of anything at all. Likewise it is the prerequisite of perception that in order that so many things should be intelligible there must remain something which is unintelligible, namely, the instrument of thought itself and the mysterious link which binds together object and idea. But if we cannot probe to the bottom of this matter by means of reason, that is not to say that there is any other faculty, instinct or intuition or faith, which is more competent to understand it. Intellect is the advanced guard, it is the light which pierces the gloom.

What intellect cannot accomplish here, instinct is most surely powerless to perform. The union of matter and mind cannot be explained either by intuition or by reason, but reason must lead us to the philosophic temper wherein we can rest satisfied with this ultimate reality. Mathematicians have familiarised us with a form of proof which is called the "reductio ad absurdum." No proof is more convincing than this. We accept a fact because we cannot conceive it to be otherwise. And we should regard the relationship of space to time, and of object to idea of object with an untroubled spirit, because no alternative to their present manner of disposition can possibly suggest itself to us.

The uncomfortable perplexity of metaphysicians in the presence of the problem of knowledge is occasioned by the very narrow conception of personality which is prevalent among them. As they concentrate their minds upon the subjective element of the person and call that the whole person they are at a loss to establish correlation between the person and the objective world. To those who have read the foregoing pages there will immediately occur an obvious way out of the difficulty, for it only remains to be affirmed that a man's personality resides in the objective world just as much as in the subjective.

In the exposition of this doctrine there is no need to use language in an abnormal manner. If a man has the vitality which is natural to him he can say to us "When you do a kindness to somebody else you are befriending me also, when you hurt somebody else you make me suffer too.

As for the city with all its appurtenances, over this I exercise a spiritual proprietorship, for the works of Man and the emblems of his civilisation are part of that common being in which I have a share. Nature, too, in her abundance of animal and vegetable life, and the sun and the moon and the stars, are indissolubly bound up with me.''

The things which an artist makes and the things in which he finds pleasure are but an extension of himself, and it is only because he is thus identified with what is outside him that he can never be content with mere sentiments or visions but is moved by a powerful impulse to produce some actual change in the material universe. Herein is the metaphysical foundation of the æsthetic ideal.

CHAPTER X.

The Personal and the Impersonal.

The preceding nine chapters, although they necessarily cover a wide field do not themselves suffice to give an accurate idea of the place of the artist in society. It may be remembered that in the essay which was introductory to the third part of this volume reference was made to a division of society into the learned and the unlearned, and I expressed the intention of discussing each of these types separately. The procedure which was there outlined may perhaps now be held to have been justified in so far as the first stage of it is concerned; for it is obvious that unless the artist takes account of the kinds of opponent with whom he may have to contend, and the attitudes of mind most likely to be at variance with his own, he is unable to define his relation to his neighbours.

In making a rough distinction between the learned and the unlearned, I am not seeking to disparage the latter. In fact, it is sufficiently plain that I am not here dealing with distant social classes, but am merely affirming the

existence of two sorts of audience—the particular and the general. Although the second may be held to include the first, inasmuch as it contains all the persons composing it, there is an obvious difference between the two, the difference in this instance being not one of degree but of kind. When the artist encounters the specialists he becomes aware of a variety of type, and he must take note of this variety, but as soon as he addresses himself to the public the individual characters of the members of his audience cease to obtrude themselves, and he imagines himself to be dealing with that elementary human nature which may for convenience be personified in "the average man."

The artist's attitude to "the average man" has already been partly determined in the discussion upon "The Hierarchy of the Arts," where it was shown that judgments which concern the subject of æsthetics must always be based upon a consideration of the welfare of society.

Wherein, then, does the personality of the artist consist? One half of his creative activity lies in the application of reason to the elements of Form while the other half lies in the application of this same reason to the elements of Subject. The law of form is not new because it is inherent in Nature, and the significance of the subject is social, that is, it is dependent upon the existence of a society in which the artist is but a very small unit. Moreover, the claim of the artist to the gift of originality seems to rest upon a still more slender foundation when we reflect that the rules of logic which govern all the operations of the

mind are not his peculiar property but are the common inheritance of the race. Is not the answer quite plain? Are we not compelled to affirm that the artist is of necessity severely impersonal?

Before giving a wholehearted acceptance to this doctrine, it may be well to define a little more clearly the meaning of the words " personality " and " impersonality." When we declare that a man has a personality of his own, we intend to pay him a compliment, or at any rate we credit him with a kind of distinction. On the other hand if somebody says to a friend " Your outlook on life is too personal " it is implied that there is an element in the person which is not worthy of our respect, namely the element of self-absorption which tends to prevent a man from forming unprejudiced opinions. Hence we have an apparent incongruity inasmuch as the possession of " personality " is considered a merit, while an inability to take any but " personal " views about human affairs is held to be the mark of a vulgar mind. But the paradox need not be the cause of any confusion if we firmly decline to depart from the terminology of popular speech. It is easy to be personal, but very difficult to be impersonal. The act of envisaging the self in its true perspective has been commended from time immemorial, for it implies an ability to understand the needs of society. A man who can truly perform this act will be conspicuous in his own immediate circle, he can attain eminence in the city, he may even be recognised as the spokesman of a whole people. So the self is not

in any way diminished or rendered insignificant through being merged in a larger spiritual entity. On the contrary, it immediately grows the more prominent. This fact is perhaps stated in the tersest form possible in the Chinese aphorism: "Put your person behind, and your person comes to the front." The double use of the same term does not obscure the meaning of the sentence, for it is recognised that the word "person" has both a complimentary and an uncomplimentary signification, the former being expressed in the word "personality" and the latter in the word "personal." It is quite reasonable, therefore, to conclude that a great personality is impersonal. But impersonality must not be confounded with the idea of self-abnegation nor yet with that of anonymity; for those who are able to achieve it in any large measure have as their reward not only a temporal aggrandisement but wide and lasting renown.

In the case of the artist it is obvious that the consistency which is the result of the attainment of a logical method cannot fail to make an impression on the public mind. He whose practice of his art is dominated by reason has the same sort of effectiveness as belongs to a man that wields a hammer and succeeds in hitting the same place every time. Without this consistency no series of actions of whatever kind can have that element of style which always marks the conduct of persons of distinction. It is necessary here to insist upon the difference between a mannerism and a method. The one is related to the other as travesty to truth. If an artist condescends to

mannerism he may indeed achieve a certain illusion of style, but in this instance the particular feature or quality that constitutes the label by which his work is recognised is peculiar to himself and is not born of an acknowledgment of what is great and permanent in humanity. Many artists attain a fleeting reputation by cleverly exploiting a mannerism, but they are invariably found out sooner or later and with contumely cast down from the pedestals they occupied. They fail in their mission because they are not sufficiently impersonal.

The stiffness of character which befits an artist is accompanied by geniality. Smilingly he carries his sword. That it is necessary for him to wield a weapon of offence will be well understood by all who are acquainted with the many schools of thought which tend to take little cognisance of the æsthetic ideal or are directly hostile to it. But, on the other hand, as his interests are inseparable from the interests of society as a whole, he is united to the average man in an intimate comradeship.

It would be misleading to say, however, that art is a social product. Such a view would be derogatory to the great individuals through whom alone society can find its true expression. The artist insists upon his title to intellectual independence. This is not a right arbitrarily claimed, but rather a duty which the nature of his task imposes upon him. No man of spirit would surrender his convictions to the mob. Now " mob " is an offensive term, so it is all the more incumbent upon us to use it with discrimination.

It may be defined as the sum of what is personal in a multitude of persons. But although the mob is sometimes very conspicuous, it is only the small-minded who maintain that humanity is nearly all comprised of mob. The artist feels no such contempt for his fellows; he has faith in humanity and loves it, for it is his chosen subject. Reason enables the artist to apprehend humanity and to render it articulate, and reason is also the means whereby the members of a crowd can eliminate from their souls that personal element which is so apt to make a crowd dangerous and inhuman. The mob is unintelligent and it stones the prophets. The mob, however, is not permanently in evidence, for it can only assert itself under certain peculiar conditions; hence it must on no account be identified with that organisation of men and women which is called "the commonwealth." But neither must democracy be identified with it. The democrat is not entitled to speak for humanity in general, for the democrat is not the average man, neither is the average man in all circumstances a democrat. Democracy is merely a political system which has been found to promote some of the purposes of government. The democratic principle should be introduced with moderation, for it is not fitted to pervade all the departments of human life. A democracy, if it is to be stable, must be accompanied by such subordinate autocracies as can be set up in the services of state, in industry and commerce, and in educational and disciplinary institutions. But as every privileged class is inclined to abuse its powers, it is generally

desirable that political sovereignty should be vested in the many, for this is a safeguard against the worst kinds of oppression. On the other hand, a despotic regime may be less injurious to the interests of the average man than is the establishment of a state of affairs where the *mob* is encouraged to assert itself. I now use the word in the sense in which it has just been defined. A populace goaded to frenzy by its rulers, even if its actions are violent, is not necessarily a mob. Tyrants like to apply this term of opprobrium to the humanity they have outraged, imagining that by such means they may cast discredit upon revolutionary movements. The point at which democracy becomes ignoble, however, is immediately reached when it is assumed that a multitude of small men has as much authority as a great man, that thousands of small ideas, if added together, have the same spiritual worth as a great idea. This is what the artist will never admit.

The intellectual faculty cannot justly be compared to a collective instrument which many people share between them. It is something self-contained within the soul of an individual. We ought, therefore, jealously to guard the prestige of great individuals, not on the ground that they have any quality which is personal to themselves, but because they are the mainspring of a special kind of reason. Theirs is the reason that is public, and it weighs more than the reasons of countless smaller men, the reasons that are private. This public reason is the determining factor in the creation of the true democracy and the true

aristocracy which in a well-regulated state must exist side by side. On the one hand it ensures that the people are guided by a consideration of the permanent interests of the commonwealth, and thus never degenerate into a mob; on the other hand it provides the sole justification of the honour and privileges which are or ought to be accorded to those individuals eminent above their fellows in whom the gift of being impersonal has been invested.

The upholders of some evil institution have good cause to be afraid if there is a general desire to submit it to the test of logic. Many of the bitterest opponents of popular rule, so far from being of a truly aristocratic temper, are the merest parvenus to whom an enlightened proletariat appears as a menace to their status and their possessions. The artist cannot be numbered among these false witnesses against democracy. He fears the populace least of all when it is animated by a critical spirit, for he knows that the æsthetic ideal is sustained by reason and the more the intellects of men are brought to bear upon it the more firmly will it be established. Even universal suffrage has no terrors for him, for in a democratic realm the equality of executive power which attaches to the votes of both the wise and the foolish does not symbolise an equality of value in the different opinions which may be expressed. The wise man has the advantage in that he is able by his gift of persuasion to determine the votes of others, and he has as much influence as if he possessed a multiple franchise. Majority government, however, will not justify

itself unless the habit of publicity be fostered, and it is obvious that the publicity of ideas can only lead to desirable results when such ideas concern the common good and are logically presented. Movements in art are just as dependent upon popular support as are political movements, hence the artist must take pains to avoid all mystery. He should speak frankly to his fellows and explain both the purpose of his work and its technique. If he is unable or unwilling to do this, he reveals himself to be a man of little consequence.

There is one other consideration which may affect our judgment upon the nature of personality. When discussing the problem of knowledge in the chapter entitled " The Artist and the Metaphysician " I made the assertion that all creatures are united in an identity of being. It is an easy thing to say this, but a supremely difficult thing to give practical effect to such a precept. If a man regards his neighbours as part of his own being, he is moved to sympathy with the fortunes of mankind, for mankind is his greater self.

A man's ability to perform this act of identification between himself and others is the measure of his personality. Three main degrees of worth may be observed. The lowest degree may be attributed to those whose activities are entirely personal and private, and who, even if they display great vigour, are something less than human. The second is attained by that large class of people who have sufficient sense of responsibility to concern themselves with public affairs, but who are unfortunately incompetent to arrive at any

just conclusions about them. These are the pushful reformers who make themselves a nuisance by trying to alter what they have not first understood. But they have their uses, for although they are busybodies and meddlers, the very persistence with which they pursue wrong courses leads to their own exposure and ultimately to the firmer establishment of the truths which they were most inclined to ignore.

The highest of the three standards is a subject of aspiration rather than a reality. It might be held to characterise the perfect artist, if such can be imagined. A person of that eminence would have a natural right both to create and to criticise. In his creation and in his criticism he would be stimulated by a sense of immeasurable guilt in that it was incumbent upon him to provide a cure for all social ills, nor could he rest while the consciousness of this great debt to humanity still weighed upon his soul. In fact, he would be nothing less than a Messiah. In saying, however, that such a man takes upon himself the sins of the world one is not subscribing to any doctrine of atonement. The Messiah is not offered up as a sacrifice to God for men. His guilt is greater than that of others because his responsibility is greater, and his responsibility is greater because he has more power to control the destinies of men than is possessed by those lesser spirits who do not understand the causes of human suffering and can do little to assuage the bitterness of their lot. And he willingly assumes this gigantic burden of sin. Both his pride and his remorse are without limit. He regards it as a personal insult that

there should be evil and ugliness in his presence and that the evil and ugliness should remain. Yet although he casts such an imperious glance upon the world and makes no secret of his desire to act as a preceptor to his neighbours, it is to himself that he addresses the sternest admonishment. In looking out upon mankind he takes strict notice of what is wrong and says he is to blame for it, and anguish would overcome his soul if he had reason to exclaim at the end of his days " I have lived and I have not changed it."

Are not all of us allowed to cherish the ambition to remodel the world? Nobody should hastily be denied such a right, as we cannot foresee the place from whence a Messiah may come. Yet we ought to ask of everyone that would alter our condition " Who are you that you should alter it? Are you perchance something that itself requires to be moulded rather than a force which can be employed to mould others? " For the assumption of responsibility is an act of aggression, and if a man of insignificant character tells us that he must take upon himself some social task and feels guilty of a dereliction of duty while the task is unfulfilled, he should be informed that he is not great enough to bear the burden of this guilt. Let him be content with a state of innocence. None but an outstanding personality is entitled to inscribe upon his banner the words MEA CULPA.

CONCLUSION.

As an account of the growth of this book may have some bearing upon its main theme, I may be pardoned if I here interpose a few remarks upon the method of its composition.

It may savour of presumption that the present writer has tried to cover so large a field. No defence is possible except what is suggested by a reflection upon the nature of reason itself. The human mind is so constituted that no one can set a boundary to its interests. However determined a man may be to inquire into one limited subject and that subject alone, step by step he is irresistibly driven to widen the area of his investigation. Life is like a cloth spread out before us. Ever so modestly we clutch at a little fold of it, but we find that we are tugging at the whole.

My original intention was to confine myself to an illustrated essay upon architectural form. It soon became apparent to me, however, that the principles which are applicable to the design of buildings find expression in the structure of other objects as well, and I was compelled to take into

my purview not only the creations of Man in all their diversity, but even the members of the animal and vegetable worlds. The visual arts were thus brought into connection both with one another and with Nature.

Two results followed from this. In the first place, being led through the formal analysis of these arts to conceive of them as a homogeneous group, I naturally sought to establish a link between their subjects, and I found that the relationship could best be indicated in a system of values such as was outlined in the chapters devoted to the development of an order of rank in which human beauty, manners, dress, architecture, painting and sculpture were given their proper place in the scale of social importance. Secondly, the Grammar of Design had so many philosophic implications that it seemed to me desirable to discuss at some length its bearings upon the problems of the mind. The theme was a vast one, and in order to reduce my treatment of it to manageable proportions in attempting a scrutiny into the soul of Man, I was content to do little more than lay special emphasis upon such aspects of his intellectual activity as might be of obvious concern to the artist.

The division of the subject of æsthetics which has been adopted here is not without the element of novelty, yet it may perhaps be claimed that no other kind of analysis could have led to such definite results. Anyone who is accustomed to make a study of æsthetic criticism must be aware that a state of great confusion prevails on

account of a lack of co-ordination of the various methods by which a work of art can be approached. If this confusion is to be ended, three injunctions must be laid upon the critic. He must estimate correctly the social value of the art to which the particular object of his attention belongs, as otherwise he is likely to lose his sense of perspective and become a dilettante for whom art is a private hobby rather than the means of providing for a public need. Next he must separate in his mind the elements of Form and Subject in order that he may hold the balance justly between the intention and the execution, nor in any instance attribute to the one the faults or virtues which belong to the other; for there are things done badly which yet require to be done, and there are things done very skilfully which ought not to have been done at all. Lastly, when seeking to appraise the character of the artist he must bear in mind that the possession of an idiosyncrasy is not a mark of eminence, as the greatest of artists are the most impersonal, that is to say they deal with topics of universal interest, and in their treatment of such topics it is no individual spirit but the spirit of humanity that finds expression.

In this book, as its title suggests, I have discussed the visual arts. The relation of these to literature has already been touched upon in the closing chapter of Part I., where there was a general review of the hierarchy in which they were comprised. Since literature has as its subject-matter the life that dwells among "The Things which are Seen," its status is rather like

that of a dependent; before men can create literature they must labour to understand the significance of "The Things which are Seen" and of the arts most closely related to them. Literature is of very high consequence nevertheless, and cannot be ignored even by people engaged in occupations that seem to be far removed from it. A philosophy of æsthetics may be the means of emphasising the supreme importance of the visual arts, yet it requires the use of the literary medium for its proper presentation. That it is possible, however, unduly to exalt the claims of literature will be admitted by everybody, for there is a special name for those who are guilty of making such a false estimate. They are called bookish, and although they profess an extravagant regard for literature they are not the best exponents of it. The sincerest and most practical way for a man to show his reverence for this great art is to see to it that no matter what may be the nature of the thought he wishes to convey, he does not carelessly employ the written word.

I may now make a brief comment upon the style of language which I have permitted myself in these pages. From the beginning of the book to the end my manner of expression has been dogmatic. I have tried to present the reader with the finished thought rather than with the process of thinking it. There is no need for me to make a long excuse for having acted thus. The publication of a definite judgment upon a matter of general concern may appear to be an act of self-assertion; but of two men which is the more

obtrusive, the one who prefers to be silent until such time as he be capable of precise utterance, or the one who deems the operations of his mind to be of such great import that even his doubts and waverings, even his most tentative suggestions and vaguest prognostications, must at once be communicated to all the world? The answer is obvious. The former shows a respect for social convention, for he is the kind of man who, when he leaves his home to go into the presence of strangers, likes to make sure that the clothes he wears are in a clean and orderly state, even though their quality may not be of the best; the latter is a spiritual slattern and may be compared with an ill-bred person who would stride forth into the market-place and there proceed leisurely to attend to his toilet as if the company around him were of no account at all. In thought, as in some other activities and conditions, there must be a certain completeness before a venture into publicity can be justified.

The completeness of a thought is measured by two standards—by the degree of its definition and by its truth. A man who tries to make positive statements is already half-way on the journey to truth; he is operating in a clear light and if he says what is wrong he will probably see the wisdom of taking back his words, for as his judgment is expressed without equivocation, its impropriety will be all the more flagrant. Thus a leaning towards dogma is to be commended, for the error which is most likely to be refuted is dogmatic error, and the truth which is most likely to command assent is not what speaks

timidly, as if it ought not to show itself, but it is truth fully aware of its power and couched in the language of certainty, that is, dogmatic truth.

The basis of this dogmatic truth is reason, for if a doctrine goes contrary to reason, its pretensions to certainty will be the subject of ridicule. It may be thought that I owe an apology to the reader for having been led so many times to insist upon the claims of intellect. Yet the intellectual faculty is continually disparaged by a large body of critics, so it was necessary to point out with the utmost emphasis how essential is this faculty to the proper cultivation of the arts.

What are these supposed disabilities of the intellect? Is intellect hide-bound, stultified by its own rules, impatient of exceptions, a leveller? This is a foolish slander. Intellect is masterful, it loves to establish order, but it does away with uniformity where uniformity is associated with dulness; for dulness can only be the result of stupidity, which is the exact opposite of intellect. Is intellect coarse-grained and therefore incapable of apprehending the most delicate matters of the spirit? This is another misrepresentation. Although intellect is bold and witty and can be highly irreverent where reverence is out of place, yet it is reverent where reverence is seemly. If a man is quite blind to things of the deepest significance or mistakes them for a sham we are surely justified in accusing him of a deficiency in brains. Is intellect but a sort of superior cunning that has no part nor lot

in noble motives? Such an accusation can easily be refuted. Of course, there are people who are clever but not kind, but if we analyse their characters it becomes evident that their cleverness is displayed in some activity which is not directly concerned with their social relations. A man may be good at chemistry or mathematics, yet in his dealings with his fellows be a rogue. If some of the logic he makes use of in his scientific studies, however, were applied to the determination of his general conduct, he would soon become incapable of small-minded acts. As nothing but a profound understanding of our neighbours will enable us to show true sympathy with them, intellect is revealed to us as the source of charity. And what of the doctrine that intellect has little to do with either the creation or the appreciation of beauty? History denies it. The arts have best flourished in periods when the reason was most active, and every artistic renascence has been heralded by an intellectual renascence. Those who would try to bring about an estrangement between intellect and beauty do an ill service to the arts. If intellect is arraigned and made to suffer injury, then beauty will languish too, for intellect and beauty walk hand in hand.

The nature of the interdependence of mind and body can be indicated in a single sentence. Unless a man have faith in the intellectual instrument and is determined to use it with vigour, unless he be moved by an impulse of curiosity to extend the bounds of reason to the furthest possible field, then he is lacking in a

certain kind of animal spirit; a faculty has become atrophied as if his brain were ill supplied with blood—this is *a weakness of the body:* but on the other hand, if a man does not cleave to "The Things which are Seen," if he does not test every thought and action by its effect upon the material world, animate and inanimate, if, above all, he does not guard and reverence the human form as the chief of all the symbols of vitality, then he has failed to recognise what is supremely important and real and he shows *a weakness of the mind.* We should be intellectualists by instinct and artists by conviction.

If our lives are to be crowned with achievement it is incumbent upon us to attend to what is both the first and the last message of intellect, namely, that we should not allow our energies to stray into barren fields, but that we should concern ourselves with what is necessary or possible. Imagination which is altogether devoid of logic, which teaches us nothing either about life as it is or about life as it might become, is of no profit to us. True imagination, even if it be expressed in terms of allegory or the most fantastic fable, has always just enough of the rational element to give it point and relevancy; it illumines the reality of which we already have experience by contrasting it with a fictitious state wherein sundry features of that reality are brought into artificial prominence, but it is by no means its function to supply the weary or faint-hearted with a refuge from distasteful fact. That part of reality which is eternally necessary we must accept without complaint; nay more, we should rejoice therein

as in something final and good and harmonious with ourselves; the remaining part, which is subject to change, may indeed urgently require to be changed by us, and provided that we have an understanding of what is possible and desirable we can put a better reality in its stead and thus become creators.

"The Things which are Seen" are patent, and to a shallow mind they appear to be but surface; yet the surface is a symbol and the symbol is profound. As they represent what is ultimate and essential, in such lie the past, the present and the future. If we stand aloof from them we deny ourselves access to the Spirit, for among "The Things which are Seen" the Spirit has its home.

THE END.

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